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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The history of Franco-American relations from 1828 to 
1860 presents an intriguing paradox to the student of 
international affairs. Only one issue during that period 
led to formal negotiations between French and American 
diplomats: the question of an indemnity for American
spoliation claims resulting from French efforts to deprive 
Great Britain of the benefits of neutral trade during the 
Napoleonic Wars. But that dispute was minor, and in spite 
of Andrew Jackson'-s belligerency a settlement was reached 
in 1836. An issue of far greater importance to Franco- 
American relations existed beneath the surface of inter­
national affairs during the eighteen-thirties, and steadily 
developed until reaching a climax in the episode involving 
Maximilian and Carlotta during the eighteen-sixties. That 
issue centered around the connection between the Monroe 
Doctrine and American expansionism. As Americans began to 
view the west coast of North America and the Rio Grande 
as within the destiny of the United States, the government 
of Louis Philippe determined that the expansion of Amer­
ican republicanism was inimical to the interests of France 
in the New World. But at the same time, the ardent 
expansionists of the forties and the "Manifest Destiny"
1
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advocates of the fifties were adamant that the United States 
could not allow a monarchial nation to prevent American 
dominance of the New World. Although Great Britain was 
the only nation capable of effectively challenging 
American power in the Western Hemisphere, France, in the 
view of many Americans, typified the contrast between the 
principles of the Old World and those of the New. Through 
historiographical analysis, this writer shall endeavor to 
shed some light upon Franco-American relations from the 
administration of Jackson to the eve of the American Civil 
War. From the outset, it will be apparent that French 
policy in the New World, as well as American attitudes 
towards France, were governed more by ideological consid­
erations than by economic and strategic guidelines. In 
order to better understand this theme, it will be necessary 
to discuss its relation to the organization of this thesis.
The second chapter deals solely with the influence of 
various ideological precepts upon Franco-American relations. 
True, this topic will reappear throughout this work, for 
what the policy-makers of France and the United States 
viewed as the national interest was intimately related to 
ideological predilections. But a nation's commitment to 
a certain set of ideological principles is subject to 
change. Because France between 1828 and 1860 offers 
three examples of such a change--the revolution of 1830 
and 1848, and the coup d 1etat of Louis Napoleon--the
primary purpose of this chapter will be to review the 
historiographical interpretations of the impact of these 
ideological transitions upon Franco-American relations.
The subject of the third chapter is the dispute 
between France and the United States that developed when 
Jackson set out to settle the long-standing question of 
the American spoliation claims. Because of the nature of 
Jackson’s presidency, this writer will be concerned most 
with the effect of "Old Hickory’s" diplomacy upon American 
opinion of France,
The next three chapters center around the one develop­
ment that most hindered Franco-American amity prior to the 
Civil War--American expansionism. Of these, the fourth 
chapter is the most vital to the thesis. For it is in that 
chapter that the historiography of Franco-American relations 
with respect to American continental expansion is discussed. 
With the annexation of Texas, and the acquisition of 
California, Oregon, and the great Southwest by the United 
States, it became clear that the interests of France in 
the New World, as expressed by the government of Louis 
Philippe, clashed with the doctrine of American expansionism, 
as expressed so clearly by President James K. Polk. Accord­
ing to Albert K. Weinberg, this clash signified more than a 
competition for economic and strategic advantage. French 
attempts to establish sovereignty or political influence 
in adjacent countries seemed to many Americans to threaten
the very security of democracy. As he writes:
The expansionism of the ’forties arose as a 
defensive effort to forestall the encroachment 
of Europe in North America. So too, as one can 
see in the most numerous utterances, the con­
ception of an "extension of the area of freedom" 
became general as an ideal of preventing 
absolutistic Europe from lessening the area 
open to American democracy; extension of the 
area of "freedom" was the defiant answer to 
extension of the area of "absolutism."1
Weinberg has defined a basic issue in the historiography of 
Franco-American relations during the era of American con­
tinental expansion. Can the historian rely upon the 
accusations of French designs in the New World to evaluate 
Franco-American relations? In short, how accurate were 
the authors of those "numerous utterances" when they credited 
the government of Louis Napoleon with pursuing a policy 
inimical to the natural rights of the United States?
During the eighteen-fifties, French and American 
interests collided over the issues of the annexation of 
Hawaii and Cuba by the United States. In neither case did 
the annexation movement reach fruition. Hence the primary 
concern for historians is not whether accusations of French 
perfidy by advocates of the "Manifest Destiny" doctrine are 
to be believed, but whether French protests against the 
annexation of Cuba and Hawaii had any impact upon American 
policy-makers. These questions will be the topics of the 
fifth and sixth chapters.
1 Alb err K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study of 
Nationalist Expansionism in ArnerTcan History (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), p . T09.
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Civil War between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, 
as well as the question of a Central American canal route, 
presented further difficulties to French and American 
statesmen during the fifties. In Santo Domingo, Washing­
ton both competed with France for territorial concessions 
and cooperated with Paris and London in a joint effort at 
mediation. But never did the United States accuse either 
France or Britain of violating the Monroe Doctrine. The 
contrast between Cuba and Santo Domingo is obvious, and it 
presents an important issue to historians of Franco-American 
diplomatic relations. Although Napoleon III avoided 
involvement in the matter of a canal route, his attitudes 
toward the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and its aftermath displayed 
a definite policy towards the United States. Both Santo 
Domingo and the canal question will be the concern of the 
seventh chapter.
Throughout the period from 1828 to 1860, France often 
expressed her opposition to unlimited American expansion.
The extension of American democracy especially offended 
the sensibilities of Louis Philippe and Napoleon III, but 
it was not until 1861 that France directly challenged the 
authority and predominance of the United States in the 
Western Hemisphere. Although the episode of Maximilian 
and Carlotta is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is 
clear that the roots of Napoleon's ill-considered venture 
are to be found in the evolution of Franco-American
-6-
relations from 1828 to 1860. A notable historian has 
attempted to define this evolution within the framework 
of the Monroe Doctrine, According to Dexter Perkins, 
the real meaning of Monroe's principles is to be found 
in the nineteenth-century struggle between democracy and 
older governmental forms. "The intervention of the 
French in Mexico," he writes, "is an episode of the first 
significance in the clash between the system of the Old 
World and the system of the New." Perkins regards the 
intervention in Mexico as inevitable--sooner or later, 
circumstances would permit the Monroe Doctrine to be 
challenged.2 It is the purpose of this writer, then, 
to determine whether Perkins's interpretation can be 
used to explain Franco-American relations from 1828 to 
1860.
2Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine 
(2nd ed.: Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1955), pp. 108- 
109.
CHAPTER II
AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM AND THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTIONS OF 1830 AND 1848
Three years after President James K. Polk had accused 
French Premier Francois Guizot of advocating the applica­
tion of the reactionary Old World principle of a balance 
of power to the New World, the July Monarchy fell. Soon 
after the success of the February revolution became known 
in the United States, Congress began debate on a congratula­
tory resolution. Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, a 
Democrat, urged his colleagues to approve the measure as 
an expression of international republicanism.• He suggested 
that the United States should congratulate the French people 
for the liberty they had recently acquired, and for the 
democratic principles they had established as the founda­
tion of their new government. "We believe," Cass continued, 
"that our congratulations at this time will not only be 
acceptable to them, but useful to the great cause of 
freedom throughout the world." In response to skeptics 
who doubted the ability of the provisional government to 
establish a stable republic, Cass maintained that the 
United States must not ignore the bonds that united all 
those who resist oppression. The French people, he 
asserted,
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have overturned the late Government and estab­
lished one of their own, and with a spirit of 
wisdom and moderation which, under all the 
circumstances, has been rarely equalled in the 
World, The act of the Provisional Government-- 
the temporary Fourth of July declaration, I 
may call it--of the French people lays down 
many of the just principles of human freedom, 
which will find a responsive echo in this 
country.1
Cass was not mistaken when he claimed that the American 
people would react enthusiastically to the events in 
France. Most Americans, confident of their nation’s 
reputation as the foremost example of the virtues of 
representative democracy--the sanctuary of liberty in an 
oppressed world--believed that the French revolutionaries 
had been inspired by the accomplishments of their republic 
and would try to emulate it.
But the Second Republic did not survive. Only three 
years after the February revolution, France had again 
become an empire. This hasty transition from constitu­
tional monarchy to republic to empire points out a central 
problem in Franco-American relations between 1828 and 1860. 
During all but three of those years, France was governed 
by a centralized leadership opposed to democratic reforms.
l-U.S. Congress, Senate, "Remarks by Cass on the Revolu 
tion in France," April 6, 1848, Congressional Globe, 30th 
Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix, p. 465.
2John Gerow Gazley, American Opinion of German Unifica 
tion, 1848-1871, Studies in History, Economics^ and Rublie 
Law, Vol. CXXI (New York: Columbia University Press, 1926).
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Only during the brief interludes of the revolutions of 1830 
and 1848 could Americans see a bond between their fundamental 
ideological precepts and those currently being professed by 
the French government. For most of period under discussion, 
then, there existed as ideological gap between the pre­
dominantly autocratic governments of France and the buoyant 
republicanism of the United States. As a result, the early 
days of the July Monarchy and the short life of the Second 
Republic are especially significant to the historian. The 
primary purpose of this chapter will be to examine the his­
toriography of Franco'•American relations at the times when 
the ideological differences between the two countries seemed 
to lessen. And because the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 
failed to establish a permanent republic, it will also be 
necessary to determine what effect the defeat of French 
liberalism had upon American opinion of France.
Although this writer will be most concerned with 
American opinion of the July Monarchy and the Second Empire 
and how this was related to the failure of the 1830 and 
1848 attempts at republicanism, he will also attempt to 
characterize briefly the sentiments of Louis Philippe and 
Napoleon III with respect to the United States. Unfortunately, 
there are only two authors who attempt a general review of 
the relation of ideology to French attitudes toward the 
United States. Hence, it is the intention of this writer 
to provide a background to French foreign policy that will
•  10 *
be useful in the succeeding chapters.
Historians are in general agreement regarding the 
initial American reaction to the February revolution.
The numerous professions of American sympathy for that 
event attracted the attentions of four early historians 
and, for the most part, their descriptions of the public 
response within the United States towards the establish­
ment of the Second Republic have stood intact. Explaining 
the enthusiastic welcome given the Hungarian patriot,
Louis Kossuth, when he arrived in the United States in 
1852, all four historians point to the French revolution 
of 1848 and its impact upon American opinion. James Ford 
Rhodes offers a typical explanation of Kossuth's popularity. 
The splendid testimonial given Kossuth, Rhodes writes,
"was not so much to the man as to the principle of which 
he was the incarnation." Rhodes notes that the various 
revolutions that swept Europe during 1848 had been followed 
with deep interest in the United States--American newspapers 
had been replete with accounts of the downfall of the hated 
monarchies. As a result, he continues, Americans
. . .of this time had correct knowledge of contem­
porary events in Europe. These revolutionary move­
ments seemed to them due to American example; the 
contemplation of the free, united, and happy 
country created a yearning, they thought, for the 
like, and this yearning stirred up the people on 
the European continent to rebel against the tyrants. 
Never had there been a more unquestioned faith in 
our institutions, a greater desire to propagate 
the principles underlying them, or a more sublime
- 11 *
confidence in their virtue.^
According to Rhodes, who is representative of his contem­
poraries, Americans embraced the cause of the February 
revolution not only because they too detested monarchy, 
but also out of pride. They saw in the uprisings against 
oppression a fervent desire to imitate American institu­
tions. It should be noted that although Rhodes presents 
sufficient evidence to establish that Americans did assume 
that the revolutionaries of 1848 sought to utilize the 
United States as a model for their new governments, he 
neglects to demonstrate that this assumption was accurate.
By means of an impressive statistical analysis of the 
French Assembly of 1848, Eugene N. Curtis demonstrates that 
the American example did not provide a model for the new 
French constitution. To be sure, Curtis notes, Minister 
Richard Rush's early recognition of the new government made 
a favorable impression on the French rebels. Polk's 
official expression of sympathy, as well as offers of 
assistance from Congress, further enhanced the United States
^James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States From 
the Compromise of 1850. Vol. I (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1893), p. 233. Rhodes's contemporaries who also noted the 
keen American response to the February revolution were H. Von 
Holst, The Constitutional and Political History of the United 
States. Vol. IV (Chicago: Callaghan, 1885), p. 65; James 
Schouler, History of the United States of America Under the 
Constitution. Vol. V: Free Soil Controversy. 1847-1861 (New 
York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1891), pp. 226-234; John Bach 
McMaster, History of the People of the United States. Vol.
VIII (New York: Appleton and Co., 1913), pp. 143-157.
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in the eyes of the French,^ But contrary to the beliefs 
of the enthusiastic Americans, Curtis asserts that the 
United States presented an imperfect example of democratic 
government to French republicans, radical democrats, and 
socialists--the most crucial elements within the 1848 
assembly.
It is significant, Curtis states, that only the deposed 
Orleanists endorsed the American example wholeheartedly. 
Because they were equally hostile to an absolute king and 
absolute democracy, ”they sought support for their pluto­
cratic interests in an upper chamber, of non-hereditary 
character. Their strength lay in the upper middle-class, 
the great financial interests which had dominated the late 
regime; they had prospered by economic individualism and 
were willing to show enthusiasm for any political system 
that would protect and leave them alone.”5 The Orleanists, 
Curtis continues, received support from French liberals, 
the best example being Alexis de Tocqueville. In his 
Democratie en Amerique, Tocqueville had expressed his 
admiration for the American system of checks and balances, 
local self-government, the independent authority of the 
judiciary, and the federal scheme in general--all the more
^Eugene N. Curtis, The French Assembly of 1848 and 
American Constitutional Doctrine. Columbia University 
Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. LXXIX 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1918), pp. 75-96.
5Ibid., pp. 329-330.
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conservative and orderly aspects of American society. In 
the preface to an 1848 edition of his famous work, Toc­
queville reaffirmed his adherence to a "'tranquil republic*'" 
In essence, the liberals, although desirous of reform, 
abhorred revolution and sought orderly legal political 
change.^ But the admiration expressed by the Orleanists 
and the liberals for the American example failed to guide 
the French Assembly in its search for a new constitution. 
According to Curtis, this was primarily due to the contrast 
between the ideals and realities of American life.
Although the Assembly expressed nearly unanimous 
admiration for the American ideal, French attitudes towards 
the American example were at first ambivalent, and as the 
revolution progressed toward the fateful June Days, became 
increasingly hostile. The American ideal, epitomized in 
the French mind by George Washington, received broad approval 
and adulation. Nearly all Frenchmen, Curtis maintains, had 
a deep respect for the accomplishments of the early repub-
nlie. But when viewed as a model for France, the American 
political system as it had evolved by 1848 seemed to many, 
especially the more radical, to be far from the ideal.
^Ibid.. pp. 9 7-99. A good recent description of French 
liberalism during the July Monarchy and the Revolution of 
1848 is found in George Fasel's Europe in Upheaval: The 
Revolutions of 1848 (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1970)
pp. 20-26.
^Curtis, The French Assembly, p. 106.
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Critics of the United States pointed to the Mexican War 
and to the presidential election of 1848 as examples of 
the pervasiveness of American militarism. Slavery and
Qmaterialism were also assailed. As the influence of 
the French left in the Assembly increased, the persuasive­
ness of the American example declined.® Americans began 
to become aware of this when the provisional government 
established its experimental workshops. It became obvious 
during the socialist upheaval of June.
In a later article, Curtis maintains that most Amer­
icans responded with praise not only to the February 
revolution, but to the Revolution of 1830 as well.
Although there were reservations, primarily from experienced 
statesmen overwhelmingly voiced approval of the downfalls 
of Charles X and Louis Philippe. He adds, however, that in 
both instances this initial euphoria soon disappeared.
Five years after the establishment of the constitutional 
monarchy of Louis Philippe, the United States and France 
seemed on the verge of war over the claims controversy.
It had become apparent to most Americans that Orleanist 
France, in spite of its republican format, differed greatly 
from the revolutionary promise of 1830 . It took even less
^Ibid., pp. 110-114, Both Lewis Cass, the Democratic 
nominee, and Zachary Taylor, the Whig, were former generals.
9Ibid., pp. 326-328.
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time for Americans to become disillusioned with the Second 
Republic. The tendency of the new government toward 
socialistic experiment affronted American sensibilities.
And when later the revolutionary assembly abolished slavery 
in French colonies, the tone of American criticism became 
more embittered, Curtis concludes. Nevertheless, the 
Second Republic soon cast off its socialist associations 
and settled down to a bourgeois conservatism, quieting 
somewhat its American critics; Only with the coup d 1etat 
of Louis Napoleon did Americans, according to Curtis, 
finally resign themselves to the failure of French liberalism. 
The replacement of the imperfect but tolerable Second Repub­
lic by an empire seemed needless to Americans and ran 
counter to their traditional sympathy for the republican 
form of government.^
Curtis’s article is important in that he suggests the 
general nature of American opinion toward the transitory 
French political scene. His dependence upon a few of the 
more articulate expressions of American opinion, such as 
the correspondence of intellectuals, official statements, 
and prominent newspapers, can be excused since he has 
confined himself to a brief article. A more complete 
review of the broad spectrum of American opinion is found
lOCurtis, "American Opinion of the French Nineteenth 
Century Revolutions," American Historical Review, XXIX 
(January, 1921), pp. 254-255^.
- 1 6 -
in John Gerow Gazley's study of the American attitude 
toward the unification of Germany, Impressed by the 
lack of American sympathy for France in 1871, Gazley 
devotes a long chapter to American opinion of France 
from 1848 to 18 71.
Gazley agrees with Curtis that the abolition of 
slavery and the socialistic tendencies of the Second 
Republic were somewhat offset by the restoration of order 
in the summer of 1848, "Many Americans believed that the 
republic had been greatly strengthened by the defeat of 
the rebels," Gazley writes, "and that henceforth its 
chances for success were vastly improved,"H But unlike 
Curtis, Gazley maintains that on the eve of Napoleon's 
coup, widespread skepticism toward the Second Republic 
had developed in the United States. By then, Americans 
had come to believe that the revolution was the "work of 
idealists, socialists, and radicals, whose impracticable 
ideas very naturally culminated in the bloody June 
uprisings in Paris." Hence, Gazley writes, "it came to 
be. thought that the French people were unfit for republican 
institutions." The election of Louis Napoleon to the 
presidency further demonstrated the incapacity of the 
French people for self-government. Following an extensive 
review of newspapers and a variety of personal memoirs,
-^Gazley, American Opinion of German Unification, pp. 
244-247.
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Gazley* asserts that Napoleon*s "character, his policies
as president, and the people who had elected him were all
held in contempt if not hatred by* the American people."
Still, thoughtful Americans could not ignore the fact
that Napoleon had been overwhelmingly elected by the
French people, Because of this, Gazley concludes, until
the coup d'etat the general American attitude towards
Napoleon was ambivalent.̂
According to Gazley, the American reaction to the
coup d'etat of December 2, 1851, was characterized by
bitter disappointment. He writes:
It is true that many Americans were very much 
disillusioned about the ability of the French 
people to establish really republican institu­
tions on the American model, but it is also true 
that the violent overthrow of the Second 
Republic, unpopular as it had become in the 
United States, was received by most Americans 
with an outburst of indignation.
To be sure, Gazley notes, a few Americans believed that the 
French people had received a just reward. Some also ex­
pressed a grudging admiration for Napoleon's boldness and 
initiative. Still, he writes, "the feeling in the United 
States was none the less bitter against the author of the 
coup d'etat."13 Not surprisingly, there was much opposition 
against American recognition of the new government. The
12Ibid., pp. 243-244, 251-255. 
•^Ibid.t pp. 257-260.
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American minister at Paris, William Cabell Rives, reported 
the coup to his Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, adding 
that the United States might express her dissatisfaction 
by refusing recognition. Gazley quotes Webster as reply­
ing: " ’You sympathize, in this respect, with the great 
body of your countrymen , , .if the French people have 
now, substantially, made another change, we have no choice 
but to acknowledge that also,’" ^
But although Americans generally condemned Louis 
Napoleon and his.coup d ’etat, Gazley believes that until 
the Maximilian affair certain considerations mitigated 
their animosity. There was a growing admiration, he 
claims, of Napoleon's great intellectual and administra­
tive abilities. "Perhaps it might be fair to say,” Gazley 
writes, "that before 1862 most Americans hated and yet 
respected Napoleon III," Furthermore, in spite of the 
fact that the great majority of Americans judged the Second 
Empire to be autocratic, Gazley adds that the regime "was 
based on the vote of the French people, a vote so overwhelm­
ing that it could not have been effected by any amount of 
intimidation or bribery." Consequently, there existed a 
considerable minority of intelligent Americans who believed
that the essence of Louis Napoleon’s government was indeed 
1 ̂democratic.
l4lbid., p. 262. 
ISibid., pp. 271-278.
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It should be evident that any attempt to analyze 
American public opinion with the hope of reaching some 
generalizations is unavoidably plagued by the great 
diversity of popular spokesmen. Gazley manages to make 
some generalizations regarding American attitudes toward 
the Second Republic and Napoleon H I ,  but they are qual­
ified by the inclusion of opposing views. Thus, we are 
told that Americans both admired and condemned Napoleon III, 
that various newspapers and individuals at once viewed the 
Second Empire as autocratic and democratic. This, of 
course, reflects Gazley*s extensive researches. But because 
he strives to present the broad spectrum of American opinion 
of France accurately, Gazley leaves us in some doubt regard­
ing the impact of these attitudes upon Franco-American 
relations. Elizabeth Brett White makes a conscious effort 
to avoid such ambiguity. Using similar evidence, she 
attempts to clarify the ultimate effect of American opinion 
of both the revolution of 1830 and the reign of Louis 
Napoleon upon United States relations with France.
White agrees with Curtis that the relations of the 
United States with the new government of Louis Philippe 
opened most auspiciously. Americans, she states, saw much 
to applaud in the Orleans monarchy. In the first place, 
it was headed by a man whose temperament and prior exper­
ience- -Philippe, during an earlier visit to the United 
States had expressed his admiration for the American system
1. 20 '*
of government--indicated a loyalty to democratic ideals.
Also, the new government had been sponsored by the 
Marquis de Lafayette, whom Americans claimed as one of 
their own national heroes. Hence, White concludes, "France 
was deemed to have advanced materially toward the status 
of a self-governing state," But in spite of this ideolog­
ically inspired congeniality, relations between France and 
the United States soon soured. Like Curtis, White credits 
French intransigence over the claims controversy as the 
primary reason. As the Paris government continued to 
debate whether to honor the legitimate American claims 
for indemnity, it became evident, White asserts, "that the 
Revolution of 1830, if it had brought into being a con­
stitutional state, had not created a harmonious one."^-^
White concludes that this early American prejudice against 
the reign of Louis Philippe remained a problem in Franco- 
American relations until the Revolution of 1848.-^
In White’s view, the failure of the Second Republic 
reaffirmed the popular view that the French were not suited 
to democratic principles. She agrees with Gazley that the 
coup d’etat of Louis Napoleon provoked condemnation from the 
American press; but unlike Gazley, White avoids entanglement 
in the confusing aspects of American opinion of Napoleon III.
-16Eiizabeth Brett White, American Opinion, of France 
From Lafayette to Poincare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, T927), 
pp. 93-94.
17Ibid., p. 119.
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Instead, she emphasizes the impact of American disillusion­
ment over the defeat of French republicanism upon Franco- 
American relations. She writes:
With such an impression of the French nature 
prevalent, it was perhaps not to be expected 
that the Americans should show any marked 
friendliness toward their "ancient ally" in 
political affairs. Nor, on the other hand, 
since the character and the government of the 
French were obviously their own affair, was 
there any cause for active antagonism, unless 
in a specific instance the welfare of the United 
States should be threatened.18
During the fifties, then, Americans resigned themselves to 
the failure of French liberalism; not until Napoleon’s 
Mexican adventure did they openly condemn the emperor.
The works of Gazley and White, when used to supplement 
Curtis's brief article, make for a coherent and well- 
documented study of the American attitude toward the 
traumas of French politics. Their influence over subse­
quent students has been potent, Writing on James Buchanan’s 
term as Polk’s Secretary of State, St. George Leakin Sioussat, 
for example, is content merely to list a few of the more 
obvious factors which stirred the enthusiasm with which 
Americans greeted the February revolution. Certainly the 
comparative bloodlessness of the revolution contributed to 
American sympathy for the French rebels. Americans also 
remembered the alliance with France during their own revolu­
tion. But of greater importance, Sioussat writes, was the
18Ibid., pp. 271-278.
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pleasure of witnessing the fall of the double-dealing 
ministry of Louis Philippe, "and the substitution thereof 
of a republic which, it was hoped, would be like our own." 
Sioussat further agrees with Gazley and White, as well as 
Curtis, that this initial enthusiasm was soon dampened 
by the appearance of socialistic experiment and the 
abolition of slavery in the French colonies.^
In a lucid and provocative article, Merle Curti 
suggests that much of the sympathy within America for the 
revolutions of 1848 arose from a national myopia--a proud 
and artificial belief in the justice of the American 
political system. Troubled by the nagging social enigma 
of institutionalized slavery, Americans misinterpreted 
the revolutions of 1848 as a reaffirmation of their funda­
mental political ideology. Curti writes:
Pride in the apparent imitation of American repub­
lican institutions further explained the enthus­
iasm in every part of the land. Republicanism 
was commonly believed to be not only a necessary 
ingredient of American civilization, but of civil­
ization itself. It was easy to overlook the rela­
tion between prosperity and virgin resources and 
to attribute the national success to political in­
stitutions alone, With a marked self-consciousness 
and faith in republican ideas, destined it was felt 
to become universal, what was more natural than for 
Americans to sympathize with peoples trying to break 
the chains of despots and set up republics on the 
American model?^9
19St. Ge orge Leakin Sioussat, "James Buchanan," in The 
American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. by 
Samuel F. Bemis, V o l . T  (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928) , 
pp. 300-301.
29Merle Curti, "The Impact of the Revolutions of 1848
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A1though Curti*s article is well documented, it would be 
extremely difficult to substantiate the above. But his 
idea is none the less valuable, for it explains why 
Americans misunderstood the full meaning of the February 
revolution. Only a few intellectuals detected the economic 
and social forces that would soon come to the fore. Be­
cause most Americans, as Curti writes, ’’looked on the 
upheavals as moral struggles for abstract political rights"-- 
the same political rights which had been secured in the
United States--disillusionment over the failure of the
21Second Republic was widespread. In effect, Curti's 
thoughtful essay does much to reaffirm what Gazley and 
White have written about the popular American belief that 
Frenchmen were not capable of republican government.
Curtis and Gazley suggest that although Americans 
became disillusioned with French liberalism after the June 
Days and the election of Louis Napoleon, American opinion 
of the new president was ambivalent. One reason for this 
may have been Napoleon's sudden decision to settle the 
Poussin affair. Writing on John Middleton Clayton's 
career as Secretary of State, Mary W. Williams stresses 
the significance of this relatively minor incident to the
on American Thought," Proceedings of the American Philoso­
phical Society, Vol. XCIll, Klo. 3 lJune, 1949) , p. 210.
21Ibid., pp. 210-211.
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relations of tire United States with the ministry of Louis 
Napoleon.
The affair began innocuously when Guillaume Tell 
Poussin, the French minister to Washington in 1849, pre­
sented a minor claim to Clayton on behalf of a French 
national. Poussin's belligerent language, however, 
offended Clayton and President Taylor, and they retaliated 
with the threat of registering an official protest against 
the minister. Poussin retreated, but not for long. Again 
over an insignificant issue, Poussin insulted the American 
government. Incensed, Taylor instructed Rush in Paris to 
protest, hoping that Poussin would be recalled. Tocqueville, 
then the French Foreign Minister, replied that Clayton had 
used undiplomatic language, and intimated that Poussin 
would be retained. Clayton, who had appointed Rives to 
succeed Rush, again protested and announced that Poussin 
would be dismissed. Meanwhile, Tocqueville had named a 
successor to Poussin, and was naturally offended when he 
read Clayton's note. He in turn demanded an explanation of 
Washington's antagonism towards Poussin. The comic opera 
had come to the point that the administration regarded war 
with France as not improbable. But when Rives arrived in 
Paris, Napoleon received him cordially, and tensions 
finally relaxed. According to Williams, Napoleon earnestly 
desired to cultivate good relations with the United States.
-25-
At the time, the new president was deeply involved in
European politics --he could not afford to allow the
Poussin affair to harm his relations with the United
States, already dulled by the failure of the February 
7 7revolution. Two biographers of Taylor, Brainerd Dyer
and Holman Hamilton, agree with Williams that Napoleon's
initiative in ending the Poussin affair mended what could
have been a serious breach in Franco-American relations.
After the reception given Rives, Americans could at least
view the Second Republic as compatible with the United 
? 3States.
To this point, this writer has been concerned pri­
marily with the historiography of American response to the 
vicissitudes of French politics. It has been clearly 
shown that when the revolution of 1848 failed to emulate 
the American example, the public reaction in the United 
States was largely one of disillusionment, disappointment, 
and finally, with Napoleon's takeover, resignation. Only 
White, however, attempts to assess the impact upon diplomatic 
relations of this frustration of American hopes for French
22wary W. Williams, "John Middlbton Clayton," in The 
American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. by 
Samuel F. Bemis, Vol.Tl (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1928) , 
pp. 187-190.
7 ̂̂ See Brainerd Dyer, Z,acharv Tavlor (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1946), p. 352; Holman 
Hamilton, Zacharv Tavlor: Soldier in the White House. Vol. II 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1951), pp. 187-190.
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liberalism, and her conclusions are but speculation. The 
students of the Poussin affair have suggested that Louis 
Napoleon made a concerted effort to improve his relations 
with the United States, but they fail to determine for how 
long this consideration guided the emperor's, diplomacy.
In a recent monograph, Henry Blumenthal attempts to rectify 
this ambiguity by reviewing not only American opinion of 
French politics, but official French opinion of the United 
States as well, It is with the latter that Blumenthal 
makes a definite contribution to the historiography of 
Franco-American relations. His findings provide an essential 
background to the study of the diplomatic relations between 
Paris and Washington from 1828 to 1860. Because for only 
three of those thirty-two years was France governed by a 
republic, Blumenthal centers upon the attitudes of the 
governments of Louis Philippe and Napoleon III toward the 
United States.
According to Blumenthal, the leaders of both the July 
Monarchy and the Second Empire feared a resurgence of 
republican spirit during their reigns. Dedicated to 
European monarchism, both governments felt uneasy over the 
possibility that the French republican movement might be 
so impressed by the success of the American republic that 
the idea to establish such a system in France could gain 
momentum. Hence, Blumenthal adds, they regarded it "as a
■*2 7^
serious challenge that the United States lent at least its
moral support to the republican movement in Europe, and
that some Americans actually aided and assisted it.” In
meeting this supposed threat, the two governments became
even more entrenched in opposition to American expansion.
Blumenthal writes:
. . .the French monarchs did not only attempt to 
control republican activities at home and to deny 
the superiority of republican institutions, but 
they also pursued policies designed to frustrate 
the success of the American republic and to 
arouse the suspicions of the Latin Americans 
against the United States. ^
In Blumenthal*s view, then, the desire of the July Monarchy
to contain American continental expansion was ideologically
inspired. Louis Philippe, and his chief minister, Guizot,
equated the national interest of France with the prevention
of the spread of republicanism. Napoleon III, however,
initially desired to avoid difficulties with the sensitive
A me ri ca ns .N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  Blumenthal asserts that hope
for any real improvement in Franco-American relations during
the Second Empire was illusory.
Blumenthal maintains that Napoleon and his advisors
misunderstood the vigor of American culture. Although the
imperial family refrained from expressing anti-republican
antipathies, Franco-American tensions were destined to
24Henry Blumenthal, A Reappraisal of Franco-American 
Relations, 1830-1871 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1959) , p . 4.
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develop. He writes:
Applying the standards of an ancient civiliza­
tion to the young American nation, they completely 
failed to understand the spirit that moved the 
society of pioneers in the New World. Napoleon 
and Eugenie were accustomed to think in terms of 
the glory of France, the desirability of a power­
ful state, special rights and privilege for a 
top layer of society, and the vital importance of 
the cultural and intellectual aspects of life.
American concepts and practices conflicted too 
much with these ideas to be appreciated by the 
French rulers and many citizens of France.2"
With the royal family harboring such prejudices, it was 
inevitable that they would eventually be manifested. 
Blumenthal suggests that the "Young America" movement 
provided the necessary catalyst,
"Young America" began its activities as a recognized 
political group during the presidential campaign of 1852. 
Led by such men as George N. Sanders of Kentucky and 
Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, the "Young Americans" 
actively supported the candidacy of the Democratic nominee, 
Franklin K, Pierce. During the campaign, the aims of this 
ebullient movement became clear. According to Blumenthal, 
not only did their goals offend Napoleon III, but the 
"Young Americans" also held a particularly bitter resent­
ment against the new emperor. He writes:
26Ibid., pp. 24-25.
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The supporter > of the "Young America" movement, 
a group of militant democrats who advocated 
active intervention in behalf of European liberals, 
did not hide their contempt for the emperor. A 
prosperous French republic would have made an 
ideal spearhead of republicanism in the midst 
of monarchical Europe, The rise of this new 
"despot" frustrated the international aspirations 
of "Young America," ever anxious to promote the 
spread of constitutional liberties beyond the 
seas.2 7
With Piercers election, it appeared to many Europeans that 
the "Young America" spirit would settle in the White House.
An early student of the movement, Merle Curti, notes that 
the reaction of the conservative French press to Pierce's 
victory was nervous.28 Blumenthal agrees, concluding that 
in conservative French circles--which, of course, included 
the royal family--the United States earned a reputation "as 
the enfant terrible, against which European society must 
protect itself." Secretary of State William L. Marcy's 
denial of any intention on the part of the United States to 
export American political doctrines did little to allay 
these apprehensions.2^
Assuming that if the July Monarchy and the Second Empire
2 7 i b i d . ,  pp. 25-26, See also Merle Curti, "Young 
America," American Historical Review, XXXII (October, 1926), 
pp. 35-45. For Douglas’s relationship with "Young America," 
see George Fort Milton, The Eve of Conflict: Stephen A. 
Douglas and the Needless "War (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 
1935), pp. 67~80- 8 2 9 2 - 9 7 7 ”
28Curti, "Young Americaj" pp. 46-47.
^Blumenthal, A Reappraisal, pp. 26-29.
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had been replaced by a republic, Franco-American relations 
would have been less troubled, Blumenthal maintains that 
Louis Philippe and Louis Napoleon allowed their ideological 
predilections to govern their relations with the United 
States. As a result, Americans viewed French desires to 
limit the expansion of the United States as a threat to
7(]the freedom and security of their republic. In an exten­
sive review of French opinion of the United States from 
1315 to 1852, Rene Remond agrees with Blumenthal that both 
Louis Philippe and Napoleon deeply distrusted the United 
States. He further suggests, however, that French suspicion 
of the American republic went beyond the personal prejudices 
of the King and the. Emperor,
According to Remond, the traditional friendship between 
the peoples of France and the United States began to deter­
iorate during the Jacksonian Era. After the Revolution of 
1830, Frenchmen, encouraged by the progress of popular 
government in their country, undertook the task of redis­
covering America. Remond maintains that they were dis­
illusioned and confused by what they saw. It became apparent 
to them that the America of Jackson bore little resemblance 
from afar to that of Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, and 
Washington. Slavery had become a pervasive institution; 
"Yankee” influence encompassed all walks of life; and
3^Ibid., p. 31
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Virginians were no longer the typical Americans.3-*- The 
continental expansion of the United States, Remond con­
tinues, increased French criticism of the bumptious, 
self-confident republic. As a result, many of the motives 
behind Napoleon*® adventure in Mexico were not peculiar 
to that monarch, but had begun to appear throughout the 
spectrum of French opinion by the early forties. Distrust 
of Anglo-Saxons, Latinism, affinity with the Spanish, the 
idea of raising up a community of Latin and Catholic 
civilization to oppose the menacing expansion of North 
American power--all, Remond maintains, took their roots 
from widespread French disillusionment over the fate of 
the American ideal, and resentment with regard to the
•Z Jimpetuous expansionism of the forties.
True, Blumenthal and Remond are hardly impartial in 
their interpretations, Blumenthal seems unable to surmount 
the American distaste for the instability of French politics 
and monarchial governments, while Remond is in sympathy 
with the contemporary French criticism of the faults of the 
American system and appears to feel that the United States 
was ungrateful towards a former ally. And yet, Remond and 
Blumenthal point out an essential ingredient in Franco- 
American relations between the Revolution of 1830 and the
3lRene Remond , Les Etats-Unis Devant 1 * Opinion Francaise.
1815-1852. Vol. II (Paris: A. Colin, 1962), pp. 826-827.
3^Ibid., pp. 821-822.
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Civil War. From their different perspectives, both suggest 
that an ideological bond between French and American society 
simply did not exist. While Blumenthal emphasizes that 
the primary cause of this gap was the distrust with which 
Louis Philippe and Napoleon III regarded American repub­
licanism, Remond points instead to the development of a 
nativist America unfamiliar to the French and replete with 
internal problems that did not exist during the early years 
of the republic. But what is important is not that they 
differ in assessing a cause, but that they agree as to its 
effect 6 Rhodes, Gazley, and White have shown that Americans 
interpreted the revolutions of 1848 as attempts to emulate 
the United States and its institutions. This explains much 
of the enthusiasm with which Americans reacted to the up­
heavals of 1848, but, as Curtis has established from his 
extensive research into French sources, the French Assembly 
rejected the American example, Curti asserts that Americans 
in their expressions of sympathy for the French revolution­
aries not only misunderstood the full meaning of the February 
revolution, but that they also suffered from a national 
myopia which deluded them into thinking that their political 
institutions were requisite to the success of any nation.
So, in spite of the blossoming of international republican 
spirit that occurred with the downfall of the July Monarchy, 
relations between France and the United States were only
temporarily improved through ideological ties. With the 
June Days and the election of Napoleon to the presidency 
of the Second Republic, Franco-American ideological unity 
began to wither; three years later with the coup d ’etat 
of December, 1851, it died. The resulting chasm between 
nYoung America” and Napoleon III was wide indeed.
Although most of the historiography reviewed to this 
point is dominated by generalization and speculation-- 
often of such a nature that it frustrates critical analysis 
it is essential as a background for the subsequent chapters 
Unless we understand the general trend of Franco-American 
ideological relations, it will be difficult to follow the 
historiography of the diplomatic relations between Paris 
and Washington from 1828 to I860, Obviously, ideological 
predilections influence the definition of national interest 
It will be a fundamental purpose of the succeeding chapters 
to determine what impact the ideologically inspired Amer­
ican distrust of the July Monarchy and the Second Empire 
had on Franco-American relations.
CHAPTER III
THE FRENCH DEBT QUESTION AND JACKSONIAN DIPLOMACY
Prior to the declaration of war in 1812, American mer­
chants had suffered heavy losses not only from the British 
Orders in Council, but also from the French Berlin and 
Milan Decrees,, In 1814, the Treaty of Ghent brought an 
end to hostilities, but the question of the commercial 
depredations carried out by the French remained. Hoping 
to secure an indemnity for American claims against France, 
President James Madison appointed Albert Gallatin to be 
the American minister at Paris, Gallatin and his successors 
negotiated with the French government over the claims issue, 
but to no avail. Although the government of Charles X 
never denied the justice of the American claims, it repeat­
edly delayed discussions of a possible settlement. In 1829, 
the American claims remained unfulfilled.^
With the inauguration of Andrew Jackson, however, the 
claims issue became a prime concern of the foreign relations 
of the United States. The new president mentioned the 
problem in his first annual message, and instructed William
ISee Richard A. McLemore, Franco-American Relations,
1816-1836 (University: Louisiana State University Press, 
1941), pp. 1-42. McLemore is the only author who has 
reviewed these futile negotiations.
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Cabell Rives at Paris to renew negotiations. But when 
Rives met with Prince Auguste J.A.M. de Polignac, the 
French Foreign Minister, he was told that France was 
unwilling to recognize the American claims and was 
reluctant to negotiate. Jackson refused to allow the 
French to continue to delay, and pressed for a settlement. 
But Paris again avoided serious negotiations; not until 
the Revolution of 1830 did a climate conducive to a settle­
ment begin to form,2
Most Americans greeted the new government of Louis 
Philippe enthusiastically, viewing the revolution as a 
victory for popular government. As a result of the improved 
relations between France and the United States, a settlement 
of the claims issue was reached on July 4, 1831, when the 
July Monarchy agreed to pay an indemnity to satisfy the 
American claimants. But due to the reluctance of the 
Chamber of Deputies to appropriate the necessary funds, 
execution of the treaty was delayed. Although Jackson 
demanded payment, the Chamber continued to postpone action. 
Incensed, Jackson decided that diplomacy was futile, that 
only a threat of reprisals would persuade France to meet 
her obligations and begin payment. On the eve of Jackson’s 
annual message of 1834, Rives, the former minister to 
France, visited the White House, hoping to obtain a copy
2Ibid,, pp. 58-70.
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of the forthcoming speech, He found the general busily 
engaged in rewriting his declaration, " ’I know them 
French,’" Jackson is reputed to have said, " ’they won't 
pay unless they're made to,"’3
The next day Jackson brought the claims issue to a 
head. If the French continued to ignore their treaty 
commitments, Jackson warned, the United States would 
take "redress in our hand.’’̂  Obviously, Jackson’s speech 
is crucial to the historiography of the claims dispute.
In the preceeding chapter, it was noted that the animosity 
caused by the claims controversy contributed to the deep­
ening American disillusionment with the July Monarchy.
But, and this is a vital question, did Jackson's vigorous 
pursuit of the much-delayed indemnity reflect a popular 
demand for settlement, a determination of the American 
people that they would no longer be trifled with, or did 
it represent yet another example of the belligerency of 
"Old Hickory?" In short, it is important that historians 
determine whether the deterioration of Franco-American 
relations during the claims dispute was caused by public 
opinion of France or by the attitude of one man toward 
"them French."
3Quoted in White, American Opinion of France, pp. 95-96.
^The best review of Jackson’s speech is found in 
McLemore,' Franco-American Relations, pp. 130-133.
The furor that engulfed the relatively minor issue 
of the French spoliation claims first attracted the 
attention of Charles H, Peck, In his 1899 study of the 
Jacksonian Era, Peck tends to favor the Whig point of 
view. For that reason, he emphasizes the role of Jack­
son's personality in the claims crisis. When Washington 
learned that the French Chambers had refused to appropriate 
the necessary funds to meet the requirements of the 1831 
treaty, Peck writes, "Jackson was wroth." In his annual 
message of 1834, Peck continues, Jackson recommended 
reprisals if at the next session of the Chambers no pro­
vision was made for the payment of the debt, "The 
activities of the President," Peck writes, "created alarm 
throughout the country, for France would undoubtedly view 
it as virtually a recommendation of war,"^
According to Peck, Jackson's irrational fulmination 
offended France and provoked a needless crisis in Franco- 
American relations. Fortunately, he adds, the refusal of 
the Senate to approve an administration measure providing 
appropriations for the fortification of coastal defenses, 
tempered the militancy of Jackson's words in the eyes of 
the French. Ignoring the partisan nature of Jackson's 
opposition in the Senate, Peck lauds the reasonableness of
^Charles H, Peck, The Jacksonian Epoch (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 189'9) , pp. 248-250 „
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Henry Clay, the Whig spokesman. After the Senate rejected
the fortification bill* he writes,
The French Chambers passed a bill appropriating 
the amount of the indemnity, but with the pro­
viso that it would not be paid until their 
government had received a satisfactory explana­
tion of that part of the President’s message 
which recommended reprisals--that is to say, 
until he apologized for his belligerent affront 
to the dignity of France,
To be sure. Peck does not absolve the French of all blame
for the crisis created by Jackson’s 1834 message. "If
Jackson had been a little less vigorous," he writes, "and
if the French government had been as regardful of its
obligation as of its settlement, there would have been no
rupture. As it was the rupture was now complete." Only
a fortuitous offer of mediation from a concerned government
in Great Britain, Peck concludes, allowed a settlement
to be reached,^
Significantly, Peck’s documentation gives us an insight 
into his interpretation of the claims dispute. Throughout 
his study of the Jacksonian Era, Peck depends heavily upon 
the Congressional Globe. Regarding the spoliation issue, 
then, Peck bases his views on Jackson’s annual message of 
1834 and the subsequent Congressional debate. Later authors 
have supplemented this message and the related discussion
6lbid., pp. 265-266. According to Charles Webster, the 
claims quarrel disturbed the British, for London feared that 
France might find it necessary to defend its honor in the 
face of Jackson’s insulting language. Charles Webster, 
"British Mediation Between France and the United States in 
1834-1836," English Historical Review, XLII (January, 1927),
pp. 60-62.
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in Congress with at least cursory examinations of newspaper 
opinion and diplomatic correspondence. Peck's failure to 
use such material, coupled with his Whiggish sympathies, 
leads him to conclude that during the claims dispute, 
Jackson acted precipitously and without public backing.
For Peck, the spoliation crisis was animated by the 
flamboyant, irresponsible politics of the Democratic 
president.
Unlike Peck, John Spencer Bassett credits Jackson 
with having much popular support for his initial attempts 
to solve the claims issue. In his view, the signing of 
the 1831 treaty was an example "of Jackson's just but 
vigorous methods of clearing our diplomacy of old issues." 
Americans had long desired a settlement of the claims 
question, and were therefore impressed by Jackson's success 
in persuading the government of Louis Philippe to pay an 
indemnity, Bassett asserts, however, that the reluctance 
of the French Chambers to appropriate the funds necessary 
to fulfill the treaty obligation did not warrant Jackson's 
decision to threaten reprisals. For although the 1834 
message "showed the people they faced a crisis and made 
the world see that the supineness of American diplomacy 
was past,” opinion, especially in the Senate, but through­
out the nation as well, slowly sobered. Nevertheless, 
Jackson's refusal to apologize to France for his threat of
-40-
reprisals had broad support, Bassett writes:
The message of 1834 was, in fact, needlessly 
strong. Members of the President's own party 
urged him to be moderate in the next annual 
message. They had some effect, although they 
did not seriously modify his private views.
If France were an honorable nation, he said 
privately, she would pay the money and demand 
an apology afterward, , , .But from Maine to 
Florida came the voice, "No apology, no 
explanation--my [Jackson's] heart cordially 
responds to that voice,"7
Unfortunately, Bassett makes no attempt to document the 
validity of Jackson's interpretation of public opinion.
He simply assumes that because of Jackson's popularity, 
the American people supported his refusal to recant.
Bassett, like Peck, fails to provide adequate evidence 
for his findings.
In her review of American opinion of France, Elizabeth 
Brett White is the first to attempt to assess domestic 
attitudes towards Jackson's conduct of the claims dispute. 
Noting Jackson's strong personality and unmitigated partisan­
ship, White stresses that after the 1834 speech, the claims 
affair became an issue in the bitter party struggles of the 
day. "With the strong party feeling existing at the moment 
in the United States," she writes, "it was inevitable that 
the message should become the subject of party recrimina­
tions," But although White admits that partisan sympathies 
guided opinions of Jackson’s diplomacy, she suggests that
7John Spencer Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1916; first published in 1911), 
pp. 96-101.
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Jackson had ventured beyond the sentiment of the country.
After reviewing the opinions of several Democratic and 
Whig journals, as well as a few individuals of varied 
standing, White concludes that Jackson's threat of 
reprisals had very little support. The majority of the 
Democratic journals, as well as Democratic members of the 
House and the Senate, viewed reprisals as unwarranted.
The American people believed that the claims of the United 
States against France were just, but "Money, not the 
honor of the country, appeared to be the point at issue."® 
Although the Whigs roundly condemned Jackson’s bellig­
erency, White notes that one notable Whig member of Congress, 
John Quincy Adams, supported Jackson, The ’’Old Man Eloquent" 
did not deem war to be necessary, but he was certain that 
reprisals should be made, In reply to the opponents of the 
fortification bill, Adams asserted that ” 'it was the duty 
of the House to act upon this subject, and declare whether 
they would comply with the proposal of the President or 
that they would do something to sustain the rights, interests, 
and honor of the nation,” ' Whatever might be said of Jackson’s 
message, Adams concluded, " ’he, for one, would say as once 
was said of Lafayette, that whoever censured its impudence
Qmust yet admire its spirit,” ’ White adds, however, that
^White, American Opinion of France, pp. 96-101.
9Ibid., p. 104,
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Adams's opinions were unique. And although the fortifica­
tion bill passed the House, the Senate Whigs remained firm 
and killed the measure by inaction. Nevertheless, White 
concludes that the partisan debate over the claims issue 
"served to attract attention to France, and encourage 
among both Democrats and Whigs a critical spirit in regard 
to French affairs in general."^
While White rectifies the failure of both Peck and 
Bassett to analyze American public opinion, her work does 
not include diplomatic correspondence or the private 
papers of officials in the Jackson administration. Writing 
on the careers of two of Jackson's Secretaries of State 
during the thirties, Eugene I, McCormac demonstrates that 
there was a good deal of sentiment within official circles 
for punishing the recalcitrant French, Louis McLane, who 
held office from May, 1833, to June 1834, urged the 
president to take strong measures against the French, 
McCormac writes, for "the ministry possessed the power, 
if it had the will, to pay the money without an appropria­
tion by the Chambers." Although McLane advocated the 
application of bold initiatives to persuade the French to 
pay the promised indemnity, McCormac adds that he did not 
favor "an immediate declaration of war, but he advised
9lbid., p. 104.
10Ibid., p. 109.
asking Congress for authority to make reprisals."11
Following the retirement of McLane, Jackson appointed 
John Forsyth, an ardent supporter of the administration, 
as Secretary of State. According to McCormac, Forsyth 
also had some influence on the writing of the annual 
message of 1834. Shortly after taking office, Forsyth 
received a dispatch from Robert Livingston, the American 
minister at Paris, in which the representative asserted 
that a settlement of the claims question was impossible 
without some form of executive pressure. McCormac notes 
that Forsyth relayed Livingston's opinions to Jackson 
with a favorable recommendation. After the annual 
message, Forsyth gained prominence as the chief defender 
of Jackson's policy and, McCormac adds, was partially 
responsible for the adamant refusal to grant the French 
request for an apology. Concluding, McCormac notes that 
Forsyth advised acceptance of the British offer of media­
tion only on the condition that the United States would 
not be asked to retreat.12
Like Bassett, Marquis James views the claims contro­
versy through the perspective of a biographer of Jackson,
11Eugene I. McCormac, "Louis McLane," in The American 
Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. by Samuel FY 
Bernis, Vol. IV (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), p. 285,
12McCormac, "John Forsyth," in ibid., pp. 305, 309-
315.
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But while Bassett maintains that Jackson's 1834 message 
was '’needlessly strong,” James defends the president and 
asserts that the crisis of 1834-1835 was caused solely 
by the dilatory July Monarchy. Reviewing the repeated 
failure of American ministers to obtain justice on the 
claims matter, James praises Jackson's firm approach which 
resulted in the 1831 treaty. But when the French Chambers 
postponed payment, Jackson, "deeply mortified by their 
betrayal, realized that only the threat of reprisals 
would stir the French into action."1  ̂ The crisis deepened, 
James continues, when France demanded an apology. Fortu­
nately, he writes, "England stepped in to save the face of 
Louis Philippe with an offer of mediation." A settlement 
was reached, James concludes, as "France immediately, and 
Jackson after just enough hesitation to avoid a look of 
precipitation, agreed to arbitrate."14
More a popularizer than a scholar, James ignores Jack­
son's domestic critics and assumes that the president 
echoed the sentiments of the American people. In a bio­
graphy of Henry Clay, however, Glyndon G. Van Deusen 
reaffirms White's assertion that Jackson's diplomacy stirred 
a bitter partisan debate. He views the Senate rejection 
of the fortification bill as "Clay's one major victory
1^Marquis James, Andrew Jackson: Portrait of a 
President (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1937J-, pp. 3¥6-38 7.
14Ibid,, p. 403.
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over Jackson.” Admitting that Jackson's forceful diplomacy 
may have enhanced respect for American rights, Van Deusen 
asserts that the threat of reprisals weakened an excellent 
moral issue, thereby presenting the Whigs with an oppor­
tunity for political gain. But the Whig opposition to 
Jackson's annual message of 1834, in spite of political 
enmity, "served as an emollient." In Van Deusen's view, 
the passage of the fortification bill would certainly have 
insulted France. "If one believes in sabre-rattling 
diplomacy," he writes, "the Whigs should be condemned; 
if not, they should be praised,"15
To this point, the historiography of the claims con­
troversy has been fragmentary. But although none of the 
authors discussed devotes more than a few pages to the 
subject, most have taken a similar attitude towards the 
claims dispute. Although Peck's biased view led him to 
isolate Jackson's personality as the decisive factor in 
the process which caused the claims question to become a 
critical issue in Franco-American relations, Bassett, White 
and Van Deusen all agree that Jackson's threat of reprisals
t
was unwarranted. White and Van Deusen point to the partisan 
debate that resulted from Jackson's vigorous assertion of 
American rights, and conclude that Whig opposition miti­
gated the president’s belligerency. McCormac, on the
i^Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Life of Henry Clav (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Co., 1937), pp.. 289-294.
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basis of research, into the diplomatic correspondence, 
asserts that Jackson was not alone in believing that 
strong measures were needed to convince France to pay 
the indemnity, but this does not suffice to establish 
that the president’s actions reflected public opinion. 
Ignoring White, James maintains that Jackson’s leader­
ship was sound, and that the French were entirely to 
blame. James’s sympathy for Jackson is obvious, and 
his work does not weaken the more prevalent view phat 
Jackson himself created much of the animosity surrounding 
the dispute. In a 1941 monograph devoted to the history 
of the claims question from 1816 to 1836, Robert A.
McLemore expands and reaffirms this interpretation of 
the impact of Jackson’s diplomacy.
Reviewing the progress of the claims question from 
1816 to 1829, McLemore concludes that a considerable 
"national sentiment” for settlement had begun to develop 
during the administration of John Quincy Adams. As early 
as 1826, he writes, ’’there was developing among the public 
a demand that more drastic measures be taken to secure an 
adjustment of the claims,” To corroborate this, McLemore 
refers to two articles--one a report in the National 
Intelligencer of a public meeting held in January of 1826 
concerning the need for a settlement of the spoliation 
claims, the other an editorial in the North American Review 
suggesting that "energetic steps” were required to solve
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the issue. That these two articles demonstrated a public 
demand for indemnity from France is at best speculation, 
and they are used by McLemore only to provide a back­
ground to the claims crisis of the eighteen-thirties.1  ̂
Tracing the negotiations leading to the signing of 
a treaty in 1831, McLemore adds much to the historiography 
of the claims question. Through the use of both American 
and French diplomatic correspondence, he reviews the 
intricate negotiations, emphasizing the importance of the 
Revolution of 1830. Before the July Monarchy, McLemore 
maintains, relations between the United States and France 
were often plagued by partisan newspaper editorials.
Because of this occasional animosity, Rives made only 
slow progress with the Bourbon regime. With the downfall 
of Charles X, however, Americans believed that the disputed 
claims would finally be solved and justice achieved.17 
McLemore writes: nThe news of the revolution was welcomed
in the United States with much joy--the press seemed to 
feel unanimously that now, with the Bourbons out of the 
way, the negotiations could be completed with little 
problem.1' McLemore hastens to add, however, that the 
issue of indemnity was still far from solution and could 
have posed a serious threat to the renewed Franco-American 
amity. He refers to a dispatch sent by Rives to Secretary
^McLemore, Franco-American Relations, pp. 33-39. 
17jbid., pp. 52-63.
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of State Martin Van Buren in which the minister -warned that 
although the new French leaders sympathized with the Amer­
ican claims, the question of finance would be difficult.
And in spite of the signing of the treaty in 18 31, Rives
expressed regret that the French government did not believe
1 ftthe claims issue to be serious,
Rives’s trepidations were soon realized. The French 
Chambers refused to grant the necessary appropriations 
and the July Monarchy procrastinated. Furious with the 
delay, Jackson believed that the French government was 
unwilling to fulfill its obligation, ”No one was more 
severe in the denunciation of the French than Jackson 
himself,” McLemore writes, ”he pronounced the course of 
the King of France ’Jesuitical , , ,toward us.’" ^
In his estimation of the role of Jackson’s personality 
in the crisis of 1834*1835, McLemore agrees with White,
Van Deusen, and Bassett that the threat of reprisals was 
unnecessary. But McLemore also asserts that Jackson’s 
1834 speech aroused a spirit of ’’national aggressiveness” 
that had been absent since the War of 1812, The nation 
had expected Jackson, McLemore maintains, to deal with the 
claims issue in a firm but friendly tone, with possibly 
some recommendation for commercial restrictions if France
18lbid,, pp, 70-73,
19Ibid,, p, 125,
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still refused to comply with the treaty, But when Jackson
adopted a ’’strongly nationalistic tone,” McLemore writes,
and suggested the taking of ’’redress in our hand," 
he aroused a nationwide interest in the matter 
which brought on the one hand bitter reproaches 
upon the administration for its hazardous 
experiment, and on the other vehement defenses 
of such a program. A matter which had been 
largely local in interest was transformed into 
one of "national honor,’’ threatening to involve 
the two nations in war,20
To this point, only James has suggested that Jackson's
speech transformed the spoliation controversy into a
question of "national honor," It is therefore requisite
to examine McLemore's foundation for making such a claim.
As evidence that after Jackson’s 1834 message the
claims dispute was animated by an aroused '’national honor,"
McLemore refers primarily to the Washington Globe and the
National Intelligencer, as well as to a few private
observers. Without detailing the relationship of the Globe
and its editor Francis B, Blair to the administration,
McLemore quotes that organ as assaulting the more reserved
Intelligencer for suggesting that the 1831 treaty failed
because of Jackson’s militant diplomacy. It is certainly
true that, as McLemore writes, "the press did not permit
the public to forget the action that had been taken or
the prospects fox the f u t u r e N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  this alone
20lbid., p, 132.
21Ibido, pp. 133-136.
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is insufficient to prove that Jackson*s management of the 
claims affair revived an aggressive "national sentiment 
In fact, McLemore admits that to use newspaper opinion as 
evidence of a national feeling on the claims dispute is 
misleading, for "the press of the United States divided
in its views on the question according to whether it was
2 2Jackson or anti-Jackson," Given the polarization of
the country in the thirties as the second two-party
system was developing, it is not surprising that the
message of 1834 stimulated acrimonious debate in the press
as Whigs and Democrats vied for popular support.
In an attempt to bolster his claim that the spoliation
dispute engendered a new belligerency within the United
States, McLemore presents the views of three prominent
citizens, "That the relations of the two countries were
strained almost to the breaking point may be inferred*"
McLemore writes, from the following American leaders:
James A, Harris [Assistant Secretary of State 
and intimate friend of Adams] wrote Jackson,
"under a strong conviction that eventually 
there will be war," offering his service in any 
capacity, Adams wrote in his Memoirs that "if 
the two countries be saved from war, it seems 
as if it could only be a special interposition 
of Providence," Judge Joseph Story found "the 
state of public affairs . , .anything but 
satisfactory," with the President "exceedingly 
warm for war with France." Story felt that the 
only hope lay in t h e  resistance of the s e n a t e . 23
22ibid., p. 121.
25Ibid,, p. 15 7.
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When McLemore states that the above opinions, in addition 
to the newspaper debate, are evidence of "strained rela­
tions" between France and the United States, he is 
undoubtedly correct. But it is doubtful that "strained 
relations" demonstrated that the American people was in 
arms demanding payment of the indemnity,
Like Bassett, McLemore asserts that Jackson’s refusal 
to apologize to the French for his belligerent remarks in 
his 1834 message had broad support. Even in the Senate, 
where the fortification bill went down in defeat, there 
was a reluctance to accept responsibility for the failure. 
McLemore writes:
The fact that sentiment of the nation was becom­
ing more solidified in support of the president 
may be inferred from the care the senate took 
to throw from its shoulders, as far as possible, 
the responsibility for the defeat of the fort­
ification bill.
McLemore adds that the Intelligencer, seldom an adminis­
tration advocate, warned that the defeat of the fortifica­
tion bill did not mean that the nation was going to accept 
passively the nonexecution of the 1831 t r e a t y . ^4
Although McLemore goes to great pains to establish 
that Jackson’s militant diplomacy was not without support, 
he concludes that the most important factor in the claims 
controversy was "Old Hickory," He writes.
Z^Ibid., pp. 158-160.
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Probably the most interesting revelation is 
the predominant influence of the President’s 
personality upon the conduct of foreign rela­
tions. The difficulty of a democratic legisla­
tive body in divesting itself of partisan 
politics in dealing Kith international questions 
is also apparent. The intensification of 
bitterness over a comparatively unimportant 
issue as a result of constant stimulation of 
differences might have brought the two nations 
into conflict. The slowness of communications, 
which gave public opinion an opportunity to 
forget the differences, the influence of a group 
of conservative advisers, and the existence of 
other international issues of more consequence 
combined to act as successful preservers ofthe p e a c e , 2 5
Nowhere in the above quotation is there any reference to a 
new spirit of ’’national aggressiveness.” In essence, then, 
in spite of some dramatization, McLemore reaffirms the 
findings of Peck, Bassett, White, and Van Deusen. McLemore1s 
claim that the spoliation crisis stirred up a national 
sentiment antagonistic toward France and favorable to war 
appears to be an overstatement,
Since the appearance of McLemore*s study, historians 
have interpreted the claims controversy as a typical example 
of Jackson’s presidential leadership and have emphasized 
the partisan reactions to his 1834 speech. In his biography 
of Adams, Samuel F, Bemis notes the contrast between the 
presidency of the experienced diplomat from,Massachusetts 
and that of the venerable general from Tennessee. Adams
25ibid., p. 211,
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was unwilling to resort to forcible measures to persuade 
the French to negotiate. Because of general public 
apathy, Bemis writes, Adams "had not wished to risk a 
rupture with a friendly nation over what seemed to so 
many people such a small matter, of private concern 
rather than paramount public interest," Jackson, however, 
"had the ability to arouse the people’s patriotism and 
put them solidly behind him and the nation,"2^
Reviewing the aftermath of the 1834 message, Bemis 
maintains that Jackson indeed had broad popular support. 
Although he relies on McLemore for background, Bemis uses 
extensive manuscript material to support this view. Noting 
the Whig opposition to the fortification bill, he concludes 
that "public reaction to the debate in the House of Repre­
sentatives made it clear that the people were behind the 
President," Jackson's ultimate victory in the claims 
controversy "made the Whig Senate look sick,"27 And yet, 
Bemis never claims that Jackson's management of the affair 
aroused a new spirit of national militancy.
In a study of the Jacksonian Era, Van Deusen admits 
that there was a good deal of excitement created by Jack­
son’s diplomacy, but he again places the entire public
2^Samuel F. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union 
(New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1 956),pp. 306-307.
27Ibid., pp, 320-322.
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sentiment toward the issue within the spectrum of American 
partisan politics. "The merits of the French debt con­
troversy can be endlessly debated, and to little effect." 
Van Deusen writesi
Jackson had used threatening language in an 
effort to obtain satisfaction of a just claim.
This was "big-stick" diplomacy. The Whigs 
paraded themselves in all the panoplies of 
moderation, Both sides angled for political 
advantage, and each sought, with some reason, 
to blame the other for the loss of the fort­
ification bill,28
The impact of Jackson's 1834 message upon American 
opinion of France, then, remains unclear. McLemore 
suggests that the militant speech stirred a "national 
sentiment of aggressiveness" absent since the War of 
1812, but he fails to provide evidence to support this 
claim. As a result, the emphasis given especially by 
Van Deusen and White to the partisan reaction toward the 
message is more convincing. Still, it cannot be doubted 
that the claims issue contributed to a growing estrange­
ment between Paris and Washington, And although Peck's 
prejudice against Jackson led him to emphasize his role 
in the claims dispute, it is also clear that much of 
the impetus behind the controversy originated with 
"Old Hickory," The difficulty of explaining the effect 
of the spoliation issue on American opinion of France
28Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, 1828- 
1848 (Harper and Row, 1959), pp. 102-103.
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is perhaps why Henry Blumenthal, in his survey of Franco- 
American relations, avoids entangling himself within 
the domestic politics of the thirties, Blumenthal merely 
concludes that the claims controversy is only one ex­
ample among many showing that relations between France 
and the United States during the thirties were not as 
amicable as has usually been assumed.29
Despite the ambiguity of much of the historiography 
of the claims dispute, the authors under discussion 
provide support for Albert Weinberg's interpretation 
that the thirties were a time of internal building before 
the expansionism of the “Roaring 'forties,” “The speeches 
of Jackson as president»“ Weinberg writes, “exude the 
complacency and sense of self-sufficiency of this decade. 
Especially noteworthy is his confident observation con­
cerning an issue always highly determinative of the 
attitude toward expansion; 'You have no longer any cause 
to fear danger from abroad,*”30 Perhaps this is what 
McLemore intended when he referred to a renewed "national 
sentiment of aggressiveness.” Be that as it may, the 
claims dispute, in spite of Jackson's belligerency, was 
settled in 1836, thereby removing the one most outstand­
ing issue in Franco-American relations.
^Blumenthal, A Reappraisal, p. 45.
xnWeinberg, Manifest Destiny, p. 108.
CHAPTER IV
AMERICAN CONTINENTAL EXPANSION AND FRANCE
On the surface, the much'■delayed settlement of the 
claims dispute in 1836 removed one obstacle to better 
relations between France and the United States. During 
the next few years, the two countries pursued their own 
goals without interference or objectiono Striking 
examples of this apparent easing in Franco-American 
relations are to be seen in the lack of reactions to 
the French military interventions in Mexico in 1838 and 
in the La Plata region of South American in 1839.
Both the ’’Pastry War” and the La Plata venture were clear 
violations of the Monroe Doctrine, but the United States 
voiced no protests. Explanations of this unusual Amer­
ican indifference towards European interference in the 
Western Hemisphere are vague, but there is little doubt 
that American claims against Mexico, popular sympathy 
for the Texan revolution, and the general timidity of 
the Van Buren administration were important factors,^
iFor a review of the "Pastry War,” see Hubert Howe 
Bancroft, History of Mexico. Vol. V (San Francisco: The 
History Co., 1887), p p , 186-205; William Spence Robertson, 
"French Intervention in Mexico in 1838," Hispanic American
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But rather than providing time for reconciliation, 
the years after the settlement of the claims dispute 
were characterized more by the development of anxiety 
and suspicion. The United States, ending a period of 
consolidation, was approaching an era of new growth.
To the West lay the undeveloped but tantalizing Pacific 
coast and the sparsely settled Mexican province of 
California. To the Southwest, American immigrants 
had already freed their adopted Texas from Mexican rule 
and established the Lone Star Republic. Towards all of 
this, the French government of Louis Philippe reacted 
nervously. Once underway, would there be any limit to 
American expansion? Paris was the first major power 
to recognize Texan independence; after 1840, Louis 
Philippe’s new Foreign Minister, Francois Guizot, began 
to look for other means to protect French interests in 
the New World from the anticipated expansion of the 
American republic,
French apprehensions materialized quickly. Seeking
Historical Review. XXIV (1944), pp. 222-252. Regarding 
the La Plata episode see John F. Cady, Foreign Interven­
tion in the Rio de La Plata. 1838-1850 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1929), pp. 24-25, 
182-188, For explanations of American policy, or the 
lack of policy, toward these intrusions, see White, 
American Opinion of France, pp. Ill, 114-115; Dexter 
Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine. 1826-186 7 (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), pp. 42-45, 63; and Cady, 
Intervention in the La Plata. p. 268,
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to redeem his discredited administration with a spectacular 
success, President John Tyler endorsed the annexation of 
Texas in his annual message to Congress on December 3,
1844. During the presidential campaign of 1844 the 
Texas issue had gained momentum, and in February of the 
new year a joint resolution offering annexation passed 
Congress. Prompted by his Secretary of State, John C.
Calhoun, Tyler decided to initiate the proceedings for 
annexation. On the eve of the inauguration of the Demo­
crat James K» Polk, he dispatched Andrew J, DoneIson to 
Texas to offer annexation,^" It soon became apparent that 
Polk would accept Tyler’s plan, and on July 4, 1845, the 
Texas Congress voted overwhelmingly to enter the Union,
During the previous two years, Guizot had cooperated with 
Great Britain in various efforts to insure Texas indepen­
dence. Now, with annexation certain, and with American 
troops on the contested border of the Rio Grande, war 
between Mexico and the United States seemed imminent. The 
results of such a war foreboded ill not only for Mexico, 
but for France and Great Britain as well--California would 
certainly be at stake,
^Senate Ex. Doc, (449), 28th Cong,, 2nd Sess., No, 1, 
pp. 1-18. See also Charles Sellers, James K, Polk: Continen- 
talist. 1843-1846 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1966), pp. 50-60,
^Congressional Globe, Vol. XIV, 28th Cong,, 2nd Sess,, pp. 322-363,
^Sellers, Polk, pp. 215-216.
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Guizot's involvement in Texas had aroused accusations
of French intrigue from the ardent American expansionists.
Apprehensive lest France find herself at odds with the
United States, Guizot's domestic opposition questioned
the wisdom of his policy. In reply, the French minister
addressed the Chamber of Deputies in June, defending his
attempts to prevent the annexation of Texas and defining
France's broad interest in the New World in the face of
growing American dominance, France, Guizot declared,
had a lasting interest in the maintenance of 
independent states in America, and in the balance 
of forces which exists in that part of the 
world, There are in American three powers,
The United States, England, and the states of 
Spanish origin. . , .What is the interest of 
France? It is that the independent states 
remain independent, that the balance of forces 
between the great masses which divide America 
continue, that no one of them become exclusively 
preponderant, , , .France. . .ought to protect 
by the authority of its name the independence 
of states and the maintenance of the balance 
of the great political forces in America.^
Guizot's declaration created much excitement in the United 
States and became a factor in the framing of Polk's annual 
message to Congress in December of 1 8 4 5 .̂
In a private conversation with George Bancroft at about 
the time of his inauguration, Polk had divulged his commit­
ment to '"the acquisition of California and a larger district
^Quoted in Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp. 71-72. 
&Ibid., pp. 73-74.
on the coast,” According to Polkas most recent biographer, 
"only later would it become clear that he had resolved from 
the first to unroll the nation's territory far up and down 
the Western shore of North America."^ Between his inaugura­
tion and the writing of the annual message, Polk had been 
warned of possible French and British designs on California, 
This, coupled with Guizot's June speech, may have influenced 
the President to dedicate much of his December message to 
the danger of European involvement in the New World, and 
especially in North America. Alluding to Guizot's speech, 
Polk warned that the extension of American settlements to 
previously unoccupied territories, "the expansion of 
free principles, and our rising greatness as a nation, are 
attracting the attention of the powers of Europe, and lately 
the doctrine has been broached in some of them of a 'balance 
of power' on this continent to check our advancement." Al­
though desirous of preserving good relations with all 
nations, Polk continued, the United States "can not in 
silence permit any European interference on the North 
American continent, and should any such interference be 
attempted will be ready to resist it at any and all hazards," 
Since "the American system of government is entirely dif­
ferent from that of Europe," the Old World principle of a
^Sellers, Polk, p. 213.
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’’balance of power can not be permitted to have any applica­
tion on the North American continent, and especially to 
the United States.” Concluding, Polk lauded Monroe's 1823 
definition of the principle of two spheres, and added that 
"the reassertion of this principle, especially in reference 
to North America, is at this day but the promulgation of a 
policy which no European power should cherish the disposition
Oto resist.”
The Guizot-Polk exchange is a central point in the 
historiography of Franco'•American diplomatic relations. 
Occurring during the most critical year of American con­
tinental expansion, the two speeches have been interpreted 
by one group of historians as representing an irrepressible 
dichotomy between the Old and New Worlds. Hence, when 
Guizot declared that it was in the interest of France to 
preserve ’’the balance of forces” that existed in the 
Western Hemisphere, historians of this inclination have 
generally asserted that the security and natural rights of 
the United States were directly threatened. They view Polk’s 
annual message, then, as essentially defensive in nature: 
if the United States had not acted to prevent European 
intervention in North America', Texas, California, and Oregon 
could have fallen under the sway of the absolutist,
8James D. Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents (Washington, 1890). Vol. IV, pp. 398-399.
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reactionary governments of France and England. In his land­
mark study of the Monroe Doctrine, Dexter Perkins expands 
this interpretation by suggesting that a "clash of systems," 
implicit in Monroe's 1823 declaration, existed beneath the 
surface of the relations of the United States with Europe, 
and the turmoil of American expansion only brought it to 
the fore. Perkins isolates the Guizot and Polk statements 
of 1845 as the best examples of this ideologically inspired 
split.® Significantly, both Perkins and this first group 
of historians depend heavily upon the accusations of Amer­
ican expansionists, including Polk, for evidence that 
France did indeed present a threat to the security of 
American democratic principles, And yet, Perkins helped 
to revise this viewpoint by noting the partisan background 
of Polk's speech. Since he wrote, historians have generally 
challenged his dependence upon the rhetoric of American 
expansionism. The frantic alarm over European "machinations"-- 
be they French or British--has been placed within the context 
of partisan politics and sectionalism. As a result, recent 
historians have tended to conclude that any fear of overt 
French intervention in the New World was chimerical, and 
that published forebodings were largely propaganda intended 
for domestic consumption.
®Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp. 70-96.
The purpose of this chapter, then, will be to review 
the historiography of Franco^American relations with 
respect to American continental expansion, examining in 
detail the above trends. Gn the basis of this review, 
an attempt will be made in the conclusion to answer the 
following questions: (I) Can it be said that French in­
volvement in the affairs of North America presented a 
challenge to the United States and as a result provided 
much of the impetus behind American continental expansion? 
(2) What significance did the Guizot-Polk exchange have 
within the context of Franco-American relations? (3) What 
impact did the realization of Polk's continental vision 
have upon Franco-American relations? Because of the com­
plexity of the topic, this writer will examine first the 
role of Texas in Franco-American relations, culminating 
with Guizot's speech, and second, the California issue, 
leading to Polk's message. Finally, this writer will 
review the historiography of Franco-American relations 
during the year 1846, concentrating on the issues of Oregon, 
the Mexican War, and European intervention in the La Plata 
region of South America,
The impact of the Texas issue upon Franco-American 
relations was first noted by three early twentieth-century 
historians, whose works are still used today. In 1907,
Jesse S. Reeves published an analysis of the diplomacy
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practiced by Tyler and Polk; three years later, Ephraim D. 
Adams brought forth his influential work on Great Britain's 
interests and efforts in the Lone Star Republic; and finally, 
Justin H. Smith's history of the annexation of Texas 
appeared in 1911. Taken together, the three almost 
concurrent works form a nearly complete review of Franco- 
American relations regarding the Texas question.10
Dealing with American policy towards Texas, Reeves 
isolates the role of Calhoun as Secretary of State during 
the last year of Tyler's presidency. While in the State 
Department, Calhoun often voiced a fear that Texas, in 
pursuing a policy of independence, would fall under the 
sway of a country hostile to the interests of the United 
States. Reeves asserts that the South Carolinian's appre­
hensions were not unwarranted, Because the Van Buren 
administration refused to accept the Texas offer of
annexation in 1837, the leaders of the infant republic turned
1 1elsewhere for security against a still belligerent Mexico, 
Upon the election of Mirabeau Bonaparte Lamar to the presi­
dency of Texas in 1838, the United States was duly warned,
lOSee James S, Reeves, American Diplomacy Under Tyler 
and Polk (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1907);
Ephraim Douglass Adams, British Interests and Activities in 
Texas. 1838-1846 (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1910); 
Justin H. Smith, The Annexation of Texas (New York: Barnes 
and Noble Reprint, 1941; first published in 1911),
llReeves, Diplomacy Under Tyler and Polk, p. 84.
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Reeves writes, that if Texas were denied American protec­
tion, "she would turn for aid to the powers of Europe, 
notably to France and England, who. . .would be glad to 
avail themselves of the great advantage which a generous 
commercial treaty would give, them,"12 According to 
Reeves, this consideration later spurred Calhoun to assail 
the "designs" of France and Britain in Texas. Although 
the Secretary was confident that the people of Texas still 
desired annexation, he "feared that there might be a re­
vulsion of feeling. , .on account of the rejection of the 
treaty, and that this might be played upon by those who 
were unfriendly to the United S t a t e s , I t  is clear, 
then, that Calhoun believed Texas annexation to be necessary 
to the security of the United States. He viewed Mexico's 
policy of stalling annexation by a threat of war as an 
attempt '"to drive Texas into political connections with 
some other power less congenial to her feelings and favor­
able to her independence, and more threatening to her and 
our permanent welfare and safety,*"1^
But Calhoun believed that Great Britain and not France 
posed the greatest threat to American security in Texas„
•^Ibido t p, 87, 
iSlbid., p. 166. 
14lbid., pp, 169-170,
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In his explanation of the different policies pursued by 
Calhoun toward the two European powers most concerned 
with Texas, Reeves makes his most important contribution 
to the historiography of Franco-American relations. In 
1843, the French Chambers had voted to refrain from 
participating with Great Britain in outlawing slavery. In 
spite of Guizot's amiable feeling toward Lord Aberdeen, 
the British Foreign Secretary, the rejection of the pro­
posed treaty by the Chambers signified a lingering French 
animosity towards Great Britain,15 When in 1844 the rumor 
reached Calhoun that France was considering joint action 
with London to prevent the annexation of Texas by the 
United States, the Secretary's response was dictated by 
his adamant views on slavery. Consequently, Reeves writes, 
Calhoun "dwelt upon the dissimilarity of interest between 
France and Great Britain, The latter had political, the 
former merely commercial motives in treating for Texas 
independence." Unfortunately, Reeves neglects to explain 
why the contemplated Anglo-French joint intervention in 
Texas never materialized. Instead of pursuing his analysis 
of Calhoun's policy towards France and attempting to 
interpret its relation to traditional Franco-American 
friendship, the author is content to deride his deceitful 
diplomacy. He writes;
l^Ibid.t pp. 34-36,
It is hard to comprehend that such a position 
was ever assumed by any American Secretary of 
State, Had Calhoun stated, , .that Great Britain 
and France must keep hands off Texas, he would 
have remained on safe ground. He could not, 
however, say this as long as the United States 
had determined not to permit Texas to remain 
independent. To draw France away from England 
upon the Texas question was obviously n e c e s s a r y .
In part, Reeves’s reluctance to examine French policy
towards joint intervention with England in Texas can be
explained by a lack of documentary evidence. In 1910,
three years after Reeves published, the archives of the
British Foreign Office and the Admirality were opened.
E.D. Adams demonstrates that these are indeed vital to an
understanding of French attitudes towards the Texas question<,
Adams makes two basic points regarding the policies of
London and Paris in Texas, In the first place, he denies
that slavery played any role in the British involvement in
Texas. And in the second place, he asserts that the British
were responsible for the failure of joint Anglo-French
intervention. Because Calhoun so feared British aims in
Texas, these viewpoints are of special note to Franco-
American relations. Adams intimates that since Britain was
unwilling to resort to forcible intervention in Texas, any
apprehensions of a similar French threat were illusory.
To dispel the notion that a conspiracy to abolish slavery
was behind the British efforts in Texas, Adams examines closely
16Ibid,, pp. 173-174,
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its principal source. Duff Green, an unofficial American 
representative in Europe dedicated to the annexation of 
Texas, first warned of the ulterior motives of Britain 
in Texas, In contrast to Green’s forebodings, Adams 
reviews the dispatches of Edward Everett, the American 
Minister to the Court of St, James. Writing to Secretary 
of State Abel P. Upshur in November of 1843, Everett 
asserted that "'the subject of domestic slavery was never 
so much as mentioned or alluded to by the British minister 
to the government of Texas except to disclaim in most 
emphatic terms any intention on the part of England to 
interfere with it there.'" Although Britain might be forced 
to appease her own abolitionists, Everett concluded, she 
" ’had no idea of going on a crusade with them to abolish 
slavery in Texas or anywhere else." Regrettably, Upshur’s 
successor, Calhoun, chose to ignore Everett's dispatch and 
to accept Green's warning as valid.17
Because London's interest in Texas was basically 
commercial, not political, Aberdeen never seriously con­
sidered resorting to force to impede the annexation of 
Texas. According to Adams, Aberdeen "probably never dreamed 
that the United States would venture to annex Texas in the 
face of vigorous objections from England and France."1 ^
17Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, p, 144,
18Ibid., p. 159.
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Confident that the Americans would be intimidated by a 
united Anglo-French diplomatic front guaranteeing the 
independence of Texas, Aberdeen proceeded to enlist the 
French behind his "Diplomatic Act." The British minister 
at Paris reported that ” ’M, Guizot was of opinion that it 
was of importance that the designs of the Government of 
the United States with regard to Texas, should be pre­
vented.
Britain’s withdrawal from the plan, Adams states,
frustrated Guizot’s desire to forestall American expansion
to the Rio Grande. The turning point came in the summer
of 1844, when the British ambassador at Washington, Sir
Richard Pakenham, warned Aberdeen of the danger to European
intervention in Texas, Pakenham’s "portrayal of the
strength and depth of American feeling," Adams writes,
was a revelation to Aberdeen, and was extremely 
disconcerting. In his plan for a joint action 
with France, he had made but meager allowance 
for United States opposition, and he had be­
lieved that if accepted by Mexico and Texas it 
would effectively and peacefully prevent
American annexation,20
Aberdeen had been assured of "French compliance and cordiality 
when joint action was first proposed, [and] he had no reason 
to think that France would not act heartily with England."
But even French cooperation, Adams notes, "would not insure
19Quoted in ibid,, p. 160.
20ibid., p. 180.
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a successful termination of the negotiation under such 
circumstances as Pakenham states." Thus, Aberdeen realized 
his plan was destined to fail, and he gracefully allowed 
France to withdraw from the "Diplomatic Act,"2!
So far, it has been shown that much of Calhoun's fear 
of Anglo-French intervention in Texas was unwarranted. 
Although Reeves notes that Calhoun's commitment to slavery 
as an institution led the Secretary to discriminate between 
the British and French involvements in Texas, he fails to 
determine what interest the French government had in that 
youthful republic. Adams intimates that France might have 
intervened in Texas if Aberdeen had not retreated upon 
receipt of Pakenham's dispatch; but his work also contains 
no outline of French policy towards Texas. Through exten­
sive research into French source material--both private 
and governmental--Justin Smith was able to construct a 
summary of French Texan diplomacy.
In Smith's view, a prime motive behind French efforts 
in Texas was the limitation of the expansion of the United 
States. Because of his devotion to monarchy, Smith writes, 
Louis Philippe "could not look with favor upon the develop­
ment of a powerful republic," Furthermore, the July Mon­
archy was sympathetic towards London, for the British had 
been the first to recognize the government of Louis Philippe,
21Ibid., pp. 180-181.
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and since the two countries had similar interests in Texas, 
they "would naturally be drawn together by joint action 
regarding it."^
French policy in Texas, Smith tells us, was further 
prompted by a keen desire to forestall American dominance 
in Latin America. Louis Philippe regarded France as the 
guardian of Spanish America, and especially Mexico. For 
this reason, Smith writes, the French monarch "was alive 
to the danger that our neighbor on the South [Mexico] might 
suffer from American encroachments." Also, it was to Paris 
"a point of pride to save a power which his majesty had 
acknowledged as independent from being swallowed up by 
annexation.
Unlike Adams, Smith claims that it was France which 
first indicated a reluctance to intervene in Texas. 
According to Smith, the diplomacy of the Guizot ministry 
so irritated the French public that the minister was forced 
to abandon the "Diplomatic Act," In spite of Guizot’s 
detente with Aberdeen, Anglo-French relations were still 
plagued by such questions as the future of Algeria and 
Morocco, and the memory of recent troubles in Egypt. As 
a result, most Frenchmen harbored an unmitigated resentment 
of the British. Furthermore, because London’s deeper 
involvement in Texas, as well as her superior power in the
22smith, Annexation of Texas, p. 385.
2^Ibid.t p . 286.
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New World, required France to submit to the British lead 
in any joint effort, Guizot's government was accused of 
’'truckling" to the English, Hence, when Guizot's adherence 
to the "Diplomatic Act" came into the public view, Smith 
writes, "the outcry against it was furious." In the Chamber 
of Deputies Duizot's diplomacy was denounced as "undignified 
intrigue," and Guizot was accused of betraying the United 
States. "It was entirely wrong, said many, to turn against
an ancient and valuable customer without the strongest of
,.24 reasons."
In his assessment of the failure of joint intervention, 
Smith credits French public opinion with forcing Guizot to 
reconsider. Never would the French people be willing to 
risk war with the Americans, Smith reasons. But as evidence 
of an American determination to resort to war to defeat any 
European attempt to guarantee Texas independence, Smith 
notes only the vehement outcries of Calhoun, Green, and 
other advocates of annexation. His assumption that Calhoun 
and Green echoed the sentiments of the American people 
permits Smith to conclude the following:
24 Ibid,, pp. 397-398.
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In short then, it appears that_Great Britain was 
so anxious to prevent the annexation of Texas 
that she stood ready, if supported by France, 
to coerce Mexico and fight the United States; 
that the French government were at first no less 
willing than England to agree upon decisive 
measures; that the determination of the American 
people to resent vigorously such dictation--a 
course sure to arouse the many Frenchmen who 
were against the British, against the King, and 
against Guizot*.caused that power to fall back; 
that in consequence England wavered and then 
withdrew; and that all this grand effort at 
international concert resulted only in a sort 
of conspiracy to divert the people of Texas 
from the destiny actually preferred by themajority,25
More so than Reeves, who seems to avoid the matter, Smith 
sees a crisis in Franco-American relations with regard to 
Texas--a crisis precipitated by the unpopular diplomacy of 
the Paris government. It was only when the prospect became 
clear that France, in union, with England, risked war with 
the United States that Guizot retreated. Smith notes that 
a "decisive element in the affair was the readiness of a 
large number of Americans to plunge into a war for which 
the nation was wholly unprepared." He does not mention, 
however, that this willingness for war was most prevalent 
among dedicated American expansionists. He does not give 
consideration to the possibility that the American outcry 
against the "Diplomatic Act" was more partisan politics 
than responsible leadership, except to note that "after
25Ibid,, p. 413.
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these diplomatic events had been taking place for months, 
it was loudly asserted by opponents of Tyler’s administra­
tion, not only that England had no schemes afoot with ref­
erence to Texas, but that every idea of a European concert 
against annexation was transparent moonshine."2  ̂ True, 
this is a vital exception. But it simply is insufficient 
to counter what has gone before.
A third interpretation of the failure of the Anglo- 
French effort at joint mediation appeared in 1913. Writing 
on Mexican diplomacy on the eve of war with the United 
States, George L. Rives suggests that Britain doubted the 
willingness of France to act forcibly against its former 
ally. Although he agrees with Smith that American expan­
sion affronted Paris, Rives points out that even the French 
ministry distrusted the British and was hesitant to offend 
the United States. Because Guizot was a Protestant bourgeois, 
Rives writes, "he profoundly distrusted the people, and he 
never comprehended the strength or sincerity of their demands. 
He practiced, therefore, with the cordial consent of the 
King, a policy of timid conservatism, of which continued 
peace and material prosperity were to be the fruits."27 
With such an attitude, Rives concludes, although Guizot did 
what was possible to strengthen ties with London, "there was
26Ibid., p. 413.
2 7Qeorge L. Rives, "Mexican Diplomacy on Eve of War 
with United States," American Historical Review, XVIII 
(January, 1913), pp. 267-277.
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a point beyond which the French government would not have
? 8to go in support of Great Britain,"
In spite of their many dissimilarities, Reeves, Adams, 
Smith, and Rives agree on one point--namely, that by the 
summer of 1844 the "Diplomatic Act" had been severely 
weakened and could present little real threat to the United 
States. Both London and Paris had reason to avoid confront­
ing the United States over Texas, Smith provides an 
obvious explanation for Guizot’s refusal to intervene 
actively in Texas--the French populace was squarely opposed 
to any gesture offensive to the United States--but he still 
sanctions the alarm sounded by many Americans over the rumor 
of Anglo-French intervention in Texas. Reeves, Adams, and 
Rives also fail to examine the motives behind the vehement 
American denunciation of European involvement in Texas.
More recent historians of the Lone Star Republic, as well 
as students of American continental expansion, have asserted 
that not only was any fear of European intervention in Texas 
artificially stimulated by a shrewd Texas diplomacy, but 
also that the rhetoric surrounding the annexation of Texas 
was highly partisan and designed for domestic consumption.
In 1904, and with access only to printed sources,
George P. Garrison noted the Texas reaction to the refusal
28ibid., p. 285„
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of the United States to accept its offer of annexation.
"If the mother"Country of Texas would not cultivate 
sufficiently cordial relations with her runaway children," 
Garrison writes, the young republic would be forced to 
appeal to France and England. The Texas ambassador to the 
United States warned Secretary of State John Forsyth that 
"delay might be fatal to annexation, for Texas was estab­
lishing relations with foreign powers that might develop 
insurmountable obstacles" to that project. Unfortunately, 
Garrison concludes, the Van Buren administration at first 
postponed, then dropped annexation,^
To be sure, Van BurenJs rejection of the Texas invita­
tion was predicated upon an accurate judgment of domestic 
politics; but the delay of annexation only made Texas 
leaders more determined to insure independence.^ By the 
eighteen-forties, Texas diplomacy had succeeded. Sam 
Houston and Anson Jones provided the impetus behind the 
effort to protect Texas through the recognition and mediation 
of France and England, That they had good reason to turn 
to Europe is clear; that both realized the impact their
^George p. Garrison, "The First Stage of the Movement 
for the Annexation of Texas," American Historical Review, X 
(October, 1904), pp. 78-89.
"^See ibid.. pp. 80-81; also Ethel Zivley Rather, "The 
Recognition of the Republic of Texas by the United States," 
The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Associaton. VIII 
(April, 1910), pp. 155-256.
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diplomacy would have on tke American government is also 
clear. According to Thomas M, Marshall, Houston realized 
that the Tyler administration would be sensitive to rumors 
that Texas had close ties with Europe. Hence, when Texas 
dependence upon Europe was "made known to Tyler, as Houston 
probably intended," Tyler became even more adamant in his
•Z 1devotion to annexation.
St. George Leakin Sioussat also suggests that the 
Tyler administration capitalized upon rumors of French and 
British involvement in Texas to further annexation. Writing 
on Calhoun's tenure as Secretary of State, Sioussat notes 
that the American minister at Paris, William Rufus King, had 
informed the Secretary that France had no intention of 
forcibly intervening in Texas. In reply to allegations that 
France was siding with England in opposition to annexation, 
King further reported to Calhoun that "'Mr, Guizot at once 
reassured me that no such step . . .had been taken: that on
this subject France had acted for herself and in connection 
with no other power,*" But, according to Sioussat, Calhoun 
was better informed than his representative in France and 
could not be mollified. Although he approved of King's 
distinction between the interests of France and those of 
England in Texas, Calhoun set out to defeat the intrigues
^Thomas Maitland Marshall, "Diplomatic Relations of 
Texas and the United States, 1839-1843," ibid., XV (April, 
1912), p. 290.
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7. nof. Paris- and London through annexation,
Sioussat’s research into the King-Calhoun correspon­
dence broke new ground, but in justifying Calhoun’s denial 
of the minister’s reassurances, he demonstrates his accep­
tance of the polemics of annexation. In contrast to 
Sioussat, Mary Katherine Chase views the American accusation 
of French and British ’’machinations” in Texas as unfounded.
According to Chase, European interest in Texas was 
innocuous and based solely upon the professed desire of the 
Texans for independence. Perhaps a little sentimental 
towards the Lone Star Republic, Chase maintains that Texas, 
deeply wounded by the refusal of the United States to accept 
its proposal of annexation, was rescued by her friends in 
Europe. Chase scorns what she calls the "pretendues 
’menees europeens’ au Texas,” so vehemently denounced in 
the United States, and is one of the first to recognize 
the partisanship of these accusations, , She writes:
. ,^1’interet que certain des gouvernements 
europeens commencaient a prendre au sort du 
Texas, ou ils^envoyerent des agents pour les 
representer reguliejement, ne tarderent pas 
a faire croire aux Etats-Unis mille bruits sur 
les intentions de ces gouvernements amis et de 
fair coire, a la facile jalousie du peuple  ̂
Americain, qu’il existait des intrigues europeens, 
et surtout britanniques, au Texas. Ces sentiments
32St. George Leak,in Sioussat, ’’John Caldwell Calhoun," 
in The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, 
edo by Samuel F, Bemis, Vol. V (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 
1928), pp. 169-170.
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de defiance et de soupcon furent habilement exploites 
par les orateurs politiques--pour des raisons 
souvent personnelles, IIs acquirent enfin une 
telle importance que, si l'on devait lire l'histoire 
des relations entre 1 'Europe et Texas dans les 
pamphlets et les journaux de l ’epoque on n'y 
trouverait gu'un tissu de mensonges et de rancunes 
politiques.33
Lest the United States take offense, Chase notes, Britain 
and France were at first circumspect and required that Texas 
prove itself a viable nation,
Chase stresses two points which were instrumental in 
revising the historiography of France-American relations 
with respect to Texas. In the first place, she asserts 
that neither France nor England intended to offend the 
United States in their dealings with Texas, They simply 
believed that Texas desired independence and should be 
allowed to determine its own destiny. In the second place, 
she concludes that warnings of European intrigues in Texas
33Mary Katherine Chase, Negociations de la Republiaue 
du Texas en Eurone. 1837-1845 (Paris: Libraire Ancienne 
Honore Champion, 1932}, pp. 110-112, I have translated 
Chase as follows:
, . ,the interest certain European governments began 
to take in the fate of Texas, where they sent agents 
to regularly represent them, was not long in causing 
widespread speculation in the United States as to 
the intentions of these friendly governments, and in 
leading to the belief of the easily jealous American 
people, that European intrigues, especially British, 
existed in Texas, These feelings of mistrust and 
suspicion were skillfully exploited by political ora- 
tors--often for personal reasons. They acquired such 
an importance that finally, if one must read the his­
tory of the relations between Europe and Texas from 
the pamphlets and newspapers of the period, one will 
find only a pack of lies and political spite.
were expansionist propaganda, Unfortunately, Chase provides 
sufficient evidence to support only her first assertion. If 
expanding upon Sioussat*s findings, she had shown that Cal­
houn, Tyler, and the other advocates of annexation had 
information revealing the basically honorable intentions of 
France and Britain and neglected or rejected it, then her 
second point would have been strengthened. It is simply 
not justified to claim that partisan politics and expan­
sionist emotion created an artificial crisis in Franco- 
American relations without extensive documentation.
In his thoughtful study of "Manifest Destiny," Albert K 
Weinberg supports the view that the proponents of the 
annexation of Texas raised the spectre of European intrigue 
to further their cause. In the eyes of the dedicated 
American expansionists, Weinberg asserts, European involve­
ment in Texas, as elsewhere in North America, "appeared" 
to threaten the United States. He writes:
British and French attempts to establish sovereignty 
or political influence in adjacent countries 
appeared to threaten not merely economic and 
strategic interests but also the security of 
democracy. The expansionism of the * forties 
arose as a defensive effort to forestall the 
encroachment of Europe in North America. . . .
As one can see in the most numerous utterances, 
the conception of an "extension of the area of 
freedom" became general as an ideal of pre­
venting absolutistic Europe from lessening 
the area open to American democracy.34
34Weinberg, Manifest Destiny, p. 109,
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In a 1941 article, R»A, McLemore offers further proof 
that France and England only "appeared" to endanger Amer­
ican interests in Texas, Drawing heavily from the archives 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris, as well as 
from Smith, Adams, and Chase, McLemore’s brief article is 
a synopsis of French policy in Texas. He asserts that 
France gave little reason for the United States to resent 
her involvement in Texas. "In the end," he writes, French 
"policy weakened the British program of opposition and 
thus made the final consumation of annexation less dif­
ficult." Throughout the entire affair, from 1837 to 1845,
"the French leaders were careful not to take any action 
that would alienate the friendship of the United States.
The desire to avoid offending the United States, McLemore 
claims, was coupled with the hope of the Guizot ministry 
that Texas independence would be preserved. McLemore echoes 
Smith when he writes that "Guizot found. , .there were 
certain political and commercial considerations which 
would not permit France to view such a move with indifference." 
Included in these considerations were
•^Richard A. McLemore, "The Influence of French 
Diplomatic Policy on the Annexation of Texas," Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly, XLIII (January, 1940), p. 347.
the possible consequences to Mexico, the Spanish 
race and the Catholic religion in America. The 
annexation of Texas, Guizot declared, would lead 
directly to the conquest of Mexico, This would 
place the United States in such a position of 
predominance that it would cause alarm in Europe.
The commercial considerations of most impor­
tance. . .were first the hope that Texas would 
offer a profitable market. . .and second the 
expectation that French shipping would find the 
direct trade with Texas profitable. Guizot also 
expressed the belief that French prestige would 
suffer by annexation since France had been the 
first European state to recognize the independence 
of Texas.
The French attitude towards Texas, then, was ambivalent. 
Consequently, France could present no real threat to 
American interests in Texas, and suspicions to that 
effect were unwarranted,
McLemore*s article is a watershed in the historiography 
of the role of Texas in Franco-American relations. During 
the past thirty years, historians have increasingly stressed 
both the influence of Texas diplomacy upon American attitudes 
toward the French presence in Texas and the enervating 
ambivalence of French policy and sentiments towards Amer­
ican expansion.
In 1941, Joseph William Schmitz published the first 
detailed examination of the various aspects of Texan 
diplomacy. Paraphrasing Memucan Hunt, the Texas minister 
to the United States during most of the Van Buren adminis­
tration, Schmitz analyzes the unfavorable situation in
36lbid., p . 342.
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Washington concerning annexation:
. . .he [Hunt] wrote that most of the important 
political men including Van Buren were eager for 
annexation; for the past twelve years had it not 
been the settled and uniform policy of the United 
States to acquire Texas? Yet they would not act 
hampered as they were "by their party trammels 
on the one hand, and their treaty obligations 
with Mexico on the other, by the furious opposition 
of all the free states, by the fear of incurring 
the charge of false dealings and injustice, and 
of involving this country in a war."37
It was with Hunt's views in mind, Schmitz asserts, that
Texans fashioned their diplomacy to provide insurance in
the event that annexation continued unfulfilled. But
annexation was not regarded as a cure-all, for the Texan
government feared that war with Mexico would result. In
essence, then, Schmitz interprets Texas diplomacy as two-
sided: on the one hand, the leadership sought to satisfy
the popular desire for annexation; and on the other, it
hoped to provide an opportunity for European mediation to
settle the dispute with Mexico.^
In a 1948 biography of Anson Jones, A Texas diplomat
and politician whose career spanned the entire life of the
Lone Star Republic, Herbert Gambrell makes the more positive
claim that the Texan leadership hoped to stimulate American
•^Joseph William Schmitz, Texan Statecraft, 1836- 
184 5 (San Antonio: The Naylor Co., 1941), p . 58\
38Ibid., pp. 176, 202 .
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alarm over European intrigues so that the United States 
would offer annexation. After the failure of the first 
attempt to bring Texas into the Union, Jones knew, Gam- 
brell writes, "that annexation would be impossible unless 
American sentiment c h a n g e d , H o u s t o n  appointed Jones 
Secretary of State in 1842, whereupon the effort to change 
the American attitude intensified. Intending to stir 
Washington into action, Jones instructed his representa­
tive there to intimate "that Texas was seeking connections 
with Europe."4® Calhoun and Tyler responded quickly, but 
the debate on annexation was renewed in 1844, and Jones 
saw the need for further "hints" of Anglo-French designs 
in Texas. Gambrell writes; "What the United States 
needed, Dr, Jones thought, was 'another scare. One or 
two doses of English calomel and French quinine. . .and 
the case will be pretty well out of danger.'"4^
Stanley Siegel capped the historiography of the shrewd 
Texan diplomacy in 1956, Siegel's study is primarily a 
political history of Texas, going beyond Gambrell to include 
such figures as Lamar, Austin, and Houston. Nevertheless,
^Herbert Gambrell, Anson Jones; The Last President of 
Texas (Garden City; Doubleday and Co., 1948), p. 156,
40Ibid,, p. 276.
4 -̂Ibid. , p. 327. Author's italics.
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Siegel does reaffirm what Gambrell has written about the 
goals of Texan diplomacy, "The Executive’s entire policy 
in the annexation proceedings," Siegel claims, "was based 
on the idea of prompting the United States to accept 
annexation by making the most of English friendship."42'
But not only was English involvement to be emphasized, 
for due to the Anglo-French "Diplomatic Act" a British 
threat to the United States meant a French threat as well. 
Paris had recognized Texas in 1839, and in the forties 
the Texan government hoped that this would "show the United 
States the Republic’s importance as an independent power."4  ̂
Schmitz, Gambrell, and Siegel, then, clearly establish 
that the leadership of Texas employed American suspicion 
of Europe to further annexation.
With few exceptions, recent historians have reaffirmed 
McLemore’s view that French policy in Texas did not endanger 
American interests,44 McLemore’s influence is pervasive in
^Stanley Siegel, 4  Political History of the Texas 
Republic. 1836-1845 (Austin; University of Texas Press, 
1956), p. 228.
45Ibid., p. 119,
4 4 Two  notable exceptions are Donald C .  McKay, The 
United States and France (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1951); and Ray Allen Billington, The Far Western 
Frontier. 1830-1.860 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), 
McKay is confused regarding French policy in Texas (see 
p. 88), and Billington reverts to the older view that 
France did indeed present a challenge to American interests 
in Texas (see p. 137).
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Henry Blumenthal*s important monograph. Summarizing French
policy in Texas, Blumenthal writes:
As long as France could not acquire Texas di­
rectly. , .it favored the independence of the 
Lone Star Republic. This policy was designed 
to block the dynamic southwestern advance of 
the American people as well as to keep the door 
open for the dynastic interests of the House of 
Bourbon. For in Guizot’s judgment, Europe had 
the duty to stem the flow of Protestantism and 
republicanism on the American continent. When 
in the fall of 1839 France recognized Texas in 
exchange for a favorable trade treaty, it 
became the first European power to take this 
step. From that moment on it had an additional 
reason to object to the annexation of this 
independent state by the United States.45
But France merely "wished to convey the impression of a 
united diplomatic front in order to make military inter­
vention unnecessary," Blumenthal hastens to add. He also 
quotes, as does McLemore, Guizot’s declaration that " ’I 
am not prepared to say that its [Texas] junction with the 
American states is of sufficient importance to us to 
justify us in having recourse to arms in order to prevent
One point, however, remains in doubt. Because McLemore 
does not mention the failure of Aberdeen’s scheme for joint 
action in Texas, it can only be assumed from his article 
that Paris feared that intervention in Texas would offend 
the United States. Blumenthal is content to list the
45Blumenthal, A Reappraisal, pp. 36-37.
46Ibid., pp. 38-39.
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differing opinions of Smith, Adams, and Rives on the matter, 
concluding that "historians are generally agreed that the 
question was one of joint intervention or none."^
Frederick Merk has shed some light on this confused sub­
ject, and he suggests that due to memories of British 
arrogance and predominance, the entente cordiale was at 
best feeble. Merk also reviews the Calhoun-King corres­
pondence, as well as Calhoun's subsequent efforts to 
discriminate between Paris and London, and in his con­
clusion asserts that this only further alienated the 
British from the French. Thus, Merk seems to accept 
the validity of both the Adams and Rives interpretations.
Clearly, the American annexation of Texas ran counter 
to Guizot's sympathies, and his resulting frustration 
was exhibited in his June speech, Hindered not only by 
domestic politics, but also by the weakness of France in 
the New World, Guizot was unable to preserve Texan inde­
pendence, His speech reflects both the inability of France 
to influence events in the New World, and the ideological 
inclinations of the July Monarchy. It is surprising that 
only two authors have dealt extensively with the Guizot 
declaration; it is significant that they differ as to its 
meaning.
47ibid., p. 38.
^Frederick Merk, The Monroe Doctrine and American Ex­
pansionism. 1843-1849 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 
pp. 40-43.
•»  88  »
According to Dexter Perkins, Guizot's speech was 
self-defeating and only further separated the United 
States from France. After quoting Guizot's remarks, 
he writes:
It is true that nothing in the sentences 
just quoted implied a policy of armed inter­
vention in the New World; it is true, indeed, 
that the French minister expressly disclaimed 
the use of force; but the theory which he 
propounded in this defense of his policy was 
a theory which could not fail to be entirely 
uncongenial to the public opinion of the 
United States. For behind the Monroe Doctrine, 
from the very first, had lain an antagonism to 
those shifting arrangements of interest on 
which the balance of power was based; and 
however innocent might be the methods employed 
for the moment to promote the idea of an 
American equilibrium, the idea itself was 
naturally repugnant to the people of the 
rising republic of North America, In an era 
of self-confident nationalism, it was 
naturally a little galling to be regarded, 
not as the dominant nation of the New World, 
but as only one element in an American balance 
of power.
Perkins goes on to review the American reaction exemplified 
by the Washington Union and the Democratic Review. While 
admitting that both were administration organs, he con­
cludes that their vehement criticism of Guizot probably 
influenced Polk.^
Stressing the unsavory connotation of the balance of 
power doctrine, Perkins accepts completely the interpreta­
tion of the Union and the Democratic Review that Guizot
^^Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp. 72-74.
was advocating an "American balance of power." Frederick 
Merk has taken Perkins to task on this account, criticizing 
his dependence upon partisan polemics. It was only in 
American expansionist journals, Merk insists, that Guizot 
was presented as advocating that the Old World principle 
of a power balance should be applied to the New. Merk 
reviews the assessments of the speech in the correspondence 
of the American minister at Paris, William Rives, in the 
French press, both conservative and opposition, in the 
London Times, and in American Whig papers. None found 
Guizot advocating an "American balance of power."50 While 
Perkins emphasizes the upsurge of "Manifest Destiny" feel­
ing after the Guizot speech, Merk claims that "this reverses 
the actual order of events, which was that Manifest Destiny 
advocates were using a phrase attributed to Guizot for their 
own purposes."51
To demonstrate further that it is fallacious to inter­
pret Guizot as pressing for an "American balance of power," 
Merk reviews the speech itself. He concludes that Guizot 
chose his phrases with care:
They included "equilibre des forces" between the great 
masses which divide America, so that no one of them 
become exclusively predominant; "equilibre des divers 
Etats"; and "equilibre des grandes forces politique 
en Amerique." "Equilibre" was a general term meaning 
balance, a condition, natural and even beneficial. It 
was the opposite in political affairs of domination by 
a single power over a continent or a world.
50Merk, The Monroe Doctrine and Expansionism, pp. 52-53.
51Ibid., pp. 60-61.
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Furthermore, Merk notes, ’'balance of power" in French is
equilibre europeens; nowhere did Guizot use equilibre
✓ . * 5 2amencain . ^
While only two authors have examined the Guizot 
speech, several deal with Polk’s annual message. But 
because during the intervening months American expansion 
had turned toward the Pacific, interpretations of Polk's 
declaration have varied. A few historians see Polk's 
revival of Monroe's principles as caused by new threats, 
both French and British, on the West Coast. Perkins is 
the only one of this group to discuss Guizot’s policy 
announcement and to assert that Polk was replying to the 
insidious doctrine of an "American balance of power." 
Nevertheless, his work is similar to that of the others 
included in this grouping--all of whom are influenced 
by expansionist propaganda, in spite of its partisan 
nature. A second viewpoint, most clearly illustrated by 
Reeves, is that Polk was plotting to acquire California, 
and consequently reiterated the Monroe Doctrine to gain 
popular support, More recently, historians have clarified 
the relationship of California to the "Polk Doctrine," 
and have emphasized the political background of his Decem­
ber message.
^2Ibid., pp. 49-51.
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In his innovative study of American diplomacy during 
the administration of Tyler and Polk, Reeves is unmoved by 
the claim, so prevalent among the advocates of expansion, 
that Polk's message was a warranted response to a very 
real danger. Instead, Reeves asserts that Polk "coveted 
California from his entrance into office. . .with Polk 
belongs the glory, if glory it be, of the Mexican War
C *Zand of the conquest of California." According to 
Reeves, Polk's instructions to John Slidell, the newly 
appointed representative to Mexico, are proof of his 
dishonorable diplomacy. These directives dwelt first on 
the rumored designs of France and Britain upon Mexican 
territory, and Reeves writes, they "are the key-note to 
Polk's aggressive policy of expansion,"**4 Turning to the 
December message, Reeves makes no mention of Guizot, or 
of an "American balance of power." He views the speech 
as primarily directed to Oregon and the dispute With 
Britain. Nonetheless, he suggests that in order to gain 
additional popular backing, Polk "*re-affirmed' the Monroe 
Doctrine, with an eye as much to California and the fine 
bay of San Francisco, as to Oregon,"****
^Reeves, Diplomacy Under Tyler and Polk, p. 189.
54Ibid., p. 275.
55Ibid., p. 258.
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Although Polk had received reports from the American 
consul in California, Thomas 0. Larkin, "that Great Britain 
and France had evident designs upon the province,” Reeves 
doubts the validity of these warnings. Rather, he con­
tinues, they were only a pretense to bolster Polk's determ­
ination to acquire California regardless of the means.
This caustic treatment of Polk’s California policy is 
countered by Eugene I. McCormac in his 1922 biography of 
the ninth president. McCormac asserts that California was 
not a sine qua non to Polk's diplomacy; if it had not been 
for the efforts of Britain and France to usurp Mexican 
sovereignty in California, then the United States would 
not have been driven to acquire it. To be sure, McCormac 
adds, Polk was not immune to the lure of the West Coast.
But "rumors of British and French designs on California 
induced Polk to take early steps to prevent their success." 
Thus, McCormac writes, Polk "told Congress that certain 
European nations, in order to check the territorial expan­
sion of the United States, were attempting to extend to
America the ’balance-of-power’ doctrine which had been long
5 7maintained in Europe." As a biographer, McCormac tends
56Ibid», pp. 278-281,
'Eugene Irving McCormac, James K. Polk: A Political 
Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 192 2) , 
pp. 391, 692-693.
p oto sympathize with his subject. Unfortunately, he makes 
no further reference to Franco"American relations.
J. Fred Rippy also asserts that Polk’s speech was a 
justified reaction to European lust for California. To 
Rippy, the threat of European interference in California 
signified more than just the possible transfer to terri­
tory. Because Europe was monarchial and conservative, 
the acquisition of California by the United States was 
unmistakably necessary. To support this claim, Rippy
refers indirectly to the ’’undemocratic principles”
59articulated by Guizot,
Perkins expands upon Rippy’s interpretation and 
emphasizes its importance to an understanding of Franco- 
American relations. From our review of the interpretation 
given by Perkins to the Guizot speech, what that author 
has to say about Polk’s message should come as no surprise. 
According to Perkins, Guizot’s principles, if left un­
challenged, threatened the security of the United States.
He writes:
5®0f the decision to send General Zachary Taylor 
across the Nueces River, McCormac writes: ”It was
certainly the duty of the President to defend Texas.” 
Ibid., pp, 38~381,
Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931), pp. 29.
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The Guizot doctrine of the balance of power in 
the New World, (if it be not unfair to call by 
the name of Guizot a doctrine not uncommonly 
held by many others), was a doctrine dangerous 
to the peace of the American continents. It 
ought to have been challenged, and so far as 
the United States was concerned, repudiated,
Because the December speech came in the midst of the 
Oregon dispute, Polk’s bold reply to Guizot would seem 
to have been risky, if not foolhardy * A crisis with France 
might have led to an Anglo-French accord directed against 
the United States, ’’But in answer to this,” Perkins has­
tens to add, ”it can be pointed out that the risks of any 
very serious breach with France were decidedly not great." 
Because there "existed in France a very friendly feeling 
o . .for the United States, , , ,the American government 
would have had to go much further than to dispute what 
was after all a theoretical principle, however dangerous, 
before a genuine tension in Franco-American relations 
would result,"^
By detailing the Paris reaction to the Polk message, 
Perkins establishes that the American president was in­
deed replying to the French minister0 On January 12, 1846, 
Guizot again spoke in the Chambers, Perkins writes:
60perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp. 96-98.
. . ,[Guizot] amplified and expanded his views 
of American policy* and his doctrine of the 
balance of power, and directly challenged the 
Presidents doctrine. The two great races of 
the Hew World, the Spanish and the English, he 
declared, must not be permitted one to absorb 
the other, and in particular, the southern 
Catholic race must not be devoured by the 
Anglo-American. The doctrine of the balance 
of power, he went on, in language which sounds 
a little grotesque to the generation which 
remembers the balance of power of 1914, had 
been the source of the development, the 
prosperity, the moral and social greatness of 
Europe, and would be equally salutary in the 
New World. . . .with regard to the United 
States the French prime minister made his 
viewpoint clear. The relations of the United 
States with France* he declared, were entirely 
friendly; France, far from looking with regret 
upon the rising greatness of the new republic 
of the West, applauded it.
With this outline of French concern for events in the New
World, Perkins notes, Guizot went on to declare that he
could not accept the idea that Europe should be barred
from exercising any political action in the New World.^
Significantly, Perkins denies that Polk's speech was
an accurate appraisal of European aims in the New World.
Of the problems that had stimulated the speech, Perkins
writes, "it is worth noting that one, Texas, had been
settled; that another, California, existed only in the
President's imagination;. . .and that the third, Oregon,
was finally composed without reference to what Polk had
to say." Furthermore, Perkins notes, the support accorded
61Ibid., pp. 114-115.
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the speech was largely partisan.^2 And yet, in spite of 
the fact that much of what gave Polk cause for concern was 
illusory, and in spite of its obvious partisan background, 
Polk’s address, Perkins claims, punctuated the conflicting 
interests of Washington and Paris in the New World. When 
Guizot replied to Polk in January of 1846, the dichotomy 
between French and American goals was clearly defined.
Perkins writes: "It was Guizot, . .who, first of all
European statesmen, denounced the pretension of the United 
States to the hegemony of the New World in a public 
address.
Historians writing after Perkins have reinforced his 
assertion that the problem of European intervention in 
California was imaginary. Furthermore, where Perkins speaks 
but briefly about the political aspects of Polk’s speech, 
subsequent historians have stressed the acrimonious 
partisanship of the forties, in which the December speech 
played a significant role, Frederick Merk, as seen above, 
goes so far as to challenge Perkins's assumption that Polk 
was correct when he interpreted Guizot as advocating an 
"American balance of power,” Nevertheless, Perkins's 
interpretation that the Guizot-Polk exchange symbolized 
an ideologically inspired breach in Franco-American relations
62ibid,, p. 120.
63lbid., p. 117.
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remains intact, Historians have generally accepted his 
view that, regardless of Polkfs immediate motives, the 
December speech was representative of the conflict between 
the New and Old Worlds.
Prior to Perkins, a few authors had dealt with 
European aims in California. E.D. Adams, for example, 
discounted the British involvement in that Mexican province 
as being greatly exaggerated. Aside from being indifferent 
to colonial expansion, the Peel government had close ties 
with Mexico and was basically ignorant of California, For 
these reasons, Adams writes, the British attitude toward the 
province was one of "consistent passivity„"64 George Rives 
does not view the British as being so indifferent to Calif­
ornia, but he notes that any designs of London were still­
born because of the French policy of keeping "in accord 
with the United States,**6'’ Likewise, St. George Leakin 
Sioussat believes that the lack of French support frustrated 
any potential British effort in California,66 Thus, even 
before Perkins wrote, there was a belief that a European 
threat in California was minimal.
64Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 
p. 264.
6 5 Rives, "Mexican Diplomacy on Eve of War with the 
United States," pp. 286-298,
66St. George Leakin Sioussat, "James Buchanan," in 
The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed.
by Samuel F. Bemis, Vol. V (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1928), p. 271.
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It was not until 1945, however, that the European 
involvement in California began to come into clearer light. 
Relying on extensive research into the records of French 
activities in California, Abraham P. Nasatir supplies by 
far the best review of French policy in the province. In 
his view, the French interest in the West Coast of North 
America was exemplified by the expedition of Eugene Duflot 
de Mofras in 1841-1842. ”There can be little doubt,” he 
writes, ”that France, in sending Mofras as an agent to 
collect information about the Pacific region entertained 
hopes similar to those of England and the United States-- 
that California might fall into her possession,” '̂7 But 
France was forced to be discreet, awaiting a favorable 
opportunity. By 1844, Nasatir asserts, Paris realized 
that the United States and Great Britain were the two 
powers most likely to secure California. And since France 
had other interests in the Pacific--interests most en­
dangered by an expansion of British power--she preferred 
California, if it could not belong to France, to fall to 
the United States.^
Drawing from American and European manuscript material 
as well as from Nasatir, Norman A, Graebner provides a 
superior account of the international rivalry for California
67Abraham P. Nasatir, French Activities in California 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1945), p. 15.
68Ibid., p. 8.
69Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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and its relations to the Guizot-Polk exchange, He, too,
discredits French aspirations in California: "French
hopes in California faded first, if they existed beyond
the minds of a few enthusiasts, France possessed no special
claims to the region, nor did her power and interests in
the Pacific equal those of Great Britain and the United
States." Graebner agrees with Nasatir that Paris feared
70a British victory in the contest for California, He is
also in accord with earlier historians, especially Adams,
for he doubts that either France or Britain would have
acted with conviction in California. He writes:
British and French diplomacy, which became so 
grand in its pretensions and so disillusioning 
in its eventual failure, ended finally as little 
more than a tribute of commercially minded powers 
to the grandeur of California and the growing 
importance of the Pacific Ocean, . , .neither 
government ever revealed any true imperialism 
toward the Mexican province. . . .Frenchmen who 
knew California coveted it to the end, but they 
never inaugurated any policy. , .that might have 
acquired it.^l
Graebner makes his most important contribution to the 
historiography of Franco-American relations when he connects 
the French frustration in failing to influence events in 
California, as well as Texas, to Guizot's June speech. By 
1845, both France and Britain, he writes, "had turned
in American Continental Expansion (New York: The Ronald 
Press, 1955), pp. 74-75.
71Ibid., p. 81.
rman A. Graebner. Emnire on the Pacific: A Stud
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jaundiced eyes toward the United States, for American 
expansionism threatened to encompass the bay [of San 
Francisco! and destroy the balance of Pacific commerce."7  ̂
In a 1953 article, Graebner refers to a dispatch sent by 
Alphonse Pageot, the French ambassador at Washington, to 
Guizot, in which the representative ’’thought it time to 
protest against American arrogance which threatened the 
'balance of forces in this hemisphere.’ He believed that 
the American spirit of usurpation could ’endanger the 
peace of the world,’ if not restrained in time by serious 
warning,” Upon receipt of Pageot's anxious observations, 
Graebner continues, Guizot declared in front of the 
Chambers: " ’It behooves France to preserve the balance
of power in the Western Hemisphere,
In their assessments of the intent of Guizot's pro­
nouncement, Perkins and Graebner differ, Perkins, as we 
have seen, views the American criticism of Guizot's speech 
as not unjustified,7  ̂ Graebner, however, believes the 
reaction of the American expansionist press to be mistaken. 
Even if it be only through diplomacy, Graebner writes,
72Ibid., p. 66,
73Graebner, "American Interest in California, 1845," 
Pacific Historical Review, XXII (February, 1953), p. 19.
74perkins, Monroe Doctrine, p. 72.
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these expansionists, [Graebner here refers in 
part to the same editors quoted by Perkins] 
ironically, never understood that the European 
inclination to interfere in American affairs 
resulted largely from a fear of this nation’s 
apparent continental ambitions. The mushroom 
growth of American acquisitiveness toward 
California in 1845 was actually more alarming 
to European observers than the annexation of 
Texas. But these natural British and French 
reactions toward American expansionism merely 
aggravated the American desire to annex Cali­
fornia. European intervention seemed to 
threaten the moral growth of the nation and 
endanger the entire concept of the Monroe 
Doctrine.
Where Perkins sees a threat inherent in Guizot's doctrine 
of American equilibrium, Graebner sees an understandable 
concern. But both authors agree that the American response 
to this concern, whatever its intent, signified an ideo­
logical division between the Old and New Worlds.
Subsequent to Graebner*s work, Frederick Merk makes 
the only significant contribution to the historiography 
of the Guizot-Polk exchange. We have already seen that 
Merk criticizes the one-sidedness of Perkins’s' evidence-.
Like Graebner, Merk emphasizes the partisan background of 
the "Polk Doctrine." Merk, however, is more explicit on 
the subject. Indeed, he views the Polk message as a 
virtual campaign document, and in doing so he is reminiscent 
of Reeves. Of the motives of Polk in reasserting Monroe's 
principles, Merk writes:
^Graebner, Empire on the Pacific, p. 88.
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When Polk began preparation of bis message to 
Congress in' the autumn of 1845, he was unques­
tionably aware of all this newspaper discussion 
of the "balance-of-power" idea. The Washington 
Union, his daily fare, was filled with the 
subject. . . .Newspaper propaganda is not 
normally lifted into state papers, and yet how 
could a President who had employed it to such 
advantage in his election and had seen it so 
usefully employed afterwards fail to use it?
The magic phrase "balance-of-power" occurred 
thrice in brief space in the message, as if 
to make sure that it be remembered. It was, 
indeed, remembered. Thereafter, it was used 
by Democrats incessantly to suggest that 
European monarchs were intent on keeping the 
American world divided,76
Merk further resembles Reeves when he assesses the role
played by California in stimulating Polk to expand the
principle of the two spheres to exclude even diplomatic
intervention. In order to secure California, as well as
to solve the Oregon dispute and the Mexican boundary
question, Merk writes, "what could be more useful than to
remind Americans of meddling and 'balance-of-power’
tactics employed by European monarchs in the recent past
as a protection against their use in the future?"77
As further evidence that Polk misinterpreted Guizot
in crediting him as advocating an "American balance of
power," Merk examines the debate between Guizot and Thiers
during January of 1846, Perkins uses this debate as final
proof of Guizot's devotion to a principle inimical to
American interests. But, according to Merk, Thiers never
76Merk, The Monroe Doctrine and Expansionism, p. 60.
77Ibid.t p. 64.
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accused Guizot of supporting an "equiTibre americalne";
furthermore, Guizot translated Polk’s phrase "balance of
power" as " ’ce_ qu’ on appelle en Europe la balance des
s 7 8pouvolrs entre les Etats.’" True, this may seem 
picayunish, But Merk has at least demonstrated that 
what Polk meant when he referred derisively to the phrase 
"balance of power" was something entirely different from 
what Guizot intended.
The significance of Merk's interpretation of Guizot's 
speech is illustrated by two historians who published before 
Merk and who revert to the Perkins viewpoint. In a summary 
of French policy towards the United States, Henry Blumenthal
writes that Paris sought to "check" American expansion,
79using as evidence Guizot’s speech. Along the same lines 
Glyndon G. Van Deusen claims that Polk was troubled not only 
by the Oregon dispute and the vulnerability of California, 
but also by "the declaration by French Premier Francois 
Guizot that it was in the interest of France to preserve
Q Qthe existing balance of power in the New World."0 Both 
authors view Guizot’s speech as proof that France hoped to 
hinder the growth of the United States. That the Guizot 
ministry was upset by American expansionism is obvious,
78Ibid., pp. 88-91.
^Blumenthal, A Reappraisal, p. 36.
8°Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, pp. 217-218.
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but to claim, using Guizot’s June declaration as a sole 
support, that France sought to prevent the acquisition 
of territory by the United States is misleading^
It has been suggested that Merk and Reeves are 
similar in that both authors interpret Polk’s December 
message as a campaign document. Polk's most recent bio­
grapher, Charles Sellers, reaffirms this viewpoint, 
challenging the idea that Guizot’s speech and the European 
involvement in California directly prompted Polk to revive 
the Monroe Doctrine, Sellers claims that Polk, upon his 
inauguration, already possessed a ’’continental vision" 
that included California. The conversation with Bancroft 
has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, and in refer­
ence to Polk’s dedication to the acquisition of California, 
Sellers asserts that the annual message was a fundamental 
step in the process that fused the traditional agrarian 
expansionism of the United States with the new force of 
commercial expansionism. According to Sellers, Polk was 
"superbly fitted" to direct the drive to the Pacific. He 
writes:
. . .[Polk] had the political genius to sense the 
latent strength of the continentalist impulse and 
the political audacity and skill to chart the 
series of declarations and actions by which he 
committed the country to an continentalist course, 
and in response to which the continentalist impulse 
became manifest and overwhelming.81
SlSellers, Polk, pp. 213-214.
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Tlie significance of the annual message, then, cannot be 
ignoredo Polk practiced the Jacksonian theory of 
presidential leadership, Sellers writes, "more systemat­
ically than any other nineteenth-century president," 
Fundamental to this theory was the principle of presi­
dential initiative in the legislative process, the primary 
instrument of which was the annual message. Sellers 
writes:
Thus a President who was attuned to the public 
mood--as John Quincy Adams had not been in a 
notable earlier effort at presidential initia­
tive --could make the annual message a powerful 
instrument for crystallizing national opinion 
behind his measures and bringing it to bear on 
a distracted or even hostile Congress,
Although Polk made no direct references to California in
his speech, Sellers concludes that "the thought of
California was interwoven with every word of his arresting
warning that ’any European interference on the North
American Continent’ would be resisted by the United States
'at any and all hazards,’" Sellers adds that Polk received
o 2overwhelming bipartisan support for his message.
For the most part, historians have consistently moved 
away from the idea that European interests in the New World 
threatened the American democracy and as such warranted 
the acquisition of Texas and California, Adams, Smith, 
and Rives, in spite of their faults, have established that
82lbid,, pp„ 324-326,
-106 -
the ’'Diplomatic Act," so suspect in the eyes of Americans, 
was stillborn, The historians of the Texas republic have 
further demonstrated that the Texan leadership of Houston 
and Jones played upon American suspicions of Europe to 
advance the cause of annexation. Furthermore, beginning 
with Reeves and Adams, and including Nasatir and Graebner, 
it has been shown that fear of European intrigue in 
California was chimerical. It is clear, then, that 
neither France nor Britain seriously planned to thwart 
the continental expansion of the United States, To be 
sure, both London and Paris hoped to preserve Texan inde­
pendence. The two also had some interest in the fate of 
California. Still, nowhere did France or Britain present 
a challenge to American interests. For this reason, 
recent historians have differed with Perkins’s interpreta­
tion that Guizot's June speech endangered American interests 
in the New World and therefore warranted Polk’s strident 
revival of Monroe’s principles, Perkins himself noted the 
partisan background of Polk’s annual message, Graebner, 
Merk, and Sellers have emphasized this point even more. In 
the process, Reeves’s early denunciation of Polk's plot 
to acquire California has come into new focus. Sellers 
has also placed the December message within the context 
of Polk's contribution to the development of presidential 
leadership. Nevertheless, Perkins has not been totally
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repudiated. In his belief that the Guizot-Polk exchange 
signified an ideologically inspired dichotomy between 
the interests of France and the United States in the New 
World, Perkins has been upheld. Although Polk’s motives 
have been clarified, although Guizot’s speech has been 
re-defined, it cannot be denied that the bumptious ex­
pansion of American republicanism conflicted with the 
predilections of the government of Louis Philippe. But 
because the expansion of the United States did not threaten 
the security of France, but only offended the sensibilities 
of the July Monarchy, Guizot’s desire to limit the American 
advance was not matched by a determination to implement it.
French policy towards the Oregon question and the 
outbreak of war between Mexico and the United States, as 
well as the American response to renewed Anglo-French 
military intervention in the La Plata region of South 
America, offer an insight into the quality of Franco- 
American relations in the aftermath of the Guizot-Polk 
exchange. During 1846, all three of these issues reached 
a crucial point. But Paris remained neutral towards the 
Oregon dispute and the Mexican War, and Washington in 
effect ignored events in the La Plata area.
French abstention from involvement in the Oregon 
question first attracted the attention of George Vern Blue. 
Relying upon dispatches between the French minister in
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Washington, Pageot, and Guizot, Blue demonstrates that
although both were offended by American belligerency,
Guizot was adamant that France must not intervene. In
reply to Pageot*s suggestion that France should offer
arbitration, Blue quotes Guizot as writing the following:
On a special question of Oregon we warmly 
desire that a pacific solution take place; 
for it would be doubly regrettable if the 
peace of the world were threatened by such 
a matter, and we are in any case firmly 
decided to keep the most complete neutrality 
as long as it will be possible for us to do 
s o .83
Blue concludes that the French were uninterested in the 
Oregon issue, for no French policies were immediately at 
stake. Agreeing with Blue, two more recent authors have 
also asserted that the French policy of neutrality con­
tributed to the peaceful solution of this dispute.
John S, Galbraith maintains that a contributing factor 
in London’s Oregon policy was its concern for relations 
with France. British statesmen, Galbraith writes, "could 
not ignore the possibilities of conflict with European 
states, in particular with France, as a concomitant to war 
with the United States," The entente with France was so 
weak, Galbraith continues, that "hatred of Britain, evident 
in the speeches of French politicians and in the tone of 
the French press, might force the government of Louis
83George Vera Blue, "France and the Oregon Question," 
Oregon Historical Quarterly, XXXIII (1933), pp. 149-150.
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Philippe into war and that war fever in Prance would mount 
if Britain were to be drawn into conflict with the United 
States „ ”8^
Galbraith’s assertions are based upon thorough research 
into British records, and his article is revealing of 
Anglo-French relations. Over the objections of his foreign 
minister, Aberdeen, Sir Robert Peel remained distrustful 
of France, The possibility that war with the United States 
would involve war with France did not cause Peel to retreat 
before the American bluster, Galbraith notes, ’’Such con­
siderations, however, compelled him to seek peaceful 
agreement with the United States if it could be attained 
without the sacrifice of prestige,”^
Henry Blumenthal ventures beyond Galbraith to assert 
that ’’Britain’s suspicion of France, , .was the decisive 
factor in its final disposition of the Oregon question,”
But Blumenthal also considers the impact of the Oregon 
dispute upon Franco-American relations. In his view, the 
French attitude toward Oregon was similar to that taken 
toward Texas and California, Guizot interpreted the 
slogan ”54’40° or fight” as another example of American 
acquisitiveness. But, Blumenthal notes, the French minister 
was trammeled by domestic opinions. Thus, ’’unable to act
84john S. Galbraith, "France as a Factor in the Oregon 
Negotiations,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly. XLIV (April, 
1953), pp. 69-70,
85Ibid.,'p. 72.
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with determination and forcefulness, he announced that 
France would be neutral in case of an Anglo-American war," 
Blumenthal adds, however, that "This premature neutrality 
declaration had serious consequences." Not only did 
Guizot demonstrate to both Britain and the United States 
that France could not be counted on, but he also further 
alienated the United States from France. It is Blumenthal's 
opinion that upon the sudden termination of the Oregon 
dispute, "the Pacific triumph of Polk’s administration did
O Anot help endear ’neutral’ France to the United States." 
Blumenthal’s support for this assertion is weak, but until 
further research is done on the matter, his work remains 
the only general review of the impact of the Oregon ques­
tion upon Franco-American relations.
Unlike Oregon, French interest in Mexico was strong. 
Historians are agreed, however, that France did nothing to 
offend the United States during the Mexican War. Elizabeth 
Brett White points out that although Paris bolstered its 
squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, little concern was shown 
in the United States, It was only in cooperation with England 
that France would undertake any important operations. ̂  
Throughout the war, France remained devoted to her position
O A Blumenthal, A Reappraisal, pp. 42-43,
^White, American Opinion of France, pp. 113-114.
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o£ neutrality. According to Sioussat, this had a favor­
able effect upon American opinion, The significant fact 
of the Mexican War, he writes, ’’was the abstention of 
the British and French Governments from any attempts at 
intervention or interference,”^
After the settlement of the Oregon issue, Blumenthal 
asserts, any chance for a united Anglo-French intervention 
in the Mexican War was negated. Still, he adds, the 
French government begrudgingly declared its neutrality. 
”Even after his ’defeat* in Texas,” Blumenthal writes, 
Guizot ’’continued to make some half-hearted efforts to 
organize a great European coalition to block the United 
States from overrunning Mexico,” Despite reassuring 
pledges to the American minister early in 1846, Blumenthal 
notes, Louis Philippe’s ’’government was really still 
undecided in June of 1846 as to its policy in the Mexican 
War.” The cumulative effects of the Oregon decision and
the impressive early successes of the American army, how-
89ever, prompted France to proclaim its neutrality.
In contrast to Blumenthal, Frederick Merk emphasizes 
that French neutrality in the Mexican War was due to public 
enmity towards the British. Although French public 
opinion of the Mexican War was sharply divided, Merk
88sioussat, "Buchanan," p. 282,
®9Blumenthal, A Reappraisal, pp. 43-44.
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writes, opposition journals made it clear "that if a
choice must be made between hegemony by the United States
and hegemony by the British, they preferred the former„
They exhibited, in general, antipathy for their British
qqpartner in the entente cordiale," In addition to French 
domestic opinion, Merk notes, joint Anglo-French inter­
vention in the Mexican War was also hindered by British 
suspicion concerning French dynastic relations with Spain,91- 
That the "Polk Doctrine" was proclaimed to further 
American continental expansion rather than intended as a 
principle to guide American diplomacy is illustrated by 
the American attitude regarding renewed intervention in 
the La Plata region. In the heady aftermath of Polk's 
speech, Senator William Allen, Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, introduced a resolution which was 
directed against the resumption of European intervention 
in the La Plata, Lewis Cass, a Democratic colleague of 
Allen, claimed that the resolution merited support because 
of its condemnation of Guizot's balance of power princi­
ples.^ While Polk for the most part had omitted South 
America in his declaration, the Allen resolution purported
90Merk, The Monroe Doctrine and Expansionism, p. 167.
9^Ibld, , pp. 178-181,
92Ibid,, pp. 98-99.
to extend his doctrine to all of the New World, Significantly, 
historians have used the defeat of Allen’s proposal to cast 
light upon Franco“American relations regarding the La Plata 
affair.
In her review of the debate over the Allen resolution, 
White stresses its significance to Franco"American relations. 
Although opposed to the resolution, Calhoun ’’strongly ob­
jected to the ’improper interference’ of the European powers 
in American affairs. , . .But he did not think it possible 
that the United States could take under her guardianship 
the whole family of American states.” The Allen resolution 
was defeated, but White adds that Calhoun’s indignation at 
the overt intervention was typical of American opinion.
In the end, she concludes, French efforts in the La Plata
Q  *7only further prejudiced Americans against France.
The official attitude of the United States towards the 
La Plata incursion was first outlined by Sioussat. "In 
contrast with its vigorous opposition to British or European 
expansion or interference in Texas, in Oregon, in California," 
he writes, "Polk’s administration did not see fit to attempt 
to prevent European intervention in the affairs of these 
South American nations.’’®^ Subsequent historians have agreed
^White* American Opinion of France, pp. 116-118.
^Sioussat, ’’Buchanan," pp. 314-315.
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with Sioussat that Polkas use of Monroe's principles was 
directed towards securing American in North America and 
was not intended to challenge French or British efforts 
elsewhere.
Nevertheless, John F. Cady asserts that the La Plata 
affair had some impact upon Polk as he prepared his Decem­
ber message. But Polk's diplomacy was shrewd, Cady adds, 
for when he asserted that all American states had a right, 
because of their sovereignty and independence, to be free 
from foreign interference, he was merely showing a token 
interest in the affairs of South America. By the feeble 
warning "that the people of the United States could not be 
indifferent to, . .violations of the sovereign rights of 
these states," Cady writes, "Polk thus avoided committing 
his government to any policy." Furthermore, Cady notes,
Polk instructed his envoy to Argentina that although 
"existing circumstances" prevented American involvement 
in behalf of the beseiged Argentinian nation, the "moral 
influence" of the United States would be used. Polk 
assumed this noncommittal attitude, Cady claims, in spite 
of the unanimous condemnation by the American press of the 
operation of French and British forces in the La Plata, 
and in the face of accusations of foreign "machinations."^
®^Cady, Intervention in the Rio de la Plata, pp. 182-185.
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Perkins also believes that Polk's mention of the right
of American nations to be free from foreign interventions
Q6was a response to affairs in the La Plata region. But 
while Cady is critical of Polk's polite deference to South 
America--he goes so far as to accuse Polk of conniving to 
secure the unopposed expansion of the United States -- 
Perkins merely writes that "the Polk administration. . . 
remained for the most part extraordinarily indifferent to 
what was going on in La Plata."97
A summary view of Washington’s policy regarding the 
resumption of hostilities in La Plata is found in Harold 
Peterson's recent work, Like White, Peterson outlines 
the considerable clamor in the United States for inter­
vention, But, he writes, "In his eagerness to avoid 
war. .over Oregon and to forestall Anglo-French opposition 
to his dreams of expansion in the southwest, Polk had no 
intention of forcing a showdown over the faraway La 
Plata. . , .The Polk administration was facing west, not 
south.
It is clear, then, that the July Monarchy made a
^Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, p. 84.
97Ibid., p. 133,
^Harold F, Peterson, Argentina and the United States. 
1810-1960 (New York: State University of New York Press, 
1964), pp. 137-138.
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conscious effort to avoid any involvement prejudicial to 
American interests in the Oregon question and the Mexican 
War. It is also clear that the Polk administration, in 
spite of popular criticisms, allowed France and Britain 
to continue their efforts in the La Plata without inter­
ference. Still, Guizot was uneasy over the prospect of 
further American expansion. But Texas, and to some extent 
California, were the central issues in Franco-American 
relations during the mid-forties. The French government 
had failed to preserve Texas independence, in part due to 
Mexican ineptitude--there was little reason, then, for 
Paris to assist the Mexicans in regaining Texas in the 
face of American military might. Furthermore, whatever 
designs the July Monarchy had on California had long been 
given up, and Oregon had never been a matter of concern 
for France. By the middle of 1846, Paris had resigned 
itself to continental expansion of the United States, 
and Washington, anxious to consolidate that expansion, 
sought to avoid further difficulties with Europe, even at 
the expense of South American republics.
CHAPTER V
FRANCO-AMERICAN RIVALRY IN HAWAII AND THE FAR EAST
Three short years after the controversial annexation 
of Texas, the United States had acquired the vast South­
west, upper California, and Oregon. The westward impulse, 
however, did not stop at the ocean's edge. The expansion 
of the United States to the west coast of North America 
stimulated American interest in the central and east 
Pacific, marking the beginning of a new era in the 
struggle for the control of the fabled Far Eastern 
trade.'*' Speaking before Congress in 1847, President 
James K. Polk defined the real significance of the 
acquisition of California by the United States. The 
bay of San Francisco and the other harbors along the 
coast of California, Polk predicted, "would in a short 
period become the marts of an extensive and profitable 
commerce with China and other countries in the Far East."
■̂ See Robert G. Cleland, "Asiatic Trade and American 
Occupation of the Pacific Coast," Annual Report of the 
American Historical Association, Vol. I (Washington, 1916), 
pT 289.
^"Annual Message," Congressional Globe, December 7, 
1847, 30th Cong., 1st Sess„, Part I, p. 6.
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But American eyes turned first to the Hawaiian archipelago-- 
the hub of Pacific commerce and a temptation to the world's 
two other great maritime powers, France and Great Britain, 
American policy towards Hawaii was first defined in 
1842, For several years prior to that date, Hawaii had 
been the scene of numerous interventions, intrigues, and 
assorted coercive acts. French, British, and American 
warships had frequently anchored in Honolulu's serene 
harbor. By 1842, the native Hawaiian government, fearful 
lest the islands should fall to one of the competing 
Pacific powers, determined that the time had come to 
insure its sovereignty. King Kamehameha III dispatched 
envoys to Washington, London, and Paris to secure recogni­
tion of Hawaiian independence. In response, President 
John Tyler, acting upon the advice of his Secretary of 
State, Daniel Webster, declared that the United States 
would respect Hawaiian sovereignty. Tyler reassured the 
Hawaiian diplomats that although the United States possessed 
the largest share of the kingdom's trade, it sought
no peculiar advantages, no exclusive control over 
the Hawaiian Government, but is content with its 
independent existence. . . .Its forebearance in this 
respect, under the circumstances of the very large 
intercourse of their citizens with the islands, 
would justify the Government, should events here­
after arise, to require it, in making a decided
remonstrance against the adoption of an 
opposite policy by any other power.3
Twelve years later, however, an American representative 
signed a treaty with the native Hawaiian government 
providing for the annexation of the islands by the 
United States„
The first, and largest, part of this chapter will 
be devoted to determining how historians have treated 
the apparent shift in American policy within the larger 
framework of Franco-American relations. To be precise: 
did French involvement in Hawaii have any impact upon 
American policy-makers in 1842 and in 1854? The second 
part of this chapter will be a brief review of the his­
toriography of Franco-American relations with respect to 
China. By way of introduction, a summary of French and 
American interests and activities in Hawaii might be 
helpful before embarking on a study of the historiography. 
But rather than repeat a list of events, this writer will 
review the works of two early twentieth-century historians, 
emphasizing the more significant points.
In a 1901 examination of American involvement in the 
Pacific, James Morton Callahan touches upon many points
^Foreign Relations of the United States. 1894, 
Appendix, II (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1901), pp. 39-41.
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vital to Franco-American relations regarding Hawaii, He 
recognizes that by the eighteen-thirties Protestant Amer­
ican missionaries of staunch New England stock had come 
to exert a potent influence upon the native Hawaiian 
government. Also, Callahan acknowledges that the French 
interest in the islands was founded upon an equally 
staunch Jesuit mission. Hence, when French Captain C.P.T. 
Laplace coerced Kamehameha III into an unfavorable treaty
in 1838, he sought to protect both the Catholic mission
4and the interests of the government of Louis Philippe. 
Laplace’s intervention was but one of a series by both 
France and Great Britain, which, Callahan asserts, caused 
Kamehameha to strive for the recognition of Hawaiian 
independence. The American response to the Hawaiian plea, 
Callahan tells us, was honorable. For despite the reports 
of progress in the islands and the increase of American 
involvement there, the United States sought no exclusive 
control or advantage. Even after learning of Kamehameha's 
voluntary cession of sovereignty to the British Admiral 
Lord Paulet in 1843, Callahan continues, Washington resorted
^Two later studies of American and French missionaries 
in Hawaii are Bradford Smith, Yankees in Paradise: The New 
England Impact on Hawaii (New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 
1956), and Aarne A. Koskinen, Missionary Influence as a 
Political Factor in the Pacific Islands (Helsinki, 1953) . 
Unfortunately, neither author sheds much light upon the 
role played by Hawaiian missionaries in Franco-American 
relations.
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only to diplomatic retort. The United States, he notes, 
informed Britain and France of its hope that neither 
would violate Hawaiian sovereignty. According to Callahan, 
the American attitude helped persuade London and Paris to 
recognize Hawaiian independence by a joint declaration.^
Although Tyler subsequently refused to participate 
in the Anglo-French declaration guaranteeing Hawaiian 
independence, the Hawaiian government interpreted his 
1842 statement, coupled with later assurances by Secretaries 
Abel P. Upshur and John C. Calhoun, as constituting recog­
nition of the island kingdom. Thus assured, Hawaii hoped 
to enjoy normal relations with the competing Pacific 
powers. But further trouble soon arose. In 1849, French 
forces, upon the instigation of Consul Patrice Dillon, 
occupied Honolulu. Callahan neglects to assess the purpose 
of the intervention, but he does describe the American 
reaction.
According to Callahan, the administration of Zachary 
Taylor was apprehensive of French intentions in the Pacific. 
Tahiti had recently succumbed to an aggressive French effort, 
and Washington feared a similar occurrence in Hawaii.
5James Morton Callahan, American Relations in the 
Pacific and the Far East, 1784-1900. Johns Hopkins Univer­
sity Studies in History and Political Science, Vol. XIX 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1901), pp. 115-117.
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Secretary of State John Clayton, Callahan writes, informed 
William R. Rives at Paris "that, although the Hawaiian 
islands were not coveted by the United States, their 
relations were such that the United States could never 
with indifference allow them to pass under the dominion 
or exclusive control of any other power." France disavowed 
Dillon's actions and the crisis subsided. But in 1851, 
convinced that France was again considering the conquest 
of the islands, the Hawaiian government proposed annexa­
tion to the United States. Nevertheless, the Fillmore 
administration, Callahan claims, remained faithful to 
established Hawaiian policy and rejected the annexation 
offer. Secretary of State Webster did protest to France, 
however, and Paris, somewhat surprised by the American 
reaction, denied any intention of violating Hawaiian 
sovereignty.̂
Hawaii became the cause for further discord between 
Paris and Washington upon the inauguration of President 
Franklin K. Pierce, a devotee of "Manifest Destiny." 
Secretary of State William L. Marcy, reflecting the tenor 
of Pierce's policy, instructed the American ambassador at 
Paris that it was inevitable that the Hawaiian archipelago 
would come under the control of the United States. In
6Ibid„, pp. 119-120.
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contrast to his earlier view that American respect for 
Hawaiian independence was established policy, Callahan 
justifies Marcy's intimation that he anticipated annexation. 
"While the United States had long expressed her policy of 
maintaining the independence of the Hawaiian islands," 
he writes, "she had never entered into any international 
agreement which would prevent her from negotiating a treaty 
of annexation with the Hawaiian government." In spite of 
vigorous French and British protests, Callahan asserts, 
negotiations for annexation continued and it was only the 
death of Kamehameha III late in 1854 that postponed Hawaiian 
entrance into the Union.7
Like Callahan, John W. Foster defends the American 
involvement in Hawaii, But while the United States pursued 
an honorable policy in Hawaii, Foster claims, the efforts 
of Britain and France to obtain an equal footing constituted 
aggression. His interpretation of events in Hawaii is 
based, at least in part, upon a devout belief in the 
righteous and beneficent efforts of the American mission­
aries.8 According to Foster, the American presence in 
Hawaii, founded upon the humanitarian missionary endeavors 
and supplemented by a long history of trade relations, was
7Ibid., pp. 121-123.
8John W. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient 
(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1903), pp. 106-109.
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predominant. In spite of Tyler's affirmation of that 
belief and his announcement that the United States would 
not allow any other nation to control the islands, Foster 
continues, it "did not deter other powers from repeated 
efforts to secure their possession. Their commanding 
situation in the Pacific was a constant temptation to the 
greed of colonizing powers."9
Reviewing the intervention of Captain Laplace in 1838, 
Foster exceeds Callahan in the vigor of his criticism. 
Assuming that Laplace acted with explicit orders from Paris, 
he writes: "The third demonstration [the first two were
British] of a foreign power against the sovereignty of 
Hawaii was on the part of France in 1839." To be sure, 
Foster adds, the Hawaiian king and his missionary advisors 
may have erred by expelling the Jesuit fathers, but this 
did not justify the Laplace intervention.
After clearly identifying France as the aggressor in 
Hawaii, Foster then contrasts French policy with that of 
the United States. Like Callahan, he credits Tyler with
1 1frustrating French, as well as British, designs on Hawaii. 
Foster further claims that the Whig administration of Taylor
9Ibid., p. 111.
■*•0Ibid. , pp. 119-121. 
Ibid., pp. 122-123.
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and Fillmore reaffirmed Tyler’s stand, for they too defeated 
French dreams of an Hawaiian empire. During the Dillon 
affair, for example, the American government informed Paris 
that it would not allow France to occupy Hawaii. Relations 
between Paris and Washington underwent further strain when 
France sent Louis Perrin to Honolulu in 1850. According to 
Foster, Perrin had been instructed to renew pressures upon 
the Hawaiian government for concessions to France. This 
led Hawaii to turn to the United States for protection, 
suggesting the possibility of annexation. As a result,
Foster concludes, the efforts of Perrin constituted the 
final attempt at aggression by a foreign power against the 
island kingdom.12
Callahan and Foster make one basic error that is crucial 
to the historiography of Franco-Americans regarding Hawaii.
In their researches, they totally ignore French primary 
materials. They assume--neglecting even the revolutions 
of 1848 and the coup d ’etat of Louis Napoleon--that throughout 
the period between 1838 and 1851, the French government sought 
to acquire Hawaii. Consequently, both authors see France and 
the United States in clear opposition over Hawaii; the former 
dedicated to preserving Hawaiian independence, the latter 
seeking to supplement its empire. But what of the American 
attempt at annexation during the Pierce administration?
12Ibid., pp. 130-131.
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Surely it would seem that Tyler's policy of respect for 
Hawaiian independence had been ignored? Foster fails to 
mention it, and Callahan claims that it was justified 
because of the threat of French aggression.
The various essays contained in The American Secre­
taries of State and Their Diplomacy cast little new light 
on Hawaii's role in Franco-American relations. Writing 
about Webster's first term, C.A. Duniway claims that the 
Hawaiian request for recognition of its independence pro­
vided but another occasion for Washington to assert its 
traditional principle of non-intervention. He notes, 
however, that "there was reason to fear at the time that 
European rivalries might lead to occupation and coloniza­
tion which would be prejudicial to American commercial 
interests." Because the United States had more interest 
in the fate of the islands and their government than any 
other nation, Duniway maintains, American policy became 
two-fold. The sovereignty of the island kingdom must be 
respected, and their acquisition by any other power would 
be inimical to the interests of the American people,^
In his sketch on Calhoun, St. George Leakin Sioussat 
has supplied some details on the circumstances surrounding
l^ciyde Augustus Duniway, "Daniel Webster," in The 
American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. by 
Samuel F. Bemis, Vol. V (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 
p . 56.
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recognition. When it learned that the Hawaiian government 
had ceded its sovereignty to Paulet, the State Department 
remained silent, Sioussat explains, for discussions in 
progress in London soon made it evident that Great Britain 
would disavow his actions. But the Paulet matter also 
involved France, and during the subsequent negotiations 
between London and Paris, speculation arose regarding the 
American policy toward Hawaii. "In reply to an inquiry 
concerning the designs of the United States in the Sand­
wich Islands," Sioussat adds in a footnote, "our minister 
gave the assurance that our purposes in the Pacific were 
purely commercial."^ Sioussat does not specify if this 
disclaimer constituted an American commitment to Hawaiian 
independence.
In her essay on Clayton, Mary W. Williams affirms that 
the French intrusion into Hawaii in 1849 alarmed the United 
States. But unlike Callahan and Foster, Williams views the 
American response to the Dillon affair within the broader 
context of Franco-American relations. So it was, she 
suggests, that Clayton "warned the Dominican Republic that 
a French protectorate over it would not be 'pleasing' to 
the United States, and notified the French Government--when 
it was trying to coerce Hawaii over the question of 
extra-territoriality--that the United States would not
■^Sioussat, "Calhoun," in ibid., pp. 223, 375.
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with indifference permit the islands to pass under the 
dominion of another nation." Although Paris recalled 
Dillon, Williams notes that Washington took advantage 
of the affair to strengthen its ties with Hawaii.15
Concerning the American protest against renewed 
tension between Hawaii and France during the Perrin 
mission, Duniway, in an essay on Webster's second term, 
moderates the findings of Callahan and Foster. Webster 
did instruct his minister at Paris to insist that France 
refrain from making unjust demands upon the Hawaiian 
government. Furthermore, Duniway continues, Webster 
directed his commissioner in the islands "not to interfere 
by force in the Franco-Hawaiian controversy--but he need 
not explain this to the French," Still, the Fillmore 
administration did not interpret events in Hawaii as 
signifying a breach in relations with France, Duniway 
emphasizes that the United States later authorized its 
representatives in Hawaii to cooperate fully with the 
French and British to bring about stability in the islands. ̂
Unlike Callahan and Foster, Henry Barrett Learned 
recognizes the expansionist tenor of the Pierce administra­
tion. Pierce hoped to acquire both Cuba and Hawaii. For
^Williams, "Clayton," in ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 14-15. 
■^Duniway, "Daniel Webster," in Ibid., pp. 108-109.
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that reason, Learned states, his Secretary of State, Marcy,
i 7contemplated the annexation of Hawaii. Unfortunately, 
Learned sees no contrast between the Hawaiian policies of 
Tyler and Pierce. He also neglects to explain why 
annexation failed.
None of the authors of these essays rectifies the 
failure of Callahan and Foster to use French primary 
material. George Vern Blue demonstrates the importance of 
such sources to the historiography of Franco-American 
relations regarding Hawaii. Drawing from the archives of 
the Ministry of the Marine and the Quai d'Orsay, as well 
as from private correspondence, Blue establishes that 
French representatives in Hawaii often exceeded the letter 
of their instructions. At best, the government of Louis 
Philippe was apathetic towards the idea of establishing a 
colony in Hawaii founded upon the Catholic mission. In 
spite of the concessions made by the Hawaiian government 
to Laplace, the French presence in the islands continued 
to diminish. Captain Mallett attempted to revive it in 
1842, but like Laplace he had no official support and his 
endeavor failed. This abortive effort was, according to
l^Henry Barrett Learned* "William Learned Marcy," 
in ibid., pp. 147, 290-291.
18George Vern Blue, "The Project of a French Settle­
ment in the Hawaiian Islands, 1824-1842," American Historical 
Review, II (1932), pp. 85-87.
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Blue, "the final chapter to the story of the only French 
project that might have been the nucleus for a colonial 
establishment in the kingdom of the Kamehamehas."
Although French agents desired to regenerate enthusiasm 
for the idea after 1842, Blue finds no evidence of any 
official instructions to that effect. ̂  Blue does not 
deny, however, that the efforts of individual Frenchmen 
often raised speculation as to the aims of the French 
government.
Referring to Blue, as well as to his own extensive 
researches in British documents, Richard W. Van Alstyne 
argues that Great Britain was the only true guardian of 
Hawaiian independence. During the forties, and especially 
in the early fifties, he writes, "France, or at least the 
French representatives in Honolulu, hoped to bring the 
islands under her veiled control, and the United States 
aspired to annex them o u t r i g h t . A c c o r d i n g  to Van Alstyne, 
the American rejoinder to France in 18 50, credited by some 
historians with causing France to retreat, was accompanied 
by a more persuasive protest from London. Britain reminded 
France, he writes, "that its policy was only calculated to 
destroy French influence in the islands and throw them into
•^Ibid. , pp. 89-96.
^Richard W. Van Alstyne, "Great Britain, the United 
States, and Hawaiian Independence," Pacific Historical 
Review, IV (1935), p. 15.
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arms of the United States." Paris apologized to London 
for the activities of its representatives, and suggested 
that a detente be reached in the form of a tripartite 
agreement with London and Washington over Cuba. To this,
Van Alstyne claims, President Fillmore was sympathetic, 
further suggesting that the agreement be extended to 
Hawaii. But it all came to naught, for Fillmore met defeat 
in his bid for renomination.
Not surprisingly, Van Alstyne is critical of the policy 
of the Pierce administration toward Hawaii. After 1843, 
he writes, "by tacit consent Hawaii was treated as a 
neutralized territory. . .and though Polk gave a nationalist 
twist to the American policy in his famous message of Decem­
ber 2, 1845, he did not essentially alter it,"^ So when 
negotiations for annexation began in 1854, both France and 
Britain rightfully and vigorously protested. Although the 
eventual treaty contained provisions objectionable to the 
United States, Van Alstyne asserts that the Anglo-French 
protest did contribute to the failure of annexation. In 
response to this unified opposition against annexation, he 
writes, "Marcy could do nothing but complain helplessly of 
the British and French penchant for interfering with the
^ Ibid. , pp. 18-20.
^ Ibid. , p. 16.
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expansionist plans of the United States."23
Van Alstyne*s assertion that Anglo-French opposition 
to annexation had an impact upon the American government 
is supported by an earlier article. Concerned with Russo- 
American relations on the eve of the Crimean War, Frank A.
Golder refers to a speech given by Lord Clarendon before 
Parliament. Clarendon's remarks, he writes, were "inter­
preted to mean that in the future England and France 
would take a more active part in American affairs than 
heretofore."24 According to both Van Alstyne and Golder, 
Callahan’s view that annexation failed because of the 
death of Kamehameha cannot be accepted without reference 
to the impact on the United States of Anglo-French opposition.
To this point, the historiography of Franco-American 
relations with respect to Hawaii has been piecemeal. Missing 
are both a general history of the Hawaiian kingdom and a 
detailed study of foreign involvement in the mid-Pacific.
And although Blue, Van Alstyne, and Golder correct the earlier 
neglect of European sources, their works are but articles 
and as such suffer from a need to generalize. Neither Van 
Alstyne nor Golder, for example, attempt to explain how 
Anglo-French opposition could have dulled the energies of
23Ibid., p. 22.
24Frank A. Golder, "Russian-American' Relations During 
the Crimean War," American Historical Review. XXI (April, 1926), 
pp. 463-464. Clarendon spoke in January, 1854, as the agita­
tion for annexation was at a fever pitch.
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"Young America" and forestalled annexation. Consequently, 
Ralph S. Kuykendall's history of Hawaii to 1854 is indeed 
important. In fact, Kuykendall's research is so complete 
that this chapter pivots around his work.
To begin, Kuykendall, although more explicit, reaffirms 
what Blue has written concerning the initial French involve­
ment in Hawaii.^ But while Blue dismisses the Laplace ven­
ture as unauthorized, Kuykendall asserts that the intervention 
had a long-term importance. He notes that Laplace pressed 
several demands upon the Hawaiian government which embittered 
Franco-American relations for many years. Not only did 
Laplace demand tolerance for the Catholic missionaries, but 
he further demanded a twenty thousand dollar guarantee that 
Kamehameha would honor this pledge. Reluctantly, Kamehameha 
also consented to lessen the duty on French spirits* and to 
allow certain extra-territorial rights for Frenchmen. These 
last two articles, Kuykendall points out, offended the king 
for they infringed on his sovereign p o w e r . W h e n  the 
Hawaiian commissioners came to Paris in 1842 seeking recog­
nition of the independence of their island kingdom, Guizot 
agreed to grant the request. But he insisted, Kuykendall
25Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom. 1778-1854; 
Foundation and Transformation (Honolulu: The University of 
Hawaii Press, 1938), pp. 138-141.
26Ibid., pp. 165-166.
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continues, that the disagreeable Laplace treaty remain in 
effect. Guizot's stubbornness disappointed the envoys, 
and continued resentment of the Laplace treaty eventually 
led to the crises of 1 8 4 9 -1 8 5 1 .27
Kuykendall disagrees with the claim made by the earlier 
historians, excluding Van Alstyne, that Tyler's 1842 declara­
tion persuaded France and Britain to respect Hawaiian 
independence. Before the American pronouncement, he notes, 
Aberdeen had determined to recognize the sovereignty of 
the Hawaiian government and to refrain from seeking an 
exclusive position for Britain in Hawaii. This decision, 
Kuykendall adds, was a direct response to the Laplace 
visit „ ̂
The early historians also assume that when Tyler and 
Webster formulated their Hawaiian policy, they were pro­
tecting an extensive and obvious American involvement in 
the islands. Kuykendall demonstrates, however, that the 
Tyler administration was at first indifferent to Hawaiian 
affairs, and that it required a calculated disclosure by 
the Hawaiian envoy to prod Webster into action. Referring 
to the notes taken by William Richards, one of the Hawaiian 
commissioners, Kuykendall writes:
27Ibid., pp. 201-202.
-135-
Aside from the indication they give of Webster’s 
initial lack of interest in Hawaii, the most 
significant thing in them is the revelation of 
Richards' purpose to place the islands under the 
protection of Great Britain in case he found it 
impossible to obtain recognition of their 
independence, and the evident effect of the 
revelation upon the American o f f i c i a l s . 2 9
But when stimulated into action, the Tyler administration 
saw not only a British menace in the mid-Pacific, but 
possibly a French threat as well. Kuykendall quotes a 
dispatch which H.S. Fox, the British minister at Washing­
ton, sent to London, analyzing Tyler’s speech. It is the 
opinion of the American government, Fox wrote, "'that those 
islands ought not to be allowed to fall under the dominion 
of any Foreign Power. It is probable that this declaratory 
movement has been prompted by the colonization of New 
Zealand by Great Britain, and by the reported recent occupa­
tion of the Marquesas, and other islands in the Pacific, by 
a Naval Force from France.’"30
When news of Paulet's seizure of Hawaii reached Europe 
and North America, London quickly disavowed his actions.
But the British government, suspicious Of French intentions 
in the Pacific and doubtful of the American attitude, 
hesitated to order Paulet's departure. "In view of the 
recent activity of the French in the Pacific and of the
^ Ibid. , p. 194,
30Ibid., p. 196.
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special interest which the Americans had in the Hawaiian 
islands," Kuykendall writes, "the British government felt 
it necessary, before restoring those islands, to guard 
against the possibility of their falling, at some later 
time, into the possession of either France or the United 
S t a t e s A b e r d e e n  hoped to use the Paulet episode to 
persuade France and the United States to agree to a tripartite 
recognition of the Hawaiian kingdom. Guizot, after consenting 
to join with Aberdeen, inquired into the American feeling 
regarding Aberdeen's proposal. Two secretaries of state, 
Kuykendall notes, signified their approval of the spirit of 
the plan. Upshur "showed himself disposed to accede to the 
proposition," and when France learned that the United States 
would not comply, Calhoun affirmed that the American acts 
constituted "'a full recognition on the part of the United 
States, of the independence of the Hawaiian government.1"
With an eye to the troubles between France and Hawaii during 
the Taylor and Fillmore administrations, Kuykendall adds 
that it was unfortunate that the United States did not go 
the full route.32
It is Van Alstyne's premise that Great Britain sought 
to protect Hawaii from French imperialism. Kuykendall 
repeats this idea. In his view, the efforts of French
Sllbid., p. 200.
32Ibid., pp. 2 02-204.
-137-
consuls and naval officers between 1849 and 1851 to increase 
French influence in the islands, coupled with American west­
ward expansion, relegated the independence of Hawaii once 
again to a state of uncertainty* The exuberant expansionism 
of the United States, first demonstrated by the acquisition 
of California and Oregon, and culminating with the "Manifest 
Destiny" agitation of the Pierce administration, led many 
Americans to desire Hawaii for the United States.
American interest in Hawaii, Kuykendall continues, was 
further stimulated by troubles between French representa­
tives in Honolulu and the native government. He writes:
"A factor of far-reaching importance was the aggressive 
policy of France as exemplified in the proceedings of 
French consular and naval officers in Hawaii. French 
pressure was a reagent, which, applied time after time, 
precipitated crisis after crisis."^
The American reaction to the 1849 seizure of govern­
ment buildings in Honolulu by Admiral de Tromelin, Kuykendall 
explains, was twofold. First, and here Kuykendall recalls 
Williams, ties with Hawaii were strengthened by an equitable 
commercial treaty. When news reached Secretary Clayton 
"of the outrage committed at Honolulu by the French Admiral
53Ibid., p. 383.
54lbid., p, 388.
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de Tromelin, at the instigation of Consul Dillon," Kuykendall 
writes, "this made the American government even more willing 
to take a friendly and protective attitude towards Hawaii. 
Second, Clayton instructed William C. Rives at Paris to 
persuade France to yield. But as in 1843, Kuykendall notes 
with some regret, "the United States government, while 
determined to. uphold the independence of Hawaii, was not 
prepared to enter into any treaty arrangement with France 
and Great Britain respecting the island k i n g d o m . "36 Upon 
the receipt of American as well as British remonstrances, 
the French Foreign Minister rebuked Dillon. Finally, an 
accord was reached between French officials in Hawaii 
and the native government, but Kuykendall emphasizes that 
it only temporarily stilled the rumors of French aggres­
sion. 37
In a fashion similar to that used by Sam Houston and 
Anson Jones in Texas, Gerrit P. Judd dramatized the remote 
possibility of French hostilities against the Hawaiian king­
dom. After meeting Perrin, Judd, a New England missionary 
prominent in the Hawaiian government, came to fear that 
France might resort to force to compel Hawaii to yield to 
her demands. Thus aroused, Kuykendall continues, Judd 
wrote to Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary,
55Ibid,, p. 379.
56Ibid., p. 378.
•^Ibid. , pp. 391, 403.
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and to Clayton, urging that Great Britain and the United 
States protest to France and that British and American 
warships be sent to Honolulu to protect the island king­
dom^® Webster had succeeded Clayton, and the new secre­
tary voiced his concern to France. He instructed Rives to 
make such representations "'to the minister of foreign 
affairs of France as will induce that Government to desist 
from measures incompatible with the sovereignty and indep­
endence of the Hawaiian islands, and to make amends for 
the acts which the French agents have already committed 
there in contravention of the law of nations and of the 
treaty between the Hawaiian Government and France.'"
In reply, Kuykendall writes, France "protested her entire 
innocence of any sinister designs on Hawaii. . .all that 
France wanted was equality of treatment with other nations," 
The Paris government further asserted that "the dignity of 
France had been wounded by the uncourteous manner in which 
the United States had intervened in the affair.
But in spite of these protestations and reassurances 
of good intentions, French efforts in Hawaii had a profound 
impact upon American opinion. Because "the proceedings of 
the French officers Dillon and De Tromelin were not disavowed
58Ibid,, pp. 398-399.
59Ibid., p. 407.
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by the French government and the assurances given by that 
government to the United States and Great Britain were not 
made public at that time,” Kuykendall writes, "exaggerated 
reports and unfounded rumors ran about freely and created 
a widespread impression that France had some ulterior design 
upon the Hawaiian islands and only awaited a convenient 
opportunity to put it into execution,"4® As a result, any 
initiative that France may have possessed in Hawaiian 
affairs soon passed to the United States. With the upsurge 
of expanionist spirit embodied in the Pierce administration, 
many Americans pressed for the annexation of Hawaii. In­
quiring into Washington's attitude toward this popular 
sentiment, the French and British ministers were reassured 
by Secretary Marcy that the United States had the same goals 
in Hawaii as their own governments. But, Kuykendall 
emphasizes, Marcy added that there were "causes which might 
render the continuance of that independence impracticable, 
as a consequence of which the government might fall into 
other hands." If it should come to this, Marcy continued, 
the American Congress and people would welcome them. 
Kuykendall suggests that Marcy was waiting for an invitation 
from Kamehameha before he promoted annexation.41
40lbid., pp. 407-408,
41Ibid., pp. 418-419.
-141-
When Hawaii, in response to new rumors of French 
ambitions, voluntarily placed herself under the auspices 
of the United States in 1853, the move for annexation 
began in earnest. Although fear of French aggression soon 
subsided in Hawaii, Kuykendall points out that reports 
continued to circulate in the United States that such a 
danger still e x i s t e d . D a v i d  L. Gregg, the newly appointed 
commissioner in Honolulu, began negotiations with the native 
government, ignoring the disappearance of the alleged 
French threat. In response, the French and British consuls 
forewarned Kamehameha of the unhappy consequences of 
American rule. When it became clear to the London and 
Paris governments that Gregg had been instructed to 
negotiate for annexation, they protested vigorously. 
Fundamental to their objections, Kuykendall states, was 
the not unmerited premise that three secretaries of state-- 
Calhoun, Upshur, and Webster--had pledged the United States 
to respect Hawiian independence. After the eventual with­
drawal of the treaty, Kuykendall notes, "several senators 
attributed the failure of the annexation project to the 
interference of Great Britain and France and spoke bitterly 
of the hostility of those governments to the foreign policies
42lbid., p. 412.
45Ibid., pp. 423-425.
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o£ the United States.” Clayton, now a senator, took issue 
with their complaints. Clayton argued, Kuykendall continues, 
that the United States had been morally bound since 1843 to 
respect the independence of Hawaii.44
In Kuykendall's opinion, then, annexation would never 
have succeeded, for the United States was committed to 
Hawaiian independence. Hence, France and Britain justifiably 
objected to annexation. Kuykendall does not credit the 
abandonment of annexation solely to British and French 
protests, however. As Van Alstyne points out, the treaty 
itself contained provisions objectionable to the United 
States; Kuykendall also sees some merit in Callahan's 
emphasis upon the impact of the death of Kamehameha III „4^
But Van Alstyne further asserts that Anglo-French protests 
had their effect, and Kuykendall agrees.
Published in the same year as Kuykendall's study,
Clifford Gessler's paean to the beauty of Hawaii stands 
in contrast to the former's erudition. Gessler mentions 
the French effort in the islands, but is content to report 
the reactions of native Hawaiian and American missionaries.
In his view, the American acquisition of Hawaii was
44Ibid., p. 427.
45lbid., pp. 426-427. For a lucid account of the con­
trast between Kamehameha III and his successor, Kamehameha IV, 
see Osborne E. Hooley, "Hawaiian Negotiation for Reciprocity, 
1885-1857,” Pacific Historical Review, VII (1938), pp. 128- 
146.
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inevitable; hence, opposition by France and Great Britain 
was futile. No power, Gessler writes, "can withstand the 
slow, quiet force of economic penetration. Industry had 
grown up, demanding markets; the American influence that 
had begun with the missionaries of 1820 became more and 
more important as it developed vested interest in the 
land and its products."46 Gessler is mentioned only be­
cause he assumes that Hawaii was well within the American 
sphere; why this is important this writer will discuss 
later.
The influence of Kuykendall is clearly shown in the 
works of three later historians. That three students of 
international affairs in the mid-Pacific published their 
findings within seven years after Kuykendall gives credit 
to his effort. In 1941, Jean Ingram Brookes published a 
monograph on the international competition for islands in 
the Pacifid; in 1942, Harold Whitman Bradley's review of the 
American role in Hawaiian history prior to 1843 appeared, 
followed a year later by his article summarizing the rela­
tion of the island kingdom to American expansion; and in 
1945, Sylvester K„ Stevens presented a monograph dealing 
with the history of Hawaiian-American relations from 1842 
to 1898.
46Clifford Gessler, Hawaii. Isles of Enchantment 
(New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1938), pp. 81-82.
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Two aspects of Brookes’s study are of particular sign­
ificance to the historiography of Franco-American relations 
regarding Hawaii. First, she clarifies the affinity of the 
government of Louis Philippe for the Catholic missionaries 
in the Pacific. And second, although she reiterates 
Kuykendall’s interpretation of the impact of French efforts 
in Hawaii upon the United States, Brookes reaches a different 
conclusion regarding the failure of annexation.
It was during the eighteen-thirties, Brookes claims, 
that France became attentive to affairs in the Pacific.
But Louis Philippe’s government hesitated; the Pacific did 
not have the appeal in France that it had in Britain and 
the United States. Few agencies were available which France 
could use to develop a presence in that distant region.47 
Thus, Brookes states, the government of Louis Philippe, in 
spite of its bourgeois Protestantism, reached a sort of 
quid pro quo with the crusading Catholic missionaries. The 
efficacy of this entente between the secular and the clerical, 
was, according to Brookes, "demonstrated most spectacularly 
at this time at Hawaii and Tahiti, where the French mission­
aries had to cope with native governments more developed 
than the average, and with strong bodies of Protestant 
teachers, both American and British."48
47Jean Ingram Brookes, International Rivalry in the 
Pacific Islands. 1800-1875 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1941), p . 69.
Ibid., p. 79.
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Because Laplace found It necessary to resort to force 
in order to underwrite the mission in Hawaii, however, 
France realized her impotency in the Pacific. In order to 
compete effectively with the Americans and the British, 
Brookes writes, "French entrepreneurs would need not only 
naval protection, but the intelligent and open backing of 
their government, a first step in which would be the com­
missioning of consuls among the i s l a n d s . B u t  when 
consuls Dillon and Perrin exhibited a determination to 
increase the French presence in Hawaii during the years 
1849-1851, the Paris government could do little to assist 
them.**^ Domestic turmoil prevented France from actively 
supporting her representatives abroad. Unfortunately, 
Brookes neglects to mention this.
Reviewing the Dillon affair, Brookes adds some detail 
to Kuykendall' s work. It is her view that the traditional 
Franco-American amity, invigorated by the 1848 revolution, 
mitigated Washington's response to Dillon's belligerency. 
To be sure, Clayton became alarmed and instructed his 
minister at Paris to protest. Still, Brookes continues, 
Rives found it necessary to assume a mild attitude, for 
"he sensed 'an undue anxiety' on the part of the British
49lbid., p. 89.
50Ibid., pp. 191-193.
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ambassador ’to put us forward in an insidious and delicate 
office that might compromise our friendly relations with 
France,' when after all it was Great Britain which had a 
declaration with France in 1843."51
But when in 1851 consul Perrin revived the demands on 
Kamehameha, Franco-American relations suffered. Again,
Brookes does not depart from Kuykendall's findings. In 
fact, throughout her study, Brookes uses basically the 
same sources as Kuykendall. Webster instructed Rives, she 
writes, "to inform the government that the enforcement of 
such demands would be equivalent to the subjugation of the 
islands by France, and that such a step would disturb 
seriously the friendly relations then existing between the 
United States and France." Brookes also repeats Kuykendall's 
appraisal of the French reply to these protests.^2
Lest one thinks Brookes overly dependent upon Kuykendall, 
this writer will review what the former has to say about the 
movement for annexation during the Pierce administration. 
Before Marcy instructed his minister at Paris "to ascertain 
if possible what course France would eventually take if the 
United States were to add the Islands to her territories by 
means which were fair and peaceable," he was aware, Brookes
5lIbid., pp. 191-192.
52Ibid., pp. 193-196.
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states, that France would appose annexation. The French 
envoy at Washington, the author continues, had tried to 
give Marcy the impression that a transfer of Hawaiian 
sovereignty would be forcibly resisted. Brookes concludes, 
then, that Marcy knew that this project would arouse the 
disapproval of the other maritime powers. Still, he 
doubted that either France or Britain would resort to 
force to prevent annexation.^
It follows from the above that Brookes discredits 
the impact of Anglo-French protests against annexation. 
Instead, she suggests that by the fifties American influence 
in the islands had begun to decline. Consequently, the 
Hawaiian government from the beginning was ambivalent 
toward annexation, and eventually came to reconsider.
Brookes does not credit the failure of annexation merely 
to this trend, however, and she is quick to add that it 
did not contribute to a rise in French prestige in the 
islands.^4
It is clear that both Kuykendall and Brookes see France 
as the major protagonist in Hawaiian affairs during the 
late forties and early fifties. But neither author claims 
that the French government was devoted to a policy of
•^Ibjd. , p. 212. 
54Ibid., pp. 217-218.
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empire-building in the Pacific prior to the recognition 
of Hawaiian independence. In fact, although both review 
the entente between the government of Louis Philippe and 
the Catholic missionaries, they appear uncertain as to 
the overall purpose of French policy in the Pacific before 
1843. The work of Harold Whitman Bradley ends this ambig­
uity.
According to Bradley, France under Louis Philippe
was clearly committed to a program of expansion in the
Pacific. He writes:
The first fruits of this policy were the seizure 
of the Marquesas Islands and the establishment 
of a protectorate over Tahiti, the latter at 
the risk of a breach of relations with Great 
Britain. How much more France coveted in the 
Pacific was uncertain. The energy of the 
French navy in that ocean and the willingness 
of the French government to identify the cause 
of Catholic missions with its own interests 
furnished ample reason for fear, shared by many 
American and English residents of the Hawaiian 
Islands, that French aggression would not be 
confined to the region south of the equator.5'5
Certainly, the Laplace visit did little to allay these
apprehensions. Indeed, Bradley asserts, the coercion
imposed by Laplace spurred the American missionaries at
Honolulu to send a memorial to Congress urging that the
United States shield them from similar action in the
future. To this appeal, the Van Buren administration was
55Harold Whitman Bradley, The American Frontier in 
Hawaii: The Pioneers. 1789-1843 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1942), pp. 395-396.
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mute. And although Tyler and Webster also hesitated,
Bradley adds that the New Englander could not afford to 
ignore the American Missionary Board. He promsied to 
make at least a nominal protest to France. So it seems 
that even before the recognition of Hawaii in 1842, the 
American government was aware of French imperialism in the 
Pacific. Yet, Webster’s was but a token response to the 
plea of the missionaries, and Bradley concludes that Wash^ 
ington remained largely indifferent to affairs in Hawaii.^ 
When in 1842, the Hawaiian government determined to 
obtain international recognition of its sovereignty, the 
Tyler administration decided to acknowledge the extent of 
the American involvement in Hawaii. Although Bradley agrees 
with Kuykendall that Webster was prompted by warnings of a 
possible British protectorate over the islands, he intimates 
that the missionary appeal of seventeen months earlier might 
have been a factor in the decision to formulate a Hawaiian 
policy. "It is interesting, although perhaps futile," 
Bradley writes, "to speculate as to whether the action of 
Tyler and Webster in December of 1842 was in any way 
influenced by a memory of Bingham’s [like Dr. Judd, a New 
England missionary high in the circles of the Hawaiian 
government] recital of the aggression of Laplace or his
56lbid., pp. 315-316.
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emphasis upon the 'great importance of the entire indepen­
dency of the Sandwich Islands' to the commercial interests 
of the United States.
If the repercussions of the Laplace affair did influence 
Webster and Tyler when they determined upon a policy for 
Hawaii, then, Bradley reasons, it would have been for the 
most part due to the Frenchman's reluctance to follow 
official policy. For although the Ministry of Marine favored 
the expansion of French influence in the mid-Pacific, he 
explains, there was nothing in Laplace's instructions which 
could have provided the basis for the occupation of Hawaii. 
According to Bradley, Laplace occupied Hawaii on his own 
initiative primarily because he refused to accede to an 
American dominance in the Pacific. It was this personal 
conviction that led Laplace in 1842 to urge his superiors 
in Paris to "protect" the Hawaiian government and to advise 
the Governor of California "to seek the protection which
C OFrance could give but which it could not offer unsolicited." 
This is convincing proof of Laplace's independence; for, as 
we have seen in the preceeding chapter, the French government 
entertained little real hope of acquiring California and 
even preferred it to fall, if fall it must, to the United 
States rather than Great Britain.
5?Ibid., p. 316.
•^Ibid. , pp, 317-318.
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Regarding the immediate situation which prompted the
Hawaiian government to strive for recognition in 1842,
Bradley is more explicit than either Kuykendall or Brookes„
With the Laplace experience all too fresh in their memory,
the native government and its missionary advisors, Bradley
suggests, were further aroused by news of French aggression
elsewhere in the Pacific. He writes:
The occupation of the Marquesas Islands by France, 
in July of 1842, was an event which could be 
regarded only with alarm by friends of the 
Hawaiian government, for it was tangible evidence 
that France had colonial ambitions in the Pacific 
and an unpleasant reminder that relations between 
France and the Hawaiian government were less than 
cordial.59
In the fall of 1842, Kamehameha commissioned his envoys to 
treat for recognition. The arrival of the French Captain 
Mallett in late 1842, Bradley continues, made an interna­
tional guarantee of Hawaiian independence even more urgent. 
Many Hawaiians, as well as British and American residents, 
believed that had the situation been more propitious, 
Mallett would have seized the islands. Only because the 
king had already sent his representatives to Europe and the 
United States, Bradley adds, was Mallett dissuaded from 
adding Hawaii to the list of French possessions in the 
Pacific.6°
59ibid., p. 418,
^Ibid. , p. 420.
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Like Kuykendall and Brookes, Bradley views Paulet's 
acquisition of the islands as an indication of British 
suspicion of France. Bradley notes that before the 
Hawaiian government consented to transfer the islands to 
Paulet, it contemplated the feasibility of a joint Franco- 
American protectorate. That ubiquitous Hawaiian of 
American origin, Dr. Judd, rejected this, for he feared 
the American government would refuse to join, thereby 
allowing France to dominate Hawaiian a f f a i r s , 61 So the 
islands were surrendered to the British admiral and,
Bradley adds, an appeal sent to President Tyler urging 
him to persuade Great Britain to disavow Paulet's actions,62 
Although the British disclaimed any intention of 
accepting Paulet's coup de main, they delayed ordering his 
withdrawal. Kuykendall and Brookes credit this hesitation 
to Aberdeen's determination to commit Guizot to recognition 
of Hawaiian independence. Bradley agrees, but adds that 
Kamehameha*s envoys and Edward Everett, the American minister 
at London, supported British diplomacy. They feared that 
France, if given an opportunity, would seize the island 
kingdom. Thus, Bradley continues, they believed that the 
continuation of the British occupation pending the recognition
61lbid., p. 431.
62Ibid., p. 435.
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of Hawaiian independence by France would be in the interest 
of the i s l a n d s B u t  Everett's belief in Britain's altruistic 
dedication to Hawaiian independence was not reflected in 
Washington.
In Bradley's opinion, Tyler refrained from joining 
Great Britain and France in a tripartite guarantee of 
Hawaiian independence because he viewed the relation of 
the United States to Hawaii to be vitally different from 
that of the other powers. Kuykendall and Brookes credit 
American abstinence from the accord to a tradition of 
avoiding treaty commitments to Old World powers. But 
Bradley sees more to Tyler's decision than merely diplomatic 
tradition. It must be remembered that Tyler distrusted 
European involvement in the New World; thus, it was only 
natural that he should be wary of French or British interest 
in any region where the American presence was predominant. 
According to Bradley, Tyler's declaration that the commercial 
value of Hawaii and its geographical tie to the United States 
would cause the American government to view with dissatisfac­
tion a threat to Hawaiian sovereignty by another power, 
signified more than merely recognition of the independence 
of the island kingdom. In effect, he continues, it meant 
that the Monroe Doctrine had been extended to the mid-Pacific.^4
63ibld., p. 462.
64Ibid., pp. 444-445.
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Fundamental to the Monroe Doctrine is the presumption that 
not only is the United States predominant in the Western 
Hemisphere, but also it is the sole guardian of all free 
nations in that portion of the world. It is Bradley's 
view that because Tyler defined Hawaii as within the sphere 
of American influence, he could not consent to a joint 
guarantee of the island kingdom.
Jean Paul Faivre reaffirms much of Bradley's findings. 
But while Bradley stresses the impact of Tyler's extension 
of the Monroe Doctrine to Hawaii upon the Anglo-French 
decision to recognize Hawaiian sovereignty, Faivre emphasizes 
instead the European rivalry in the Pacific. According to 
Faivre, Guizot and Aberdeen viewed possible hostilities 
between their nations as too high a price to pay for the 
acquisition of further territory in the Pacific; the two 
thus consented to a mutual recognition of Hawaiian indepen­
dence. Concurrently with this decision, Faivre continues, 
Tyler and Webster expanded the Monroe Doctrine to include 
Hawaii4 He writes:
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A \En 1842, la France parait a la veille d'une 
puissante pousse d'expansion dans le Pacifique. . .
Aux Hawaii, le Commandant Mallett, expede des 
Marquesas avec l'Embuscade par Du Petit-Thouars, 
rapelie durement Kamehameha III. . ,au respect 
des traites: on redoute la aussi une annexion
francaise. Mais 1'affaire Pritchard a Tahiti, 
la tentative du C.V. Lord Paulet pour placer 
Hawaii sous le protectorate anglais. . . 
provoquent le recul simultane de l'Angleterre 
et de la^France. Guizot et Aberdeen jugent 
que les iles du Pacifique ne meritent pas de 
susciter une conflict internation. . . .Les 
deux puissances reconnaissent 1 1 independence 
d'Hawaii cependant que le president Tyler et 
son secretaire d'Etat Daniel Webster elargissent 
sur ce point le doctrine de Monroe.65
On the whole, Faivre's work is disappointing. Not only is
he overly dependent upon Bradley, and also Kuykendall, but
his research is inferior to that of his predecessors.
Kuykendall, Brookes, and Bradley all employ French archival
material to a greater degree than does Faivre. Still, Faivre
is important, for he does support Bradley's interpretation
of Tyler's declaration.
65jean Paul Faivre, L'Expansion Francaise dans le 
Pacifique de 1800 a 1842 (Paris: Nouvelle Editions Francaise, 
1953), pp. 459-497. I have translated Faivre as follows:
In 1842, France appeared on the verge of a powerful 
expansionist drive in the Pacific. In Hawaii,
Commandant Mallett, dispatched from the Marquesas 
by Du Petit-Thouars, forcibly reminded Kamehameha 
III. . .in regard to the treaties: French annexa­
tion was also feared. But the Pritchard affair 
in Tahiti, the attempt of C.V. Lord Paulet to 
place Hawaii under an English protectorate. . . 
provoked the simultaneous retreat of England and 
France. Guizot and Aberdeen decided that islands 
in the Pacific did not merit the instigation of 
an international conflict. . . .The two powers 
recognized the independence of Hawaii; meanwhile, 
President Tyler and Daniel Webster, his Secretary 
of State, extended the Monroe Doctrine to that region.
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But Bradley and Faivre are not alone in their interpre­
tations of Tyler's Hawaiian policy. Sylvester K. Stevens 
also believes that in 1842 Hawaii came under the auspices 
of the United States through the Monroe Doctrine. Stevens 
maintains that Tyler saw the need to do more than merely 
announce his policy. He writes: "The transmission to
diplomatic representatives in France and Great Britain of 
the views of the administration emphasized the international 
significance of Tyler’s statement and recorded it as an 
American doctrine."66 With his policy so proclaimed,
Stevens adds, Tyler could never condone the Paulet affair. 
Echoing Bradley, Stevens explains the motive behind the 
American protest against the temporary cession of Hawaii: 
"Actually the United States had more to fear from the 
French, and might well have welcomed the Paulet seizure. . . , 
The American response to the news of the Paulet cession com­
bined a bitter condemnation of British imperialism with a
shrewd calculation of the importance of Hawaii to the United 
f\ 7States." The real significance of the protest against 
Paulet's occupation of Hawaii, Stevens asserts, is that it 
indicated that Tyler's proclamation was more than a mere 
statement of policy. "Fundamental principles of Tyler's
66sylvester k . Stevens, American Expansionism in 
Hawaii. 1842-1898 (Harrisburg: Archives Publishing Co. 
of Pennsylvania, 1945), p. 4.
^Ibid. , p. 16.
doctrine had been affirmed,” he writes. It was further 
"supplemented by the bilateral declaration of France and 
Great Britain binding the two chief possible opponents to 
a mutual check on each other,
After 1842, Stevens sees the United States as the 
prime benefactor of Hawaiian independence. He points out, 
for example, that Kamehameha had been forced to sign objec­
tionable treaties with Great Britain and France, And al­
though Ten Van Eyck, the American minister to Hawaii in 
the late forties, also demanded too much from the native 
government, Stevens notes that he was rebuked by Secretary 
B u c h a n a n . 69 Similarly, he credits the American protest 
against the Dillon affair with persuading France to withdraw-- 
no mention is made of any British influence. The Taylor 
administration informed the Hawaiian government that it would 
not only mediate, but make clear its disapproval. Stevens 
contends that unless the United States demonstrated its
ability to protect Hawaii, the Dillon incident could have
7 0meant the permanent loss of the islands.
When difficulties again befell Franco-Hawaiian relations 
in 1851, Stevens maintains that the Whig Fillmore administra­
tion, which was ideologically opposed to annexation in the
68Ibid.t p. 20. 
^ Ibid. , pp. 21-22. 
^9Ibid,, p. 50.
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first place, reaffirmed Tyler's policy. He views Fillmore's
rejection of annexation, as well as the failure of the
attempt to link Hawaii with Cuba in a tripartite guarantee,
as fortuitous. He writes:
The Fillmore policy succeeded in forestalling 
annexation and upheld the principles of the 
Tyler doctrine with success, if with little 
vigor. The failure of the proposal for a 
triple protectorate was fortunate indeed from 
the standpoint of its effect upon future 
American relations with the islands. . . , 
the forebearance of Washington in not pressing 
the opportunity for a foothold offered by the 
cession proposal combined to give a powerful 
urge toward better relations with the United 
States.71
Significantly, Stevens insists that President Pierce, 
though devoted to fulfilling the destiny of the United States, 
also upheld Tyler's Hawaiian doctrine. According to Stevens, 
Marcy's instructions to David Gregg, the new commissioner to 
Hawaii, "indicate again how fundamental were the principles 
established for Hawaii a decade earlier by Tyler." He notes 
that "the necessity for certain territorial acquisitions as 
a protection for the expanding interests of the nation became 
a cardinal point in the foreign policy of Pierce." But, he 
adds, "Hawaii stood in the same relationship to the United 
States as Cuba and the Antilles, which the United States 
would be 'pleased' to see 'independent of European powers.'"72
71lbid., pp. 56-57.
7^Ibid., p. 60.
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Unlike Kuykendall and Brookes, Stevens asserts that 
much of the impetus behind the move towards annexation 
came not from the "Manifest Destiny" spirit, but rather 
from Anglo-French opposition to the possible outcome of 
the increased expansionist fervor. In his anxiety to 
forward the union of Hawaii with the United States, Gregg, 
Stevens notes, was confronted by "the undisguised opposi­
tion of the English and especially the French consul, to 
American control." When Marcy was informed to this,
Stevens continues, he called Gregg’s attention to "one of 
the most significant angles of the Hawaiian problem--the 
growing entente of France and Great Britain in opposition 
to further American territorial expansion." Because the 
Monroe Doctrine included Hawaii, a combined Anglo-French 
resistance to annexation violated the principle of an 
American sphere of influence. Stevens writes:
This rise of the ambitious Louis Napoleon in 
France, and the union of that power with Great 
Britain in the diplomacy of the Near East against 
Russia, paved the way for a closer Anglo-French 
cooperation in proposals for the throttling of 
American ambitions. There were objections 
equally to American attempts to control either 
Cuba or Hawaii. Marcy had placed them upon 
equal footing from the standpoint of the national 
interest of the United States. *
By viewing Hawaii as within the realm of the Monroe Doctrine,
Stevens can have no sympathy for the attempts of France and
^•^Ibid. , pp. 64-66.
-160-
Britain to protect their inferior stake in the islands.
In his assessment of the failure of annexation, Stevens 
again departs from Kuykendall. The latter, drawing from 
Van Alstyne and Golder, as well as from his own researches, 
concludes that the Anglo-French protest had an effect upon 
Washington. Stevens, on the other‘hand, maintains that 
annexation failed because of complications in Hawaii, and 
not because of external opposition. Stevens1s argument is 
strengthened by his consideration, then rejection, of 
evidence to the contrary. He points out that Buchanan, then 
minister at London, distrusted Louis Napoleon. "'As a despot, 
he regards the existence and the rapid growth of the Republic 
of the United States as a standing censure upon his usurpa­
tion and tyranny,'" Stevens quotes Buchanan as writing.
"'He is bold, wary and unscrupulous,'" Buchanan went on, 
"'knowing that our naval force is comparatively insignifi­
cant. . .it would be altogether in consistency with his 
character to attempt to humble us by one of those bold 
strokes in which he so much delights, and to declare that 
we shall not have the Sandwich Islands.'" Buchanan con­
cluded, Stevens writes, that "while Cuba might be worth the 
risk of war, the Islands were certainly not so important as 
to justify the chance."74 Stevens concludes, however, that
74Ibid., p. 69.
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Buchanan's trepidations and the formal Anglo-French protest
had little impact upon Washington:
The question arises as to the effect known Anglo- 
French opposition and the advice of Buchanan may 
have had. It is questionable whether it entered 
into the problem at the time. The treaty was so 
undesirable as to preclude its consideration, 
even had no other factors been involved. Marcy 
was definite in his opinion that the demand for 
immediate statehood would not have been accept­
able. Vigorous protest from England against 
annexation may have had some influence, but was 
not fundamentalJ 5
Perhaps it is an overstatement to claim that Kuykendall
and Stevens differ. Both authors credit domestic problems
in Hawaii, as well as a disagreeable treaty, as contributing
to the failure of annexation. Still, Kuykendall believes
that Anglo-French opposition to annexation was justified.
Stevens disagrees, concluding only that "the time was not
ripe for the annexation of Hawaii."7  ̂ Because he maintains
that Tyler's doctrine in effect extended the Monroe Doctrine
to Hawaii, Stevens cannot accept the view that European
protests against annexation were justified.
This perhaps is why Henry Blumenthal reverts to the
Kuykendall viewpoint. Reviewing Tyler’s Hawaiian policy,
Blumenthal never mentions the American predominance in the
islands. The Tyler administration, he writes, "disclaimed
any desire to seek exclusive control over Hawaii." To
75rbid., p. 75.
76Ibid.
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avoid an international conflict, he adds, "Daniel Webster 
suggested that the commercial advantages the islands offered 
be made available to all powers."77 Likewise, Blumenthal 
makes no mention of a reaffirmation of a "Tyler Doctrine" 
in response to the Dillon affair. He suggests that the 
United States hoped to avoid difficulties with Republican 
France. Washington "did little more, therefore, than speak 
up in favor of Hawaiian independence." In so doing, he 
adds, "the United States was wise--why should it complicate 
relations with Paris when Great Britain could be counted 
on to stop France in Hawaii?" Obviously, Blumenthal 
rejects the view that the island kingdom was under the 
protection of the Monroe Doctrine. Regarding the reaction 
of the Fillmore administration to renewed Franco-Hawaiian 
troubles and the offer of annexation, Blumenthal again omits 
any reference to a "Tyler Doctrine," and repeats what 
Kuykendall has written about the French reply to Webster’s 
remonstrances --i.e ., that American protests against French
diplomacy insulted Paris, for it had no intention of
7 8acquiring Hawaiian territory. °
With greater confidence than Kuykendall, Blumenthal 
maintains that the Anglo-French protest against annexation 
was both effective and warranted. Not only does he emphasize
^Blumenthal, A Reappraisal, p. 61.
78Ibid., pp. 62-63.
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Buchanan's warning that Louis Napoleon might decide to resist
annexation, but he also reports that Eugene de Sartiges, the
French Foreign Minister, endeavored to convince Marcy that
such a transfer would be resisted by France and Britain,
This was no idle threat, Blumenthal adds, for "in the fall
of 1854, . „combined Anglo-French forces moved into Hawaiian
waters to protest against the impending annexation," Of
the decision to drop annexation, Blumenthal writes:
The consideration which led to the decision 
against annexation at that time was the Amer­
ican government's realization that it could 
not defend the islands against a strong naval 
assault. Fearing that over expansion might 
weaken, if not humiliate, the United States, 
the Pierce administration respected, as in the 
case of Cuba, the realities of power politics.'9
Unfortunately, Blumenthal presents inadequate evidence to
support this claim. He, as well as Van Alstyne and Golder,
fail to demonstrate that France and Great Britain, occupied
with the Crimean War, were able to resist annexation forcibly,
or to establish that the Pierce administration heeded their
protests.
Along these lines, it should be noted that three recent 
authors have avoided committing themselves to a specific 
explanation for the failure of annexation. In a revised 
edition of his biography of Pierce, Roy Franklin Nichols
79lbid,, pp. 63-64,.
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does suggest that foreign opposition to annexation did not 
go unnoticed. Nevertheless, he credits the failure of 
the project more to the death of Kamehameha than to anything 
else.^ Marcy's biographer, Ivor D. Spencer, emphasizes 
that the annexation proposal itself was not sincere, and 
was only a stopgap measure to frustrate the rumored French 
aggression. He further asserts that March did not allow 
the official protests of Clarendon and the advice of 
Sartiges to deter him from pursuing an honorable Hawaiian 
p o l i c y , M e r z e  Tate offers yet a third, an even more 
general, explanation for the failure of annexation. She 
agrees with Brookes that American prestige declined during 
the fifties, due primarily to the irresponsible behavior 
of American residents in Hawaii and the rumors of filibuster­
ing expeditions from California. These antics, she writes, 
"provided a basis for British and French contentions that 
Americans were hostile to the Hawaiian race," Tate also 
points to the death of Kamehameha III as a factor in 
Hawaii's decision to move from annexation to reciprocity.^
80Roy Franklin Nichols, Franklin Pierce: Young Hickory 
of the Granite Hills (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1958), pp, 376, 396-397.
81Ivor D. Spencer, The Victor and the Spoils: A Life 
of William L. Marcv (Providence: Brown University Press,
1959), pp. 396-397.
^Merze Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: 
A Political History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), 
pp. 18-19; Tate, Reciprocity or Annexation (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 1968), p. 30.
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In summation, historians of Hawaii's role in Franco- 
American relations have clearly demonstrated that although 
French agents and consuls in the islands were indeed trouble­
some, neither Louis Philippe nor Louis Napoleon aspired to 
extend their Pacific realm to include the kingdom of the 
Kamehamehas. Since Foster and Callahan wrote, their assump­
tion that Paris sanctioned such efforts as the Laplace and 
Tromelin interventions has been successfully challenged,, 
Beginning with Blue, and including especially Kuykendall, 
Bradley, and Brookes, historians have searched French 
archives for evidence of any official desire to acquire a 
foothold in Hawaii, but none has been found. Although 
Bradley establishes that the July Monarchy pursued certain 
imperialistic ambitions in the Pacific, he does not include 
Hawaii. Still, it cannot be denied that the Laplace affair, 
as well as the French occupation of the Marquesas and Tahiti, 
had an impact upon Washington. Kuykendall, Bradley, Faivre, 
and Stevens have all asserted that the Tyler administration 
was not unaware of French activity in the Pacific. It is 
clear that American policy in Hawaii, as defined by Tyler in 
1842, was at least partially founded upon a suspicion of 
French intentions. It Is also clear that the activities of 
the French consuls Dillon and Perrin increased American 
concern for Hawaiian independence.
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In his declaration, Tyler had asserted that in spite 
of the predominant American presence in Hawaii, the United 
States would not seek "exclusive control over the Hawaiian 
Government," but would be "content with its independent 
existence." He had warned, however, that the United States 
would make "a decided remonstrance against the adoption 
of an opposite policy by any other power." Upholding 
Tyler's warning, both the Taylor and Fillmore administra­
tions had voiced to Paris their disapproval of the efforts 
of Dillon and Perrin. And although rumors of impending 
French aggression prompted Hawaii to offer annexation to 
the United States, the Fillmore administration refused to 
consider such a project, thereby reaffirming American 
dedication to Hawaiian independence.
But Fillmore's successor was not unsympathetic to the 
idea of expansion. In 1854, the eager American minister to 
Honolulu negotiated a treaty of annexation with the native 
Hawaiian government. Van Alstyne and Blumenthal assert 
that Anglo-French opposition was a prime factor in the 
decision of the Pierce administration to reject annexation. 
Their interpretation, however, is weak. Although they 
clarify Hawaii's position in the international affairs of 
the day, neither Van Alstyne nor Blumenthal establishes 
the degree of the commitment of Pierce and Marcy to annexa­
tion, or even that the Anglo-French protests were considered
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in Washington. In contrast, the majority of historians 
have asserted that there were several obstacles, both 
American and Hawaiian in origin, that prevented annexa­
tion. Whether or not Tyler intended to extend the Monroe 
Doctrine to Hawaii, it is clear that an independent Hawaii 
served American interests, and that French opposition to 
the half-hearted annexation project had little real impact. 
So long as French representatives refrained from ambitious 
attempts to increase their country's influence in the 
islands, the United States remained content to respect 
Hawaiian independence.
Obviously, American expansionism provided much of the 
impetus behind Anglo-French efforts to prevent the possible 
extension of the United States to Hawaii. It was clear to 
London and Paris that the United States was rapidly becoming 
a major power, especially in the Pacific. Even in distant 
China the energy of American commercial expansion could not 
be ignored. But while France and England sought to protect 
their interests in Hawaii from American dominance, the 
three powers had basically the same interests in China and, 
for the most part, cooperated with each other. Throughout 
the period, however, Washington avoided any official commit­
ment to the aims of France and Britain in China.
There has been little disagreement regarding China's 
role in the relations between Washington and Paris. Most
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authors have maintained that American representatives in 
China, although advocates of a more vigorous policy, followed 
the official policy as defined in 1843 and kept in effect 
during the years before the American Civil War. Only one 
recent historian, John F. Cady, has challenged the prevalent 
assumption that while the United States government declined 
to join Britain and France in hostilities against the 
Chinese emperor, American officials in China cooperated 
closely with their European counterparts.
By 1843, it had become clear that the Chinese barrier 
against foreign trade had been breached. The "Opium War" 
had ended, with Great Britain being the first European 
power to receive extra-territorial rights by treaty. Realiz­
ing that once the first step had been taken China would be 
pressed for similar concessions by other powers, Daniel 
Webster determined to insure an American position in the 
scramble. On May 8, 1843, he instructed Caleb Cushing, 
the newly appointed commissioner to China, to negotiate 
with the emperor regarding American trading rights in China. 
Webster set a precedent that was to guide American diplomats 
in China for many years, and which prevented any real fric­
tion between the United States and France. The Secretary 
instructed Cushing to avoid involvement in any controversy 
which might arise between China and any European state. 
Furthermore, the minister was instructed not to express
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any sentiment which could give another government cause
for offense.83
In his survey of American diplomacy in the Far East, 
Callahan presents what has become the standard interpreta­
tion of United States relations with France in China,
He asserts that although Commodore Matthew C. Perry and 
Peter Parker, the American consul in China during the mid- 
fifties, attempted to involve the United States in a com­
bined Anglo-French-American military front to coerce the 
emperor into a revision of the 1843 treaties, the adminis­
trations of both Pierce and Buchanan indicated their 
determination to avoid the use of force. The American 
representatives in China, Callahan notes, were instructed 
that although Washington sympathized with the aims of France 
and England, they must not involve the United States in 
hostilities.84
In his survey of American diplomacy in the Orient,
Foster supports Callahan's views. The former is more 
explicit, however, and his work is consequently more 
revealing than Callahan's. Foster reviews the relations 
of Parker's predecessor, Robert McLane, with the French 
minister, concluding that the two decided to "act in 
concert in bringing pressure to bear upon the Chinese
83sen. Ex. Doc. (457), 28th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 138, 
pp. 1- 5.
84Callahan, American Relations in the Far East, pp. 99-100.
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government to satisfy the existing grievances." And in 
so doing, he writes, "the American minister was conforming 
to the spirit of his instructions from the Secretary of 
State."85
Noting that Parker visited with the Foreign Ministers 
of Britain and France before assuming his duties in China, 
Foster contributes much to our understanding of American 
policy in China. He maintains that Parker participated in 
a "free exchange of views as to the policy to be pursued 
in China by the three maritime powers, and an informal 
agreement [was] reached that there should be cooperation 
and harmony of action." But when Parker reached China 
and took up a scheme to acquire Formosa--plans were that 
France was to get Korea and Britain Chusan^-Marcy rejected 
the idea and informed Parker that "it did not in any way 
harmonize with the peaceful policy at Washington."86
In 1856, hostilities broke out between the united 
powers of France and Great Britain and the Chinese emperor. 
Foster maintains that William B, Reed, Parker’s replacement, 
found no difficulty in cooperating with the two European 
powers. But there were limitations on Reed’s freedom. 
Although Washington expressed its sympathy for the efforts
^ F o s t e r ,  American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 216.
86Ibid., pp. 221, 227-229.
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of France and Britain, Reed was authorized to cooperate
8 7with the two powers only in peaceful endeavors.
Subsequent historians have largely confirmed the
Callahan-Foster viewpoint, adding little new information
in the process. H.B. Morse notes that the French minister
in China, the Comte de Courcy, delayed his cooperation
with Parker. According to Morse, however, this was due to
88slow communications with Paris. Tyler Dennett asserts 
that because Parker was somewhat obnoxious, his efforts 
toward cooperation offended the French and British minis­
ters. Regrettably, Dennett does not pursue the point. He 
concludes that Washington rejected Parker's suggestions, 
and relations with France and Britain in China remained 
amiable.8  ̂ In an essay on Lewis Cass, Buchanan's Secretary 
of State, Lewis Einstein notes that minister Reed "smarted 
under the inferiority of our position in stalking behind 
England and France, [and] suggested uniting with these 
powers in a hostile movement against the Chinese." In 
Einstein's view, Cass recognized the wisdom of such a move,
87Ibid., pp. 231, 235.
88Hosea B. Morse, The International Relations of the 
Chinese Empire: The Period of Conflict. 1834-1860 (Shanghai: 
Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., 1910), pp. 327-328,
89Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical 
Study of the Policy of the United States with Reference to 
China. Japan, and Korea in the Nineteenth Century (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1922), pp. 281-291.
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but believed that Congress would veto the idea.®^ Eldon 
Griffin takes a different approach to American involvement 
in China, but he reaffirms the view that relations between 
the United States and France there were amiable. "Had the 
American government acquired significant territorial holdings 
in the East," Griffin writes, "it would perhaps have been 
obliged clearly to unify its policy with that of England, 
France, and Russia." But, he adds, in so doing, the United 
States "could not have escaped the anxieties arising from 
internal conflicts of interest among those powers.
Henry Blumenthal incorporates all of the above assessments 
into his examination of Franco-American relations, and is 
content to state that "ever since Webster's instruction 
to Caleb Cushing,. . .the United States did not wish 'to 
enter into controversies between China and any European 
state.'" He concludes that American neutrality during the 
Anglo-French war with China in 1856-1860 served as a 
reminder to London and Paris that Washington intended to 
pursue an independent policy with regard to China.^
90Lewis Einstein, "Lewis Cass," in The American Secre­
taries of State and Their Diplomacy. ed. by Samuel F, Bemis, 
Vol. VI (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), p. 372.
^Eldon Griffin, Clippers and Consuls: American Con­
sular and Commercial Relations with Eastern Asia. 1854- 
1860 (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1938), p. 177.
^Blumenthal, a  Reappraisal, pp. 66-67.
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As mentioned earlier, Cady is the one author to 
challenge the Callahan-Foster thesis. In a 1954 work on 
French imperialism in the Far East, Cady maintains that 
France under Louis Napoleon pursued a militant policy in 
the Pacific. While Louis Philippe consented, out of 
necessity, to support French Catholics in the Far East, the 
new emperor was indebted to the Catholic hierarchy for its 
support of his coup d fetat. But the significance of Louis 
Napoleon's rule to French efforts in the Far East went 
beyond a more vigorous support of Catholic missions. Cady 
writes:
. . .clerical support rendered the Prince 
President vulnerable to clerical pressure on 
on behalf1 of the protection of missionary 
interests in the Far East. The other 
principal ingredient of Bonapartism, its 
commitment to re-establishment of nationalist 
prestige and empire as a condition of the 
survival of the dynasty, also contributed to 
the inevitable emergence of an imperialist 
adventure in the Far East.93
Cady is quick to add, however, that the policy of Louis 
Napoleon confronted insurmountable obstacles in the Far 
East. France operated without a territorial base and sub­
stantial commercial interests; also, naval mobilization 
was difficult at best--all of which forced Paris to depend 
on Great Britain for diplomatic support.94
93john F. Cady, The Roots of French Imperialism in
Eastern Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 87.
94Ibid., p. 137.
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But Cady's real contribution to the historiography of 
Franco-American relations regarding China lies in his 
examination of the Parker mission. Cady revives Dennett's 
reference to Parker's belligerency and asserts that relations 
between the United States on one hand and Great Britain on 
the other suffered from mutual jealousy and suspicion. 
According to Cady, France hesitated to cooperate with 
Parker in his endeavor to convince the Chinese emperor to 
revise the 1843 treaties. Courcy had informed Paris that 
"nothing could be accomplished by making demands which the 
Chinese were perfectly able to spurn." Parker's attempts 
at peaceful treaty revision, Courcy added, would "fail and 
only add more grief and humiliation to the sad story of 
Western relations with China." Thus, Cady concludes- "by 
the fall of 1856, the fumbling effort of Washington to take 
over the diplomatic initiative in the Far East had spent 
itself." In subsequent preparations to force demands on 
China for treaty revision, Cady claims, "London and Paris 
understandably preferred to consult a deux, with little 
concern for Washington's views."95
It is interesting, if not revealing, that only Cady 
has challenged the Callahan-Foster interpretation of 
Franco-American relations in the Far East. It seems that
95Ibid., pp. 157-159.
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Cady is the only author to have searched extensively into 
both French and American sources. Blumenthal, who wrote 
after Cady, fails to incorporate the latter’s findings into 
his work. The general assumption, then, is that the 
American government, from 1843 on, cooperated passively 
with France and Great Britain in the campaign to open 
China to Western exploitation. Cady has shown that France 
and Great Britain were unimpressed by the Parker mission 
and, because Washington would not condone a joint military 
effort, generally ignored the United States. But all of 
the authors, from Callahan forward, agree that Webster's 
instructions to Cushing formed the foundation of American 
diplomacy in China.
CHAPTER VI
THE CUBAN QUESTION
In the preceeding chapter, reference was made to Cuba 
as the other goal of American expansionists during the 
eighteen-fifties. In fact, such axioms of "Manifest Destiny" 
as propinquity and national security pointed more logically 
to the acquisition of Cuba rather than of Hawaii.1 During 
the first half of the nineteenth-century, the United States 
had been content to allow Cuba to remain under Spanish 
dominion. In 1823, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams 
had reassured Madrid that the United States would never 
sanction any attempt to free Cuba from Spain. But Adams 
had also warned that the transfer of Cuba to either France 
or Great Britain would be an unacceptable threat to the 
security of the United States.2 By 1850, however, American 
attitudes towards Cuba had changed. The island had become
Weinberg, Manifest Destiny, pp. 190-197.
2See Adams's instructions to Hugh Nelson, American 
minister at Madrid, April 28, 1823, Department of State: 
Instructions to United States Ministers, Vol. IX, pp. 183- 
243. (Unpublished microfilm).
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politically unstable, as filibuster expeditions, originating 
from the United States, challenged Spanish authority and 
worked to foment revolution. To many observers, it seemed 
doubtful that the island would long remain under Spanish 
rule. Insulted by the Northern abolitionists and fearful 
that their political influence would decline, defenders 
of the Southern slavocracy were further haunted by the 
spectre of a collapse of Spanish rule in Cuba and the 
emergence of a Negro republic. Such a development, members 
of the Southern oligarchy reasoned, would provide a base 
for a general revolt of all black peoples held in bondage.
To prevent this, many prominent Southerns advocated the 
annexation of Cuba by the United States. Their ranks were 
strengthened by the champions of "Manifest Destiny" doctrine 
from other parts of the country.^
In Europe, the Cuban question created a dilemma for 
France and Great Britain. Fearful lest Cuba be lost,
Spain sought the assistance of those two powers in 1845.
For six years, Paris and London demurred, demanding that 
Spain first enforce her laws prohibiting the slave trade.
But in 1851, following the third and, although unsuccessful,
^See Basil Rauch, American Interest in Cuba, 1848-1855 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 57-66; and 
Amos A. Ettinger, The Mission to Spain of Pierre Soul£, 
1855-1855 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), pp. 4-6.
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largest filibuster expedition of Narciso Lopez, France and 
Britain reluctantly agreed to assist Spain. A year later, 
frigates of the French and British navies began to patrol 
Cuban waters in search of renewed filibustering activity.^ 
Hoping to commit the United States to the status quo in 
Cuba, France and Britain invited the administration of 
Millard Fillmore to participate in a joint guaranty over 
the island. In reply, Secretary of State Edward Everett 
asserted that although the United States did not covet the 
acquisition of the island, the condition of Cuba was an 
"American question." The proposed convention, Everett 
continued, "assumes that the United States have no other 
or greater interest in the question than France or England; 
whereas it is necessary only to cast one's eye on the map 
to see how remote are the relations of Europe, and how 
intimate those of the United States, with this island."*’
The Cuban policy of the administration of Franklin K. 
Pierce presented further problems for Paris and London. 
Owing his election at least partially to a surge of expan­
sionist sentiment stimulated by the disciples of "Young 
America," Pierce formally advocated the acquisition of Cuba
^Ettinger, Soule, pp. 26-46.
^Sen. Ex. Doc. (660), 32nd Cong,, 2nd Sess., No. 13,
pp. 16-18.
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in his inaugural address.^ Pierce, and his Secretary of 
State, William L. Marcy, at first delayed making a decision 
as to the means by which Cuba would be acquired. But early 
in 1854, an American merchant vessel, the Black Warrior, 
was seized in Havana by Spanish authorities without any 
real justification. The American minister in Madrid,
Pierre Soule, entered into negotiations with the Spanish 
government, demanding an indemnity for the outrage. Spain 
delayed, and, acting on Soule's advice, Marcy authorized 
the minister to attempt to purchase Cuba, and if Madrid 
refused, to work to "detach" Cuba from Spain. Significantly, 
the Crimean War began in the same month. As months passed 
and no progress was made toward the purchase of Cuba, Marcy 
instructed his ministers at Madrid, Paris, and London to 
confer on the Cuban question.7 What has become known as 
the Ostend "Manifesto" contains a review of the Cuban problem 
including the Black Warrior crisis, an analysis of the pur­
chase negotiations, and the following two paragraphs:
After we shall have offered Spain a price for 
Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall 
be refused it will then be time to consider the 
question, does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, 
seriously endanger our internal peace and the 
existence of our cherished Union?
^Nichols» Pierce, pp. 329-330.
7Learned, "Marcy," in Bemis, Vol. VI, pp. 202-203.
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Should this question be answered in the affirma­
tive, then, by every law, human and divine, we 
shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we 
possess the power; and this upon the very same 
principle that would justify an individual in 
tearing down the burning house of his neighbor 
if there were no other means of preventing the 
flames from destroying his own home.8
Although the conferring ministers did not conclude that 
Cuba in the possession of Spain did indeed endanger the 
"internal peace of the Union," the Ostend Manifesto could 
easily be interpreted as an endorsement of the use of force 
to acquire Cuba.
After a few days of deliberation, Marcy, in November 
of 1854, repudiated the recommendations of the Ostend dispatch 
and censured its principal author, Soule. But the spirit 
of the Ostend Manifesto differed little from Marcy's instruc­
tions to Soule in April, 1854. This apparent shift in the 
Cuban policy of the United States is vital to the historio­
graphy of the Franco-American relations with respect to Cuba. 
One group of historians explains the decision of the Pierce 
administration to disavow any intention of forcibly acquiring 
Cuba by pointing to the debilitating effect of the bitter 
domestic strife of the fifties. In their view, the Pierce 
administration, despite the devotion of Democratic expan­
sionists and Southern slaveholders to the acquisition of 
Cuba, could not ignore the adamant opposition of abolitionists
8House Ex. Doc. (790), 33rd Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 93 
pp. 127-132.
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and free soilers to the extension of slavery. The uproar 
caused by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise of 1820 
and the accompanying congressional debate on the Kansas - 
Nebraska issue seriously weakened the nation and prevented 
any administration from acting with conviction in foreign 
affairs.
To claim that the acrimonious controversy over the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act prevented the United States from 
acquiring Cuba, even at a time when Britain and France were 
preoccupied with the Crimean War, is convincing, but of 
relatively little significance to Franco-American relations. 
Noting the impact upon European, and especially French, 
opinion of the antics of "Young America" and of the revela-
»
tion of the Gstend Manifesto, a second group of historians 
claim that Anglo-French protests also influenced the Pierce 
administration to drop annexation. The purpose of this 
chapter, then, is to review the historiography of the Cuban 
question with the intention of determining the validity 
of the claim that the government of Louis Philippe, as an 
ally of Britain, but also as an ideological opponent of 
republicanism, contributed to the failure of the Pierce 
administration to annex Cuba.
In an early article on the Cuban question, Sidney 
Webster maintains that Anglo-French intervention in the 
island's affairs endangered American interests. Although
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he wrote in 1893, Webster's study is more a memoir than an 
historical analysis derived from primary sources. He had 
been a member of the White House inner circle during the 
years of the Pierce administration, and his later writings 
are marred by a pronounced bias in favor of Secretary 
Marcy. According to Webster, Anglo-French naval activities 
around Cuba in 1852 and 1853 led Marcy to believe that 
Spain's dominion over the island was faltering. Because it 
was essential that the United States prevent Cuba from 
falling into the hands of France or England, Marcy and 
Pierce decided to attempt to purchase the island. But 
Marcy doubted that Spain would be willing to sell. The 
promptness with which France and Britain had sent their 
vessels to Cuba in 1852, Webster explains, led the Secre­
tary to believe that Spain was obligated never to transfer 
the island to the United States. Nevertheless, in order 
to uphold the Cuban policy of his predecessor, Edward 
Everett, Marcy determined to make an attempt to buy Cuba.^ 
It is revealing of Webster's prejudice that no mention is 
made of the spirit of acquisitiveness that so pervaded the 
Pierce administration upon its entry into office.
Webster's predilection towards Marcy is further illus­
trated by his review of the Ostend conference. It is his
^Sidney Webster, "Mr. Marcy, the Cuban Question, and 
the Ostend Manifesto," Political Science Quarterly, VIII 
(1893), pp. 8-9.
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view that Marcy instructed his ministers at Madrid, Paris, 
and London to confer so that the purposes of France and 
Britain with respect to Cuba could be reviewed. Nowhere 
is there any mention of an intention, or even a desire, 
on the part of Marcy or Pierce to acquire Cuba with force, 
if necessary. Thus, Webster sees no incongruity in Marcy's 
repudiation of the Ostend recommendation that Cuba could 
justifiably be wrested from S p a i n . T h i s  may in part be 
due to the unavailability of documents; still, one doubts 
whether Webster could ever have found fault with Marcy's 
diplomacy.
While Webster leaves us in some doubt as to the 
ultimate goal of the Pierce administration regarding Cuba, 
James Morton Callahan clearly states that it was to acquire 
Cuba, preferably by purchase, but by force, if necessary. 
Depending for the most part upon published documents and 
secondary contemporary accounts, Callahan asserts that 
Anglo-French naval intervention in Cuba in behalf of Spain 
constituted an open challenge to the Monroe Doctrine and, 
as such, warranted a forcible American reaction. Although 
Everett had reasserted the principle of an American sphere 
in his rejection of the tripartite guarantee of Cuban 
status, Callahan claims that this did not suffice to protect
l®Ibid., p. 22.
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American interests. Destiny pointed unmistakably to an 
eventual acquisition of Cuba by the United States; neither 
France nor Great Britain had a right to interfere. Callahan 
writes:
The feeling that nature had made two continents 
with separate interests Ted the American Govern­
ment to reject the tripartite proposal. The 
United States had only a general interest in the 
fate of Turkey; why should England and France 
watch the fate of Cuba, which lay under America's 
right arm? In seventy-five years England, Spain 
and Portugal had lost vast colonies. The United 
States had become large and peaceful; it had 
needed territory and had purchased it. . . .If 
necessary, the United States might in the future 
acquire more territory.H
Clearly, Callahan is guided by his belief that Britain and
France sought to thwart the natural expansion of the United
States and challenge American supremacy in the New World.
Like Webster, Callahan points to Anglo-French naval
activities around Cuba as boding ill for the United States.
"It was feared," he writes, "that both England and France
had made some sort of arrangement to sustain Spanish dominion
in Cuba." But while Webster believes that these maneuvers
led Marcy merely to seek further information, and eventually
to authorize the Ostend conference for the same purpose,
Callahan asserts that the Pierce administration, encouraged
Hjames Morton Callahan, Cuba and International Relatiions 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1899), p. 233. It is 
of note that Callahan also stresses the Guizot-Polk exchange 
of 1845 as a further example of the contrasting interests of 
Europe and America. See pp. 196-197.
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by developments in Europe, dedicated itself to the 
acquisition of Cuba. The Crimean War had begun in the 
spring of 1854; furthermore, "France had recently erected 
an imperial throne--and some in the United States thought 
it was over the crater of a volcano which would keep the 
Emperor watching for his own safety." Callahan concludes 
with conviction that "a Continent was before us, and a 
bright future. Who could doubt that the Monroe Doctrine 
would be enforced?"^2 One wonders if the enforcement of 
the Monroe Doctrine meant the conquest of Cuba.
Reviewing Soule's mission to Spain, Callahan reaffirms 
his view that France, in alliance with Britain, conspired 
to prevent the United States from achieving its rightful 
destiny by the purchase of Cuba. Without mentioning 
Soule's views on slavery, or his devotion to the "Young 
America" movement, Callahan notes that the minister com­
plained to Marcy that Spain was under the influence of 
France. Soule further asserted that since Louis Napoleon 
opposed the American acquisition of Cuba, he was shunned 
by the Spanish government. Callahan also accepts Soule's 
claim that France and Britain interfered with the Black 
Warrior negotiations. Soule, Callahan writes,
12Ibid., pp. 261-265.
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said that the interference of England and 
France in the recent disturbances in Cuba 
"may have emboldened Spain" to experiment 
upon the patience of the United States, but 
that they could not influence us to deviate 
from a course of justice to United States 
citizens and of honor to our flag.13
Consistent with Callahan's assertion that the Anglo-
French intervention in Cuban affairs merited a determined
American response, and that the two powers had no right to
meddle with the destiny of the United States in the New
World, is his explanation of the failure of annexation.
In his view, only domestic complications prevented Pierce
from procuring Cuba for the United States. Marcy publicly
renounced the recommendations of the Ostend Manifesto,
not because Washington feared France and England would
intervene if it was decided to eject Spain from Cuba, but
rather, Callahan writes, because "the excitement which
grew out of the Kansas-Nebraska legislation rendered it
impossible to secure the annexation of Cuba by any war
which the slavery expansionists might have inaugurated
for that purpose."!^
Granted, Callahan's interpretation has many deficiencies,
not the least of which is his assumption that France and
Great Britain without hesitation sent their naval forces to
Cuba in order to frustrate the expansion of the United
l^ibid., pp. 268-269.
l^Ibid., pp. 274-278.
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States. Also, he neglects to examine the foibles of 
Soule’s character, and what impact, if any, his activities 
had upon Pierce's Cuban diplomacy. Still, Callahan has 
made a valuable contribution to the historiography of the 
Cuban question. He makes the significant observation 
that the Cuban policy of the Pierce administration under­
went a transition between the inauguration and the fall 
of 1854. Although he neglects to analyze Marcy's 
instruction to Soule and the other conferring ministers, 
Callahan at least recognizes the contrast between the 
professed aims of the Pierce administration in 1853 and 
the rejection of the Ostend recommendation that the United 
States, if necessary, could rightfully eject Spain from 
Cuba. Beyond the obvious impact of the Kansas-Nebraska 
furor, Callahan suggests that another factor in this 
transition may have been Secretary Marcy's early artificial 
enthusiasm for the annexation of Cuba. "Marcy pretended," 
he writes, "to believe that the condition of the island 
was alarming--that England was endeavoring to control its 
future by inducing Spain to take steps toward the emancipa­
tion of the slaves, and that France had guaranteed Cuba to 
Spain on these conditions." According to Callahan, 
domestic problems, when combined with the termination of 
Marcy's dissembling to favor annexation, negated any 
chance that the United States would acquire Cuba in the
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15eighteen-fifties.
Callahan's influence upon later historians has been 
substantial. John H. Latane, Elizabeth Brett White, 
and C.A. Duniway all repeat his assumption that Britain 
and France, with the intention of containing American 
expansionism, intervened enthusiastically in Cuba. Like 
Callahan, each of these historians views the Anglo-French 
patrolling as sufficiently serious to warrant Everett's 
rejection of the tripartite proposal and the revival of 
the Monroe Doctrine. According to Latane, for example, 
Everett's refusal to endorse the tripartite idea con­
stituted a direct protest against the Anglo-French 
intrusion. Latane further echoes Callahan when he 
examines the diplomacy of Marcy. He notes that in Marcy's 
instruction to Soule, the Secretary emphasized the danger 
presented to the United States by the presence of British 
and French naval forces in the waters around Cuba. In
the interests of American security, Latane concludes,
X 6Marcy could not allow Cuba to fall to another power.
Unlike Callahan and Latane, White intimates that the 
crisis in American-Cuban diplomacy caused by Anglo-French 
intervention did not emanate solely from the offensive
15Ibid., p. 274.
1 f \ John H. Latane, The United States and Latin America 
(Garden City: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1921), pp. 97-99.
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nature of that intrusion. She points out that Everett's 
predecessor and close friend, Daniel Webster, realized 
the impassioned reaction that the combined naval opera­
tions would cause in the United States, and that this 
would harm Washington's relations with the intervening 
European powers. Webster, she writes, believed "that 
the difference between the government of American and 
that of European states is of a type to create mutual 
suspicion and aversion; and that knowledge of this 
creates in American a jealousy of European interference." 
Since the theme of her work is American opinion of 
France, White concludes that French intervention in this
case, then, could not fail to produce some irritation, if
1 7not worse consequences." White adds that the Cuban 
affair was but one incident in a list of grievances causing
the American people to look at France and her emperor with
18a critical and suspicious eye.
In an essay on Webster's career as Secretary of State, 
Duniway summarizes Callahan's thesis regarding the Cuban 
policy of France and Great Britain. He writes:
l^white, American Opinion of France, pp. 136-137, 
18ibid., p. 142.
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Great Britain and France viewed with serious 
alarm the repetition of filibustering attacks 
upon Cuba, which the United States had not 
prevented. They ordered their squadrons in 
the West to repel by force any and all 
attempted invasions of Cuba. Notification 
that this had been done alarmed in turn the 
United States. 19'
None of the above authors even hint that France and 
Britain viewed the propserous Cuban slave trade with 
disgust, or that such an abhorrence of human bondage 
at first delayed, then limited Anglo-French backing 
of Spanish rule in Cuba.
Foster Stearns first challenged Callahan's assump­
tion that France and Britain plotted to frustrate American 
expansion by their intervention in Cuba. Writing in the 
same volume as Duniway, Stearns notes that the French and 
British ministers protested that Everett had over-reached 
to their naval intervention by his rejection of the 
tripartite plan and his assertion of the principle of an 
American sphere. He adds, however, that Everett could 
not be swayed by such protestations, despite their justifica­
tion, for he had a larger purpose in mind than merely 
challenging the intervention. According to Stearns,
Everett was seeking to formulate the fundamental prin­
ciples of a foreign policy that future administrations 
could adopt. Thus, although Stearns intimates that the
19Duniway, "Webster," in Bemis, Vol. VI, p. 106.
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United States had little reason to object to Anglo-French 
patrolling of Cuban waters--unfortunately, he does not 
mention why--he is of the opinion that consideration of 
this would not have softened Everett'e pronouncement.
Not only did the Monroe Doctrine have to be upheld, but 
it also had to be interpreted as applying to Cuba.^^
So although Stearns takes a different approach, his 
conclusion is identical to Callahan's.
To this point, Callahan's interpretation has remained 
basically unaltered. White is important in that she 
demonstrates that much of the crisis over Cuba was due 
to American suspicion of Europe, and especially the 
government of Louis Napoleon. But her findings are too 
vague to be of much use. Henry Barrett Learned demon­
strates that this failure to reevaluate Callahan's findings 
can be credited to a lack of evidence. He is the first to 
make extensive use of both State Department archives and 
private correspondence. Through his research, Learned 
became aware of the significance of the period between 
April and November of 1854. On April 3, Marcy instructed 
Soul£, if necessary, to work "to detach" Cuba from Spain; 
at the end of November, Marcy repudiated the Ostend report, 
which incorporated just such a provision, and censured
20poster Stearns, "Edward Everett," in ibid., pp. 135-
136.
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Soule. In order to explain this peculiar transition, 
Learned found it necessary to assess the relative 
impacts of domestic and foreign attitudes upon the 
Pierce administration. For that reason, his essay 
merits close attention.
In spite of the dissimilar philosophies of Fillmore 
and Pierce, Learned asserts that the new administration 
adopted Everett's Cuban policy. Everett's rejection of 
the tripartite proposal revived the Monroe Doctrine, 
since 1845 a Democratic article of faith, and "made a 
bold and clear assertion of the United States as the 
leading power of the Western World." What advocate of 
American expansionism could find fault with this?
Learned is quick to add, however, that Everett's stand 
did not commit the Pierce administration to refrain from 
intervention in Cuba. The rejection of the tripartite 
guarantee, he writes, "left the problem of Cuba's destiny 
open to such arrangement as might be deemed desirable by 
any future administration," But Marcy and Pierce made no 
decision regarding Cuba for a year after the inauguration. 
Still, the Cuban question did not go unnoticed; Marcy on 
several occasions urged his ministers at Madrid, Paris, 
and London to discover, Learned writes, "any signs of a 
changing attitude on the part of the British, French, 
and Spanish governments towards the United States in
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respect to our relations with Cuba." Significantly, he 
adds that Marcy, ’’aware that the Cuban question remained 
in an unsettled state, was open to suggestions."21
Learned is not the first to assert that the opinions 
of Soule influenced Marcy. Callahan notes that Soule's 
suspicion of the intentions of France and England regard­
ing Cuba led Marcy to authorize the Ostend meeting. But 
Callahan accepts Soule's analysis of the European scene 
without reservation. In his view, Soule judged the motives 
and policies of the Great Powers accurately; hence, Marcy 
was correct to act upon Soule's recommendations. While 
Learned agrees that Soul&'s dispatches influenced Marcy, 
he adds that the minister’s view of European affairs was 
clouded by a profound prejudice. Soule held strong 
opinions regarding Cuba, slavery, and the empire of Louis 
Napoleon which should have precluded his appointment. A 
native Frenchman expelled from his home country during 
the eighteen-twenties for revolutionary activities, Soule 
eventually settled in New Orleans. The mercurial Latin 
rose swiftly in Louisiana politics, and reached the United 
States Senate in 1847. Learned stresses that in the 
process, Soule became a loyal advocate of the slavocracy, 
and concurrently, the acquisition of Cuba. His appointment
21Learned, ’’Marcy," in ibid. , Vol. VI, pp. 184-185.
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to the Madrid post was solely political.22
The policy of watchful waiting ended in April of 
1854. At that time, Learned writes, "the administration, 
acting through Marcy, advocated a definite change of 
policy. . .it was decided to recur to the project of 
trying to purchase Cuba from Spain." According to 
Learned, the affair of the Black Warrior had some influence 
in causing the shift of policy. That incident made it 
clear that for American relations with Cuba to stabilize, 
reform was necessary. But, he emphasizes that it is easy
to exaggerate "the affair of the Black Warrior as being
2 3the essential and impelling factor in the situation."
Also prominent in the Secretary's mind at the time,
Learned writes, "was the idea that England and France 
together might be involved in instigating Spanish insolence 
towards the United States," Not surprisingly, the man 
behind Marcy's thinking was Soule. Just prior to the 
Black Warrior crisis, Learned points out, Soule had inti­
mated to Marcy that Spain, because of domestic problems, 
might be receptive to a transfer of Cuba to the United 
States. Accepting Soule's recommendations, Marcy author­
ized the minister to negotiate for the purchase of Cuba.
22Ibid. , pp. 176-177.
23Ibid. , pp. 187-188.
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But of far greater significance, Learned continues, Marcy
also instructed Soule that if Spain proved unreceptive
to an offer, "'you will then direct your efforts to the
next most desirable object, which is to detach that
island from the Spanish dominion and from all dependence
24on any European power.'" The ambiguity of the phrase 
"to detach" did not escape Learned; it is his view that 
it caused Soule "to advance blunderingly ahead for 
several more months."2  ̂ Unlike Callahan, and also Webster, 
both of whom find little fault in Marcy's diplomacy,
Learned assigns to him the responsibility for what trans­
pired at Ostend and Aix-la-Chapelle.
A further motive behind the authorization o„f the 
ministerial conference, according to Learned, was Marcy's 
distrust of France. Neglecting to explain why, Learned 
notes that Marcy doubted Britain would oppose the cession 
of Cuba to the United States, but was uncertain as to the 
Cuban policy of Louis Napoleon. With the hope of obtain­
ing more information regarding French policy, Marcy suggested 
in his pre-conference instructions that "the French govern­
ment, less responsible to public opinion than that of 
England, and unchecked by an effective parliamentary
24Ibid., pp. 191-193.
25Ibid., p. 203.
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influence, had 'already indicated a tendency to intermeddle 
in the affairs of the American Government.'"26 In this 
respect, Learned corroborates White; after the pathetic 
failure of the Second Republic, and the subsequent rise 
of Louis Napoleon, Americans viewed France as governed 
by an autocratic and reactionary emperor hostile to the 
cause of republicanism.
When the three ministers met at Ostend, their primary 
mission was to suggest alternative approaches to the 
Black Warrior negotiations--or so Marcy believed.
Learned claims, however, that because of the ambiguity of 
the word "detach" in Marcy's April instructions to Soule, 
the conferring ministers endorsed what appeared to be a 
forcible acquisition of Cuba.2^
The Ostend dispatch arrived in Washington on Novem­
ber 4, 1854. For nine days, Pierce and his cabinet con­
sidered its recommendations. According to Learned, their 
eventual decision amounted "to a sharp repudiation of an 
ideal which went back in origin to the notable letter of 
April 3, 18 54," in which Marcy had instructed Soule to 
seek "to detach" Cuba from Spain if the purchase negotia­
tions failed. Regarding the portion of the report which 
could be construed as an endorsement of force, Marcy
26Ibid. , p. 202.
^ Ibid. , p. 193.
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"declined to admit any such inference, as wholly unwar­
ranted." Marcy then informed Soule, Learned adds, that 
conditions in Cuba presented little menace to the United 
States; existing problems could be eliminated through 
discreet negotiation.28
The reasons behind the decision to disavow the 
Ostend Manifesto is a troublesome subject for historians. 
Learned asserts that the reply "looks very much like a 
mode of helping the Pierce administration out of confusion." 
Lacking a more precise interpretation, Learned offers the 
following:
Obviously, there was no man able or strong 
enough to guide this particular phase of our 
foreign affairs in a straight-forward and 
high-minded way. Politics, sectional strife, 
and animosity over the domestic issue of 
slavery were at the bottom of the mismanage­
ment of the phase.
That such an explanation is disappointing, Learned concedes.
The historian, he writes, "must admit himself mystified,
regretful that there are no records of discussions in the
Cabinet over the momentous days from November 4 to 13.1,29
Despite his admission of a certain degree of ignorance,
Learned believes that domestic opinion led Marcy and
Pierce to reject the recommendations of the Ostend Manifesto.
28Ibid,, pp. 210-211.
29Ibid., pp. 211, 216.
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He found no solid evidence to support the claim that Anglo- 
French protests were a factor. In this respect, he is in 
basic agreement with Callahan.
In his authoritative biography of Pierce, Roy F. 
Nichols suggests an alternative explanation for the 
decision to disavow the Ostend Manifesto. The Pierce 
administration, Nichols explains, grossly misjudged the 
European attitude toward the United States in general 
and Cuba in particular. When the Crimean War began in 
1854, it seemed to many Americans that the United States 
could acquire Cuba with impunity. Pierce and Marcy,
Nichols continues, relied on this when they authorized 
Soule, if Spain should refuse to sell, to work to "detach" 
Cuba from Spain. But the chance for success was dim. 
Nichols writes: "Neither Pierce nor his associates
comprehended the reputation which the United States had 
acquired in the European chancellories, nor what strong 
containing forces these antagonists could bring to bear
7(]upon the so-called "Manifest Destiny" of the republic."
It is significant that Nichols fails to define the
•^Nichols, Pierce, p. 347. The first edition of 
Nichol’s biography appeared in 1931. Although the author 
terms the second edition "completely revised," his inter­
pretations with respect to the Cuban matter remained 
basically unaltered. A.A. Ettinger, whose work on the 
Soule mission appeared in 1932, refers to Nichols often 
and reaches much the same conclusion.
-199-
"strong containing forces" that Britain and France could 
have used during the Crimean War to oppose the annexation 
of Cuba.
Nichols also points to other factors that contributed 
to the repudiation of the Ostend Manifesto and the censure 
of Soule. In the first place, Marcy's devotion to the 
expansionist mission had never equalled Pierce's. "Pierce 
had started out under the influence of Young America," 
Nichols writes, "but Marcy and experience had gradually 
been toning him down."3  ̂ Thus, by the time the Ostend 
dispatch reached the President's desk, caution prevailed 
over ambition and campaign promises. According to 
Nichols, the failure to keep the Ostend recommendations 
secret also persuaded Marcy and Pierce to retreat. The 
most widely read American journal in Europe, the New York 
Herald, had "announced that the three conferees had 
advised the government to declare, in effect, 'that our 
safety demanded and our interests required we purchase 
Cuba at once.'"32 Furthermore, Nichols agrees with 
Learned that the conferences at Ostend and Aix-la-Chapelle 
aroused the Pierce administration to fear the possible 
consequences in Europe if the Ostend report were accepted.
3-*-Ibid. , p. 330,
32Ibid., p. 360.
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All this, when combined with the recent Democratic set­
back at the polls, led to the denial that the United 
States might forcibly acquire Cuba, and to the censure 
of Soul^, thereby removing a prime irritant in American-
*Z TEuropean relations.
At this point, a short review is in order. In 
spite of his many faults, Callahan isolates a develop­
ment essential to an understanding of Franco-American 
relations regarding Cuba. He points out that the pres­
ence of French and British vessels in Cuban waters, 
followed by the tripartite proposal, made it necessary 
for Secretary Everett to either reject the proposition 
and assert the Monroe Doctrine, or to allow American 
predominance in the Western Hemisphere to wane. In 
Callahan's view, destiny had unmistakably allotted Cuba 
to the United States; only domestic turmoil prevented 
annexation during the Pierce administration. Fundamental 
to Callahan's interpretation is his assumption that at 
the first opportunity Britain and France eagerly rushed 
to aid Spanish rule in Cuba, intending also to thwart the 
natural expansion of the United States. None of the 
historians reviewed so far have challenged this assumption.
With the exception of Learned, historians have ignored
35Ibid., p. 368.
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the impact of Soule upon the Cuban policies of both 
France and the United States. That the provocative 
Soule might have offended the government of Louis 
Napoleon, causing Washington's Cuban policy to be viewed 
with suspicion, Callahan never suggests. Learned does 
make a point of Soule's personality, but his greatest 
contribution was made in his emphasis of the ambiguity 
of the phrase "to detach" Cuba. Like Callahan, Learned 
offers only a general explanation of the rejection of 
the Ostend Manifesto --domestic turmoil negated the 
possibility that Cuba could be acquired at that time.
But Learned also notes that the Cuban policy of France 
troubled Marcy, and that the Paris government was upset 
over the Ostend conference. Although Nichol,s also 
believes that domestic strife influenced the decision to 
postpone annexation, he further suggests that Anglo- 
French protests against annexation had an impact upon 
the Pierce administration.
One other aspect of Nichol's work deserves mention.
He devotes much effort to demonstrate the influence of 
the "Young America" movement upon American foreign policy. 
He claims that Pierce's espousal of the precepts of 
"Young America" caused the President to misjudge the 
attitudes of France and Britain towards an American 
acquisition of Cuba. A.A. Ettinger expands this idea,
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asserting that "Young America" did indeed have an impact 
upon the Cuban policy of the United States. In connec­
tion with this, Ettinger challenges Callahan's interpre­
tation of the intervention of France and Great Britain 
in Cuban affairs.
Unlike Callahan, Ettinger claims that Anglo-French 
naval activities around Cuba were not intended to be a 
barrier against American expansion. Ettinger stresses 
that Spain's plea for Anglo-French assistance had been 
rejected repeatedly since 1845. Until the last spectacular 
Lopez expedition in 1851, London and Paris had insisted 
that before they would intervene, Spain must agree to 
end the slave trade in Cuba. Only with reluctance did 
the two nations finally consent to defend Spanish rule 
in Cuba. Not without some difficulty, London and Paris 
reached an accord, which, in the aftermath of the Lopez 
debacle, "led directly to Anglo-French intervention in 
American-Spanish affairs, to the extent of issuing orders 
to their respective navies, as well as attempting direct 
diplomatic negotiations with the United States, on behalf 
of Spain.
When France and Britain determined to seek American 
acceptance of a mutual guarantee of Cuban status, Secre­
tary of State Webster, for reasons of health, delayed.
34Ettinger, Soule, pp. 26-33, 41.
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After further delay, Webster's successor, Everett,
issued his rejection of the plan, while incorporating
Cuba in the Monroe Doctrine. Everett's policy statement,
Ettinger asserts, most upset Sartiges, the French
ambassador to the United States. Seeking reassurance,
Sartiges went above Everett to the White House. But
President Fillmore reaffirmed Everett's stand, further
distressing the French envoy. Of this, Ettinger writes:
What the Frenchman most regretted was "the 
emphasis which President Fillmore placed on 
the necessity in which Spain may find itself 
of selling Cuba to the United States, and 
the declaration which he makes of the right, 
which the United States reserves to itself, 
of acquiring, by right of conquest, that 
island in the first war which arises between 
it and Spain."35
If the Cuban policy of a Whig administration so disturbed 
the French, then there can be little doubt regarding the 
Paris reaction to President Pierce's predilection for 
expansion and his appointment of "Young America" men to 
diplomatic posts.
Nichols points out that Pierce misjudged the European 
attitude toward an American acquisition of Cuba. Ettinger 
agrees, emphasizing Soule's appointment to Madrid as the 
outstanding example of Pierce's awkward handling of inter­
national affairs, Before his appointment, Soule had
55Ibid., pp. 81-83.
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demonstrated by a provocative speech on the Senate floor
that he lacked the essential quality of any diplomat--
namely, that one's public views be palatable to his
assigned government. In his oratory, the Louisiana
Democrat argued for the annexation, by whatever means
necessary, of Cuba. He further accused France and
Britain of plotting to prevent its consummation.
Naturally, the South and "Young America" rejoiced over
Soule's pronouncement. In Europe, however, opinion took
a different course. Ettinger writes:
. ■ . .abroad, these views met with a distinctly 
hostile reception. Soule's attacks on Great 
Britain and France, both for their tripartite 
proposals and as to their colonizing methods, 
made him persona non grata in London and Paris, 
while his pronounced annexationist views, 
together with his aludation of Lopez, earned 
him the hatred of Madrid and Havana, *6
But in the eyes of Europe, Soule's advocation of annexation
constituted only a part of his disagreeable nature.
Ettinger also emphasizes his identification with George N.
Sanders, spokesman for "Young America," as well as his
devotion to republicanism everywhere. He writes:
Soule's deep interest in the liberal movement 
in Europe, which had reached its zenith in the 
uprising of 1848, had been given full expression 
in his oratorical support of the French efforts 
of that year; and it was fostered by the sub­
sequent visits to the United States of Louis 
Kossuth. . . .Soul6 and Sanders. . .soon became 
the genii of the wing of the Democratic party
S^Ibid., p. 100.
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which, in 1852, was to prove a thorn in the 
flesh of the President in his Cabinet and 
diplomatic appointments, and which was known 
as ’’Young America"; its ideal of American 
geographical boundaries being once defined 
as "East by sunrise, West by sunset, North 
by the Artie Expedition, and South as far 
as we darn please!" This association, more 
perhaps than any other, colored Soule's 
concepts, due to its dual doctrine of 
encouraging European republicanism and 
asserting the American expansionist policy 
of manifest destiny in Cuba.37
It is little wonder, then, that Soule's appointment 
elicited protest from foreign ministers stationed in 
Washington, But of all, Ettinger notes, "the French 
were the most voluble."38
Both enroute to, and while at Madrid, Soule demon­
strated that his prejudice against European conservatism 
and his opinions regarding Cuba would continue unmitigated. 
It is Ettinger’s belief that Soule’s various activities 
did much to set French opinion against the United States,3® 
Although the Crimean War hindered the Anglo-French 
alliance from accomplishing all that it might have desired
3?Ibid,, pp. 118-119.
58Ibid., pp. 156-157.
3®0ne example of Soule’s conduct deserves notice. 
Before reaching Madrid, Soul£ stopped in Paris, On his 
own initiative, he attempted to persuade the Foreign 
Minister that France should desert her British ally.
Soule failed, and Marcy officially disavowed his actions, 
but not for the last time. Ibid., pp. 181-187, 198-199,
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to do for Spain, the two powers still found time to pro­
mote a settlement of the Black Warrior problem, and never 
did they abandon hope of preventing an American acquisi­
tion of Cuba. In agreement with Nichols, Ettinger asserts 
that Pierce and his advisors misjudged the European 
attitude toward the Cuban question. In spite of the 
numerous troubles in Europe, he writes, "it became clear 
that the three nations [France, Britain, and Spain] would 
present a united diplomatic front to the United States,"40
The increasing resentment felt by European govern-
/ments against the antics of Soule put Marcy in an untenable 
position. Like Learned, Ettinger notes the significance 
of the period between Marcy's instructions to Soule and 
his receipt of the Ostend report. During that period,
Marcy had not only become aware of an increasing hostility 
in Europe toward the United States, but he also had come 
to regret Soule's appointment. The Ostend dispatch merely 
forced the Secretary into a decision. Relying on Marcy's 
support because of his instruction to "detach" Cuba, if 
necessary, Soule "saw but one duty: the acquisition of 
Cuba, sans ethics, sans legality, sans expediency, sans 
anything," Ettinger further stresses the significance 
of SouTe's covering letter to the Ostend Manifesto, He
40Ibid., pp. 262-263.
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writes:
Soule was. . .the first to admit in official 
correspondence his frank willingness to fight 
to obtain Cuba, and he was quite convinced 
that a war with Spain would not draw Great 
Britain and France, for both would decline 
to interfere, the former because of Anglo- 
American trade, the latter on account of 
the Crimean War and European politics.41
But by November of 18 54, Marcy had become immune to Soule's
appraisals of European politics, however accurate they may
have been.
According to Ettinger, the repudiation of the "detach 
Cuba" clause of April is logical. As do Nichols and 
Learned, he points out that the expose by the Herald 
and the results of the November elections were two factors 
in the decision. But Ettinger continues, emphasizing also 
Marcy's disgust at Soule's revolutionary activities in 
Spain and free-lance behavior. Furthermore, the denial 
of the Ostend Manifesto, as well as the censure of Soule, 
"saved the United States from a conflict with an Anglo- 
French-Spanish alliance, the creation of which had been 
deterred by Spain's stubborn refusal to enforce her anti- 
slavery trade treaties, and by the Crimean War." While 
Nichols only intimates this, Ettinger is quite explicit.42 
In support of this last assertion, Ettinger notes
43-Ibid., p. 369.
42Ibid., pp. 381, 501.
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the reaction of the French minister, Sartiges, to the
repudiation of the Ostend Manifesto. He writes:
This brilliant representative of France saw 
clearly the fact that Pierce and Marcy were 
’’brusquely abandoning their agents after 
having authorized them to proceed," and he 
clearly understood the implied doctrine of 
seizure, and Marcy’s resultant embarrassment 
which led him to disavow Soule.43
Ettinger concludes that the decision to repudiate the
Ostend Manifesto and to censure Soule acted as a slave
on Franco-American relations.
Basil Rauch repeats the emphasis given by Nichols
and Ettinger to "Young America" as a significant factor
in European-American relations regarding Cuba. But unlike
Ettinger, Rauch believes that the boisterous movement had
a definite impact upon American foreign policy even before
the election of Pierce. The professed goals of "Young
America" did not go unnoticed in Europe; hence, Rauch
suggests that the clamor for the annexation of Cuba by
Fillmore's opponents contributed to the Anglo-French idea
to propose the tripartite plan. He writes:
The desire of American for Cuba was increasing 
while the popularity and strength of the ad­
ministration and the Whig party waned. Plans 
for new filibuster expeditions became secondary 
only to the "Young America" fervor to secure 
in the 1852 election a new administration that 
would annex Cuba. Spain anxiously sought aid
43Ibid., p. 396.
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in preserving her island against the expan­
sionist opponents of the Fillmore adminis­
tration. Rebuffed in her latest attempts 
to ally France and Britain to her Cuban 
interest, she could only await the outcome 
of British and French efforts to commit the 
United States, through the anti-expansionist 
Fillmore administration, to a renunciation 
of future possession of the island,44
When Everett rejected the Anglo-French proposal and re­
asserted American predominance in the Caribbean, Paris 
and London were disappointed; still, they remained firm 
in their determination to prevent an American acquisition 
of Cuba. During the height of the pre-inaugural debate 
on Cuba, Fillmore sounded a timely warning that, Rauch 
claims, became only too clear to Pierce and his advisors 
in late 1854. Fillmore, Rauch writes, "warned that 
annexation would. . .be a very hazardous measure. . . . 
The internationalism preached by Young American would 
combine all Europe against the United States."4'’ But 
that such a realization did indeed lead Pierce and Marcy 
to repudiate the Ostend Manifesto, Rauch never quite 
claims. Instead, he believes that Marcy’s use of the 
phrase "to detach" in his instructions to Soule was an 
oversight, and that the rejection of the Ostend dispatch 
corrected that error.4^
44Rauch, American Interest in Cuba, p. 173.
45Ibid., p. 239.
46Ibid., pp. 281-283.
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Although Nichols, Ettinger and Rauch all point to 
the influence of "Young America" upon European opinion, 
they fail to demonstrate conclusively that Anglo-French 
protests contributed to the repudiation of the Ostend 
Manifesto. Nichols and Ettinger mention that the Crimean 
War encouraged the Pierce administration, and especially 
Soule, to seek to acquire Cuba, but, at the same time, 
they seem to assume that France and Britain could have 
acted forcibly in both the Caribbean and the Black Sea.
On the one hand, they note the validity of Soule's belief 
that the time was right for the United States to acquire 
Cuba, and on the other hand, they assert that Marcy and 
Pierce could not ignore the possibility of European inter­
vention against annexation. This is a crucial weakness, 
and it has led one historian to revive Callahan's viewpoint 
that domestic strife defeated the expansionist yearnings 
of the Pierce administration.
In his study of divisive politics of the fifties,
Allen Nevins maintains that the furor over the Kansas- 
Nebraska legislation precluded the annexation of Cuba.
He asserts that the Pierce administration sought diversion 
from its domestic embarrassments in the Cuban venture, but 
adds that "an administration which blunders in home affairs 
is likely also to blunder in foreign affairs." Tracing 
the evolution of the Cuban policy of Pierce and Marcy,
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Nevins asserts that it was an exercise in futility. He 
writes:
. . ,in obedience to the rule that a precipitate 
temper always defeats itself, by its Kansas 
foray the Administration had gone far toward 
cancelling any Cuban venture. To millions of 
Northerners, slavery expansion on the breezy 
Western plains was bad enough without joining 
it to slavery expansion in the opulent 
Caribbean. . .after the fateful January of 
1854, an aggressive movement southward would 
utterly have wrecked the Democratic Party in 
the North, and divided the country into two 
mutually hostile halves.47
Nevins acknowledges that the activities of Soule and "Young
America," as well as the publication of the Ostend dispatch
offended Europe, but he hastens to add that the hottest
attacks came from the American freesoil press.48
Agreeing with Nevins, Marcy’s biographer, Ivor D.
Spencer, sheds some light on the internal politics of the
Pierce administration, Without Marcy’s knowledge, Spencer
notes, Pierce had indirectly hinted to Soule during the
Black Warrior negotiations "that he was about to abandon
Soule." But at the same time, Spencer adds, Marcy "was
as impotent as before." When the Ostend dispatch reached
Washington, Marcy finally regained control over the
diplomacy of the Pierce administration. Spencer asserts
^Allen Nevins, The Ordeal of the Union, Vol. II:
A House Divided (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), 
pp. 347-348.
48Ibid., pp. 362-363.
that the uproar caused by the publication of the Ostend 
recommendations had a profound influence on the Secre­
tary. He writes:
Marcy was deeply perturbed. While there was 
no thought of accepting the advice of the 
"Manifesto," its terms were soon known in 
substance to the press, bringing the admin­
istration in the public eye to its lowest 
point of its term.
As a result, Spencer concludes, "when the Cabinet debated
the recommendations from Ostend, . . .Marcy was able to
win a complete victory." Through Marcy's efforts, the
Ostend dispatch was repudiated and Soule was c e n s u r e d . ^9
Nowhere does Spencer claim that Anglo-French protests
prompted Marcy to disavow the Ostend dispatch.
In contrast to Nevins and Spencer, Henry Blumenthal
maintains that concern for foreign opinion played a most
vital role in the Cuban diplomacy of the United States.
His study is noteworthy in two ways: not only does he
reaffirm Ettinger's assertion that Everett's pronouncement
surprised especially the French, but he also places the
entire Cuban episode within the rivalry of international
politics. The tone of Everett's message, Blumenthal
writes,
49Spencer, The Victor and the Spoils, pp. 326-332.
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. . .surprised French statesmen as much as 
the refusal to underwrite the perpetual 
neutrality of Cuba. They saw in this 
immoderate interpretation of the Monroe Doc­
trine an attempt to substitute for general 
principles of international law an exclusively 
American law.50
As a result, France became determined to resist an Amer­
ican acquisition of Cuba.
When Marcy disavowed the Ostend dispatch, it was in 
recognition of French, and to some extent British, opposi­
tion to annexation. But preservation of the Cuban status 
quo was not without a price. Blumenthal writes:
Counting on time to remove European obstructions 
from the course of America's life-lines, Marcy 
yielded temporarily to superior force. But 
France and Britain had only won a Pyrrhic 
diplomatic victory, bought at the cost of 
America's growing mistrust of Europe.51
But what of the Crimean War? Blumenthal appears to assume
that, in spite of their European distractions, France and
Britain could have wielded a "superior force" to prevent
the annexation of Cuba. He also ignores the domestic
difficulties of the Pierce administration.
Clearly, the view that Anglo-French protests against
the Ostend recommendation that the United States could
justifiably "wrest" Cuba from Spain persuaded the Pierce
50Blumenthal, A Reappraisal, p. 56. 
53-Ibid. , p. 57,
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administration to postpone annexation is extremely weak. 
Blumenthal is the only historian to claim that the threat 
of European military intervention forced Pierce and 
Marcy to reject the Ostend Manifesto and to repudiate 
Soule. Nichols and Ettinger suggest that French and 
English opposition, stimulated by the activities of 
Soule, may have been a factor in the decision to disavow 
all intention of acquiring Cuba, but they fail to 
document this. In spite of its seventy years of existence, 
Callahan’s interpretation that the Kansas-Nebraska con­
troversy so weakened the country as to preclude any 
ambitious schemes abroad is still convincing, if not 
revealing, to the student of Franco-American relations.
And yet, in their attempts to discover the role played 
by France and Great Britain in the Cuban question, Learned, 
Nichols, Ettinger, and Rauch have shown that the Cuban 
diplomacy of the United States resulted in a deterioration 
of Franco-American relations. It cannot be denied that 
France--France and Louis Napoleon being one and the 
same--was deeply offended by the activities of "Young 
America." When the American government appointed men 
like Pierre Soule to official posts abroad, and they then 
proceeded to advance the cause of international republican­
ism, there is little doubt that Franco-American relations
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suffered. Unfortunately, by emphasizing the impact of 
the "Young America" spirit on Napoleon Ill's opinion 
of the United States, these historians are led to stress 
the role of France in Cuban affairs. Conspiciously 
absent in all of the authors reviewed is a detailed 
examination of the attitudes of Great Britain, without 
whom France could never effectively oppose American 
expansion. British policy with respect to Central Amer­
ica has been extensively and skillfully examined; a 
similar treatment of British policy with respect to Cuba 
during the fifties might shed much light upon Franco- 
American relations.
CHAPTER VII
FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
SANTO DOMINGO AND CENTRAL AMERICA
Although Cuba dominated the diplomacy of France and 
the United States in Latin America during the eighteen- 
fifties, a civil war in Santo Domingo and the question 
of a Central American canal route presented potential 
problems to policy-makers in Paris and Washington. It 
is true, however, that the Haitian-Dominican conflict, 
in spite of the vigorous competition among French, 
American, and British agents, did not become a crucial 
issue in Franco-American relations. It is also true that 
the quest for a canal route involved primarily England 
and the United States, Napoleon III remaining content 
that the British confront the republic. Nevertheless, 
these two issues are important to an understanding of 
Franco-American relations during the fifties. In both 
areas, France and the United States exhibited some of 
the same policy considerations that governed their actions 
in more spectacular controversies, such as Cuba and Texas. 
Moreover, it is precisely because the Haitian-Dominican
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struggle and the search for a canal route did not fire 
the passions of American public opinion that these two 
issues cast light upon the nature of Franco-American 
diplomatic relations.
A former French and Spanish colony, Santo Domingo 
attracted international attention in 1843, when white 
property owners revolted against their black Haitian 
governors and established the Dominican Republic on 
the eastern half of the island. Immediately, the Haitians 
set out to regain their lost territory and to reassert 
their dominion over the rebels. Fearing defeat by the 
numerically superior Haitians, the Dominican government 
turned for aid to France, which .had long been involved' 
in the affairs of the island and had once before defended 
the white population against a black uprising. Although, 
as Dexter Perkins writes, "the Dominican pear was ripe 
for assistance to supplement her colonial empire.
Nursing a dltente with Great Britain, Guizot feared that 
London would object to the establishment of any form of 
French colony in Santo Domingo. Also, the French minister 
could not ignore a large Haitian debt to France, which 
probably would be lost if Paris were to aid the Dominican 
government. Significantly, the Polk administration, 
occupied with continental expansion, remained silent
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toward Dominican affairs during the mid-forties.^
Through five years of sporadic but bloody warfare 
the Dominican Republic held on. But in 1848, following 
a series of defeats, a panic-stricken Dominican Congress 
renewed its plea for aid. Desperate, the Dominicans 
consulted not only French, but British and American 
agents as well. No longer could the United States ignore 
developments in the troubled island; inevitably, Santo 
Domingo became an issue in Franco-American relations.^
The historiography of Franco-American relations with 
respect to Santo Domingo centers around the unusual 
tripartite agreement of 1850. By that accord, the United 
States, in apparent violation of its doctrine of two 
spheres, agreed to cooperate with France and Great Britain 
in an effort to mediate the bitter civil, war. With the 
death in 1852 of its principal American advocate, Daniel 
Webster, the tripartite agreement ended in dismal failure. 
And with the inauguration of the Democratic Pierce in 
1853, American policy in Santo Domingo appeared to shift 
from cooperation with France and Britain to a pursuit of
^Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, p. 257; Sumner Welles, 
Naboth1s Vineyard: The Dominican Republic. 1844-1924 
(New York: Payson and Clarke, 1928), Vol. I, pp. 66-76.
^Charles Callan Tansill, The United States and Santo 
Domingo. 1793-1873 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1938), pp. 130-131; Welles, Naboth's Vineyard. I, p. 91.
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nationalistic goals. During Pierce's administration, 
Secretary of State Marcy sent General William L. Cazneau 
to Santo Domingo to offer recognition in return for the 
cession of a potential coaling station at Samana Bay.
The idea of an American protectorate over the vulnerable 
nation also received passing consideration. French and 
British representatives, however, successfully persuaded 
the Dominicans to avoid any quid pro quo agreement with 
the United States, and the Cazneau mission ended in 
failure.
The student of Franco-American relations with respect 
to Santo Domingo is confronted with three basic problems. 
First, it is a primary concern for historians to determine 
what factors prompted the Whig administration of Millard 
Fillmore to ignore established American foreign policy 
and to allow European powers to intervene in the internal 
affairs of an American state. The paradox is even more 
striking when one considers that the same administration 
which participated in a joint intervention in Santo 
Domingo refused to do so in Cuba. The second problem con­
cerns the Cazneau mission. Here, it is not so important 
for historians to determine what factors induced Pierce 
to seek an acquisition of territory in Santo Domingo-- 
his expansionist predilections have been outlined else­
where in this thesis--as to evaluate the impact of the
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attempt upon Franco-American relations. And because of 
the successful Anglo-French effort to frustrate the 
Cazneau mission, the historian is also confronted with 
the problem of French policy in the island and its 
effect upon American plans.
In an early review of Dominican-American relations, 
Mary Treudley offers disappointingly few answers to 
these questions. On one point, however, she is clear. 
She emphasizes that the initial American involvement in 
Dominican affairs came as a direct result of suspicion 
of French aims. Treudley notes that as the fortunes of 
war turned against the Dominican Republic in 1848, the 
United States began to realize the vulnerability of the 
youthful nation to European intervention. In 1849, 
Secretary of State Clayton dispatched Benjamin E. Green 
as a special agent to the besieged country. Green’s 
official mission was to determine the stability of the 
Dominican government in preparation for its recognition 
by the United States. Treudley asserts, however, that 
Green’s real purpose was to prevent the establishment of 
a French protectorate over the Dominican Republic. She 
concludes that on the eve of the tripartite pact, dis­
trust of the French involvement in Santo Domingo was a
determinant of American p o l i c y . ^
There can be little doubt that the deep French
involvement in Dominican affairs, when coupled with the
crisis of the civil war, gave Washington cause for
concern. As Treudley demonstrates, evidence of this
abounds in State Department correspondence. But what
influence did this have upon the American decision
to enter into the tripartite agreement? On this point,
Treudley is vague. She acknowledges that not only did
participation in the agreement conflict with traditional
American foreign policy, but also that Washington permitted
France and Britain to take the initiative. According to
Treudley, joint action seemed inevitable, for some manner
of intervention was deemed necessary to restore peace to
the troubled island. And if the racially embittered war
could be ended, the threat that France would utilize the
Dominican plight to acquire territorial concessions would
be diminished. She writes:
The American government seems to have been 
earnest in its desire to bring about peace 
in Santo Domingo in order to restore pros­
perity to the island and to lessen the danger 
of European intervention. That England and 
France were as desirous as the United States 
of an amicable settlement was considered false 
by the American agent [Green]. Both nations
3Mary Treudley, The United States and Santo Domingo. 
1789-1866 (Reprinted from The Journal of Race Development. 
Worcester, Mass., 1916), p. 236.
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had more to gain bv a continuance of disorder 
within the island.
This is plausible, but quite weak. Fundamental to 
Treudley's interpretation is her assumption that uni­
lateral American intervention would fail to end the 
Haitian-Dominican war. She merely states, without 
documentation, that the Fillmore administration regarded 
joint action as inevitable. And except for Green's 
dispatches, which alone are not sufficient, Treudley 
offers no evidence to support her claim that by consent­
ing to the tripartite plan the United States hoped to 
lessen the danger of European involvement in Santo Domingo.
Treudley is even more sketchy regarding the policy of 
the Pierce administration toward Dominican affairs. At no 
time does she attempt to assess the degree in which Pierce 
aspired to acquire Dominican territory. Hence, her 
assertion that French and British opposition frustrated 
the expansionist schemes of the United States in Santo 
Domingo is, in spite of its validity, quite weak. She 
merely concludes that "the American government was quite 
as unwilling as the Dominican to incur the hostility of 
the great European powers and so allowed itself to be 
blustered out of its plans by threats of force.
4Ibid., pp. 238-240.
^Ibid., pp. 244-252.
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In his history of the Dominican Republic, Sumner 
Welles rectifies some of Treudley's shortcomings.
Through extensive research into the Dominican archives, 
Welles offers a persuasive explanation for the decision 
of the Fillmore administration to enter into the 
tripartite pact.
Upon reading Treudley, one is led to the conclusion 
that the United States, suspicious of French intentions 
in Santo Domingo from the outset, agreed to the tripartite 
effort as a means of thwarting a possible French acquisi­
tion of the island. Although Welles agrees that rumors 
of French schemes stimulated American interest in Santo 
Domingo, he is quick to note that Washington received 
reassurance from Paris that the desires of its agents to 
acquire Dominican territory were unsanctioned. True, 
the Dominican Congress in 1849 passed a resolution request­
ing France to accept a protectorate. But to the dismay of 
the ambitious French representatives, Paris disavowed any 
intention of accepting the p r o p o s a l .  ̂ The Dominican govern­
ment, hinting at the possibility of annexation to the 
United States, then turned to the newly arrived Green.
Since he had no authority to accept such an offer, Green 
could give the Dominicans no encouragement. He told the
^Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, I, pp. 78-91.
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Dominican government that the United States preferred the 
country to remain independent, urging that they seek 
American recognition by treaty. Disappointed, the 
Dominicans again turned to France. Learning of this,
Green sought out the French consul, who informed him 
that the Paris government had refused to accept a 
protectorate over the Dominican Republic. Thus assured, 
Green proceeded to present his credentials and began 
negotiations for recognition.
It should be noted here that later historians have 
confirmed Welles's claim that the United States had little 
reason to fear that France would acquire Dominican terri­
tory. Dexter Perkins, the preeminent student of the 
Monroe Doctrine, agrees with Welles that French agents 
in Santo Domingo negotiated with the Dominican government 
for concessions in the hope that Paris would consent. 
Perkins adds that there was even some annexationist 
propaganda in France itself. But, he writes, "at no 
time were the responsible authorities at the Quad d'Orsay 
anxious to add the Dominican Republic to the French 
colonial responsibilities."^
7Ibid., pp. 100-102.
^Perkins, Monroe Doctrine. p. 254. Other histor­
ians who have noted the reluctance of the French govern­
ment to acquire Dominican territory are Tansill, United 
States and Santo Domingo. pp. 130-131, 133; Rayford W. 
Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States 
with Haiti, 1776-1891 (Chapel Hill: University of North
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According to Welles, the primary goal of American 
policy in Santo Domingo was to insure the independence 
of the Dominican Republic, It is his belief that this 
consideration prompted the Fillmore administration to 
accede to joint mediation. Because of the legitimate 
i n t e r e s t s  of France and Great Britain in Santo Domingo, 
Welles states, Secretary of State Webster concluded 
that the only means of securing Dominican independence 
lay in cooperating with the two in joint mediation.®
The tripartite agreement remained in force for two 
rather disappointing years. It is not without some 
regret that Welles notes the ending of that effort.
With Webster’s death and the shifts in American 
diplomacy caused by the demands of domestic politics, 
Welles asserts that the honorable policy of "disinterested 
assistance" in Dominican affairs was cast aside. In 
its place, the Pierce administration sought to acquire 
Samana Bay and even considered the annexation of the 
entire Dominican Republic. But due to the efforts of 
French and British representatives, this "Manifest
Carolina Press, 1941), pp. 245-246; Ludwell Lee Montague, 
Haiti and the United States. 1714-1958 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1940), pp. 57-58; Blumenthal, A 
Reappraisal. p. 49.
®Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, I, pp. 107-108.
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Destiny" impulse of the United States suffered a setback.1® 
In contrast to his earlier work, Welles provides little 
documentation for this claim. Like Treudley, he fails 
to define the extent of Pierce's commitment to expansion 
in Santo Domingo. It is also significant that Welles 
later became the foremost advocate of the "Good Neighbor" 
principle, declaring that noninterference and equality 
should be the keystones of Washington's Latin American 
policy.11 Writing on the policies of the Pierce admin­
istration in Santo Domingo, then, Welles uses the term 
"Manifest Destiny," with all of its imperialistic implica­
tions, to describe an unde ined and undocumented yearning 
for Dominican territory. Subsequent authors have taken 
Welles to task on this issue, suggesting that in effect 
the Dominican policy of the Pierce administration differed 
little from that of the Fillmore administration.1^
As a student of the Monroe Doctrine, Perkins takes a 
special interest in the Haitian-Dominican conflict. As
10Ibid., pp. 140-153.
11While Under Secretary of State during the adminis­
tration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Welles was a firm 
believer in mutual cooperation between the United States 
and the countries of Central and South America. See his 
article, "New Era in Pan-American Relations," Foreign 
Affairs, XV (April, 1937), pp. 448-449.
l^See Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp. 272-274; Tansill, 
United States and Santo Domingo. pp. 135-136.
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noted earlier, he agrees with Welles that although the 
plight of the Dominican Republic presented an opportunity 
to France for expansion, the French government refused 
to sanction such an endeavor. Perkins emphasizes, how­
ever, that American insistence that France respect the 
Monroe Doctrine did not contribute to the reluctance of 
the Guizot ministry to add part of all of the Dominican 
Republic to its colonial possessions. Rather, Guizot, 
fearful of alienating Great Britain and worried that the 
Haitians would refuse to pay their debt, instructed the 
French consul-general that France would not accept a 
protectorate. Neither in 1844 nor in 1849, Perkins 
concludes, did the attitudes of Washington have much 
influence on French policy in Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic.^
Like Welles, Perkins asserts that the Fillmore ad­
ministration sought only to secure the independence of 
the Dominican Republic, and for that reason it did not 
object to the efforts of Britain and France to end the 
civil war. During the existence of the tripartite 
agreement, for example, the representatives of France 
and England, "by virtue of a threat of blockade. . . 
extracted from the Haitian potentate the promise of a
13Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp. 254-261.
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truce for one year." Obviously, the Fillmore adminis­
tration did not interpret the Monroe Doctrine as a blanket 
embargo on all European involvement in the New World. 
Perkins writes: "The complacency, therefore, with which
the Whig administration not only looked on, but encouraged, 
the action of France and Great Britain in Santo Domingo, 
shows how little devoted it was, in any abstract sense, 
to the principles of 1 8 2 3 ."-^
But it can hardly come as a surprise that a Whig 
administration would be circumspect in its conduct of 
foreign affairs, and avoid the application of a general 
principle to a specific case. And although, as Perkins 
notes, the policies pursued by France and Great Britain 
in. Santo Domingo were in clear violation of the Polk 
Doctrine, the Democratic Pierce administration did little 
about it. Granted, it did not adopt the cooperative 
spirit that prevailed during the Fillmore administration. 
Perkins states that the newly elected Pierce administra­
tion "proceeded to interest itself without delay in the 
question of Santo Domingo." Appointed early in 1854, 
Cazneau was instructed to offer recognition in return 
for Samana Bay. The Dominican government eagerly accepted 
the offer and a draft treaty, providing for the cession of 
Saman^i Bay, was drawn up. At this point, however, the
l^Ibid., pp. 266-267.
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French and British ministers in the island became alarmed 
and persuaded the Dominican president to revoke the pro­
vision dealing with the bay. The ministers reminded 
President Pedro Santana, Perkins writes, that France 
and Britain "had extended their protection to the 
Dominican government,. They could do so no longer if 
the republic were to subinfeudate itself to the United 
States.” Although Cazneau warned the French and British 
representatives that they had violated the Monroe Doctrine, 
Perkins concludes that Washington accepted the defeat 
without protest and officially rebuked Cazneau.^
In their attitudes toward the application of the 
Monroe Doctrine to European intervention in Santo Domingo, 
then, Perkins sees little real difference between the 
Fillmore and Pierce administrations. Although one sought 
to bring about peace in the island through tripartite 
mediation, and the other sought to strengthen the 
Dominican Republic through a reciprocal treaty, neither 
objected to French and British involvement in the affairs 
of Santo Domingo.
There is one drawback, however, to the Perkins 
interpretation. Because no American government, from 
Polk to Pierce, ever voiced an objection to European
ISlbid.t pp. 267-273.
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intervention in Santo Domingo, he suggests that the
Monroe Doctrine was ignored. Charles Callan Tansill
disagrees. In his opinion, the American governments
from 1849 to 1860 patiently sought to realize the
ultimate goal of the Monroe Doctrine. He asserts:
From the American point of view the situation 
in the Caribbean was seriously involved. In 
accordance with the Monroe Doctrine it was the 
desire of the American Government constantly 
to diminish European control and steadily to 
magnify American influence in that r e g i o n .16
According to Tansill, there was one constant that 
guided the relations of the United States with France in 
Santo Domingo--namely, the destiny of Samana Bay. As he 
demonstrates from some original research in the diplomatic 
correspondence of Secretary Clayton, even the Whiggish 
Taylor administration harbored a desire to acquire Samana 
Bay. Acting upon reports that the Dominican government 
had offered to cede the bay to the French in return for 
protection against the Haitians, Clayton sent new instruc­
tions to Green. "From the tenor of these instructions," 
Tansill writes, "it is evident that Green was not only 
entrusted with the duty of defeating foreign schemes for 
securing Samana Bay but was further expected to prepare 
the Dominican Government to cede this very bay to the
l^Tansill, United States and Santo Domingo, p. 135.
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United States.” But the Dominicans offered annexation 
instead, and Green, for the want of specific instructions 
on that subject, could only suggest negotiations in 
preparation for recognition. Whereupon the Dominican 
government, Tansill continues, addressed identical notes 
to the representatives of France, the United States, and 
Great Britain, requesting joint mediation. "The matter 
thus became an international affair,” Tansill concludes, 
"and for the next two years these three powers exacted 
pressure upon the emperor of Haiti in favor of a con­
ciliatory policy towards the Dominican Republic.
With the abandonment, for various reasons, of the 
effort at joint mediation in 1852, Tansill asserts that 
the policies of France and the United States returned to 
competition for concessions. During the short tenure of 
Edward Everett as Secretary of State, and throughout the 
Pierce administration, rumors of French intrigues were 
rife. Tansill acknowledges that the French foreign office 
assured Minister William Rives "that the rumored occupa­
tion of Samana Bay by a French squadron was nothing more 
than a fable from begining to end.” Still, the United 
States could not afford to ignore the French presence in 
Santo Domingo and, during the Pierce administration,
l?lbid., pp. 133-136.
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resumed negotiations with the Dominican government for a
reciprocal commercial treaty. Like Perkins, Tansill
believes that Washington's attempt to enhance the
American position in Santo Domingo through a favorable
trade agreement with the Dominican government might have
succeeded had it not.aspired to acquire Samana Bay. In
any case, the opposition of the French and British
representatives proved effective. In the aftermath of
the furor over the Ostend Manifesto, along with the
domestic unrest stirred by the Kansas-Nebraska debates,
the Pierce administration, Tansill writes, had no desire
"to adopt an aggressive policy that would again invite
18the sharp opposition of the European powers."
In Tansill's view, the basic consideration that 
governed American policy in Santo Domingo from 1849 on 
did not betray the ideal of the Monroe Doctrine. The 
various administrations of the United States, in spite 
of repeated French denials of any intention of acquiring 
Dominican territory, distrusted the French involvement in 
that besieged country and consistently sought to lessen 
it. Suspicion that the Dominicans might cede Samana Bay 
to the French in return for assistance led the Democratic 
Marcy to attempt to acquire that bay in return for
18Ibid., pp. 172-175, 202-204.
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recognition of the Dominican Republic. Nevertheless, 
Tansill agrees with Perkins that the United States, unable 
to pursue an aggressive policy in Santo Domingo, had 
little real impact upon affairs in that island. Since 
the tripartite idea had originated in the Dominican 
Republic, the United States could do little else but 
agree. To be sure, the tripartite plan was perhaps less 
offensive to the sensibilities of the Whig Fillmore 
administration than to its successor. Yet, as Treudley 
and Welles have suggested, even the Democratic Pierce 
administration witnessed without objection the defeat 
of its Dominican policy by French and British agents. 
Perkins and Tansill, through their more extensive re­
searches, substantiate this.
That even the expansionist Pierce administration 
had relatively little influence in Dominican affairs is 
reaffirmed by the works of three later historians.
Writing on Haitian-American relations, Ludwell Lee Montague 
outlines the nature of Anglo-French opposition to the 
signing of a treaty between the United States and Santo 
Domingo in which Samana Bay would be included:
Anglo-French propaganda to the effect that the 
United States would seize the country, thrust 
the natives aside, and enslave the blacks, 
created an uproar among the Dominicans; direct 
Anglo-French menaces persuaded their Congress
-234-
to reject not only the least [of Samana Bay] 
but also a commercial treaty that would have 
embodied recognition.19
In a similar vein, Rayford W, Logan notes that even
during the tripartite mediation Paris was convinced that
the United States would seek to acquire territory in Santo
Domingo, and for that reason hoped to commit the United
2 0States to a recognition of the independence of Haiti.
In his survey of Franco-American relations, Henry Blumen- 
thal suggests another factor aside from Anglo-French 
opposition that contributed to the defeat of the Dominican 
policy of the Pierce administration. Had it not been for 
certain clauses in the proposed treaty involving racial 
discrimination inimical to the interests of the Dominicans, 
Blumenthal explains, the Pierce administration could have 
acquired Samana Bay in 1854, Still, Blumenthal does 
acknowledge that throughout the fifties the United States 
and France continued to compete for Samana Bay, while 
Great Britain maneuvered to prevent either from acquiring 
it, 21
At first glance, it would appear that several inter­
pretations of American policy toward the French involvement
19Montague, Haiti and the United States, p. 60,
? n*uLogan, Diplomatic Relations of the United States 
with Haiti, pp. 260-261.
^Blumenthal, A Reappraisal, pp. 48-49.
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in Santo Domingo have been offered. According to Treudley, 
the United States strongly suspected that France would 
capitalize upon the Haitian-Dominican conflict to supple­
ment her colonial empire. In her view, Washington con­
sented to participate in the tripartite pact in order to 
bring about peace in Santo Domingo, thereby lessening 
the danger of European intervention. Welles, however, 
notes that the United States had ample knowledge of the 
reluctance of the Paris government to pursue an aggres­
sive policy in Santo Domingo. It is his belief that the 
United States, until 1853, was committed to the honorable 
policy of securing the independence of the Dominican 
Republic, and since France and Britain had legitimate 
interests in Dominican affairs, Webster rightly agreed 
to tripartite mediation, But both Treudley and Welles 
see a contrast between the Dominican policy of the Taylor 
and Fillmore administrations on one hand, and that of the 
Pierce administration on the other. They intimate that 
after 18 53, Franco-American relations deteriorated over 
the Dominican issue. Yet, as Perkins demonstrates, 
neither the Taylor, the Fillmore, nor the Pierce adminis­
trations saw fit to apply the Monroe Doctrine to Santo 
Domingo. Tansill has pursued this point, asserting that, 
in effect, American Dominican policy from 1849 to 1860 
was consistent. He interprets the American desire to
-236-
acquire Samana Bay and to attain a commercial treaty with 
the Dominican Republic as a patient, restrained effort 
to lessen European influence in the island. That his 
policy received a setback in the mid-fifties was reflec­
tive of the inability of the United States to control 
affairs in Santo Domingo without a determined interven­
tion. Even the militant Pierce administration accepted 
this, and voiced no objection to the defeat of its 
Dominican plans. As a result, Santo Domingo failed to 
become a serious issue in Franco-American relations.
Because Great Britain dominated the concerns of 
American policy-makers with respect to a Central American 
canal route, that issue also had little impact upon 
Franco-American relations. But this does not mean that 
France ignored developments in Central America. Several 
authors have stressed that both Guizot and Louis Napoleon 
were not averse to the possibility that France might play 
a role in the realization of such a canal.22 Lewis 
Einstein has demonstrated, however, that the United States 
had no reason to fear the prospect of French involvement 
in the quest for a canal route. France had assured
22See Perkins, Monroe Doctrine. p. 159; Gerstle 
Mack, The Land Divided: A History of the Panama Canal 
and Other Isthmian Canal Proiects. (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1944), pp. 178-179.
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Washington, Einstein notes, that it had no designs on 
Central America. During the fifties, Paris remained 
true to this promise, totally refraining from any inter­
ference ,23
The one blemish on this record of noninvolvement
occurred in 1855, One Felix Belly, a French journalist
much intrigued by the idea of a canal route, at first
verbally, then by a filibuster to Central America,
challenged the Monroe Doctrine. But Dexter Perkins
points out that the French government had nothing to do
with M. Belly's extraordinary activites. The United States
remained unconcerned; events in Central America did no
24harm to Franco-American relations.
The basic consideration behind French policy towards 
a Central American canal route is best explained by Henry 
Blumenthal. Because the taming of America's "Manifest 
Destiny" spirit had been an aim of French policy since 
the forties, France welcomed the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
The United States had acknowledged the legitimacy of the 
British presence in Central America; France could gain 
nothing by intervention, Blumenthal c o n c l u d e s . 2 5
23Einstein, "Cass," in Bemis, Vol. VI, p. 353.
24perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp. 245-247. For a 
review of Belly's activities, see Cyril Allen, "Felix 
Belly: Nicaraguan Canal Promoter," Hispanic American 
Historical Review, XXXVII (February, 1957) , pp. 46-59.
25’Biumenthal, 4  Reappraisal. p. 59. See also 
Hamilton, Tpvlor, Vol. II, p. 374,
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One student o£ French interest in the Caribbean 
area, however, doubts whether Louis Napoleon ever aban­
doned his long-held desire to build a canal across 
Central America. W. Adolphe Roberts suggests that the 
French emperor resorted to an indirect means to fulfill 
his dream. According to Roberts, Napoleon's ill-fated 
adventure in Mexico during the sixties stemmed from a 
passion not only to control that country and establish 
a Catholic monarchy, but also to construct a canal at 
the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the Nicaragua depression, 
or the Isthmus of Panama.^ Roberts fails to fully 
substantiate this claim, but that Louis Napoleon's 
diplomacy in Mexico was not unrelated to his overall 
attitude towards the New World cannot be doubted.
Although neither Santo Domingo nor the Canal ques­
tion became crucial to Franco-American relations, the 
policy of France in the Dominican Republic, as well as 
the sentiment of Louis Napoleon with respect to a Central 
American canal make it clear that the interests of France 
in the New World were at odds with the Monroe Doctrine. 
But Cuba was the focus of the "Manifest Destiny" doctrine 
during the fifties; neither the Fillmore nor the Pierce 
administrations viewed Anglo-French involvement in Santo 
Domingo and Central America as inimical to the interest 
of the United States,
Adolphe Roberts, The French in the West Indies 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill C o ~  1947), p. 253.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
In any historiographical study, one can pursue two 
themes. The first concerns the research of the historians 
under discussion. Obviously, the writing of history is a 
cumulative process. Either previously untouched sources 
are used to support a new interpretation, or well-known 
sources are analyzed anew, causing the historian to 
challenge an established viewpoint. Gradually, historical 
knowledge is altered. This process, although somewhat 
unappealing to the layman, is of interest to any serious 
student of history, and is a worthy goal of historio­
graphical study. But historiography can also be reviewed 
with another, perhaps more stimulating, goal in mind.
By analyzing the historiography of a subject, it is often 
possible to shed new light on that subject. If while in 
the process of an historiographical analysis one isolates 
the interpretation of a single historian, or of a "school" 
of historians, one can demonstrate the weaknesses or 
emphasize the strengths of that particular viewpoint. This 
serves both to elucidate a copfused subject, and to clear
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the path for a new interpretation. Granted, these two 
branches of historiographical research are related. For 
the sake of clarity, however, it is convenient to separate 
them here.
With respect to source material, historians of 
Franco-American relations from 1828 to 1860 have made 
a fairly consistent advance away from the polemics of 
American expansion. The dependence of earlier historians 
on the American accusations of European intrigue in the 
New World as proof of a foreign threat to the United 
States, for example, has been successfully challenged. 
Adams, Smith, and Rives were the first to explore foreign 
archives, and as a result they establish that Aberdeen's 
"Diplomatic Act" made no provisions for Anglo-French 
military intervention in Texas. The historians of the 
Lone Star Republic have further shown that the Texas 
leadership purposely aroused fears of European designs 
to encourage support for annexation in the United States. 
Likewise, Nasatir and Graebner demonstrate that France 
had little serious desire to acquire California and pre­
ferred an American to a British acquisition of the pro­
vince. As a result, the Guizot-Polk exchange has come 
into new focus. Merk redefines the meaning of Guizot's 
address and emphasizes the partisan background of Polk's 
declaration, reaffirming Reeves's earlier view that
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Polk was plotting to acquire California and that his 
speech was a campaign document.
A similar process has taken place in the histori­
ography of the Cuban and Hawaiian questions. In both 
cases, recent research into French archives proves that 
France, even though allied with Great Britain, had little 
intention of challenging the American acquisition of 
these insular domains. Although there is some specula­
tion that Anglo-French protests persuaded the Pierce 
administration to postpone the annexation of Cuba and 
Hawaii, this is undocumented and fails to take into 
account the Crimean War. But perhaps it is easy to over­
emphasize this process of historical evolution, for it 
is so basic to the principles of the writing of history. 
Also, it should be noted that one recent historian, 
Blumenthal, asserts that France and Britain forced the 
United States to accept the "realities of power politics" 
and drop the annexation of Cuba and Hawaii. Because this 
writer believes that a general frame of reference is 
essential for one to understand Franco-American relations 
from 1828 to 1860, the second goal of historiographical 
study is emphasized in this conclusion.
When trying to understand the diplomatic relations 
between two countries, one searches for constants, for 
predictable guidelines that influence policy decisions
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and give some meaning to international affairs. To be 
sure, individual governments may react differently to a 
principle of foreign policy, but it cannot be denied 
that within the relations of any two powers there are 
forces, however elusive and subtle, that consistently 
influence their policies with respect to each other.
In the case of France and the United States from 1828 
to 1860, any attempt at generalization is somewhat 
hazardous. For, as the historians of the Cuban question 
have demonstrated, domestic concerns can at times severely 
limit alternatives abroad. Nevertheless, one historian 
has suggested that Franco-American relations during the 
three decades prior to the American Civil War can be 
viewed through the perspective of the Monroe Doctrine.
It is the belief of Dexter Perkins that Monroe's 1823 
declaration defined a basic conflict between France and 
the United States that progressively deepened until 
Napoleon III undertook his ill-fated venture into Mexico. 
He writes:
In the struggle of the nineteenth century between 
democracy and older governmental forms, between 
the spirit of the Old World and the New, the 
decisive point, in a sense, is the begining of 
the decade of the sixties. In the period of 
sixty years since the begining of the century 
the democratic spirit had won as yet only partial 
and indecisive victories in Europe. In England 
the middle classes had been admitted to power by 
the Reform Bill of 1832; but in France the 
rising democratic tide, which engulfed the
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Orleans monarchy in 1848 and swept to power 
the republicans of that same year, soon 
ebbed again, and, using the mechanics of 
democracy to aid his rise to authority,
Louis Napoleon, half genius, half scheming 
politician, established a semi-authoritarian 
regime which for some years at least ex­
pressed largely his own will and purpose.
. . .The issue of the Civil War. . .gave 
opportunity for a European sovereign to offer 
a most serious challenge to the position of 
the United States in the Western Hemisphere.
The intervention of the French in Mexico is 
an episode of the first significance in the 
clash between the system of the Old World 
and the system of the New.l
Reviewing the historiography of Franco-American relations
from 1828 to 1860, this writer believes that Perkins's
emphasis on the ideological dichotomy between France and
the United States, defined by Monroe in 1823 and made
concrete by the expansionism of the forties and fifties,
is justified.
Most Americans reacted enthusiastically to the revolu­
tions of 1830 and 1848, interpreting them as inspired by 
the example of the American political system. But as 
Rhodes, White, Gazley, and Curti have shown, this initial 
euphoria soon vanished. The claims controversy dispelled 
any notion that the July Monarchy would seek to better 
relations with the United States, and the coup d*etat of 
Louis Napoleon reaffirmed American disillusionment with 
the Second Republic. Relations between the prevalent
^Perkins, History of the Monroe Doctrine, p. 108.
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governments of France and the United States, as Blumenthal 
and Remond suggest, were dominated by suspicion and ideo­
logical conflict.
But it was the expansion of the United States that 
made clear the conflict between the political sympathies 
of Louis Philippe and Louis Napoleon and the vigorous, 
self-confident republicanism of ante-bellum America.
True, the historians of American continental expansion 
have dismissed the idea that contemporary fear of French 
intervention in the New World warranted a forcible response. 
Furthermore, Merk, Graebner, and Sellers, in taking issue 
with Perkins’s interpretation of the Guizot-Polk exchange, 
have reaffirmed the earlier interpretation of Reeves that 
Polk's speech was intended primarily for domestic consump­
tion. Still, it i clear that Guizot’s desire to see a 
"balance of forces" in the New World conflicted, albeit 
symbolically, with Polk's use of the Monroe Doctrine to 
defend the American acquisition of California, Oregon, and 
Texas. And in spite of some ambiguity, caused no doubt 
by the domestic strife of the volatile fifties, the 
historians of the Hawaiian and Cuban questions also have 
demonstrated that the controversy over the annexation of 
these islands by the United States did contribute to the 
ideological gap between France and the United States.
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This is especially true with regard to the Cuban question, 
where the activities of the ’’Young America" movement so 
irritated Louis Napoleon.
Significantly, historians have clearly shown that 
only where the Monroe Doctrine, whether formally in the 
case of Polk in 1845 and Everett in 1852, or informally 
in the case of Tyler in 1843, was applied to an area and 
used to complement American expansionism did the ideological 
conflict between France and the United States become 
apparent. In Santo Domingo, where both France and Great 
Britain worked successfully to counter American attempts 
to acquire Samana Bay, the Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan 
administrations quietly accepted their defeat. Apparently, 
the destiny of the United States was not ’’manifest" in 
Santo Domingo; hence, the Monroe Doctrine was ignored.
The historiography of Franco-American relations from 
1828 to 1860 is sorely deficient in one respect. Only 
Henry Blumenthal has devoted an entire monograph to the 
subject. But Blumenthal’s work is disappointing. His 
evidence is often weak and it appears, especially with 
regard to Cuba, Hawaii, and Santo Domingo, that he ignores 
the findings of recent historians. The intent of his 
study is to dispel the belief that France and the United 
States enjoyed close ties, stemming from the Treaty of
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Alliance of 1778 and interrupted only briefly during 
the Maximilian episode. Although he demonstrates that 
France and the United States were far from allies during 
the years 1828-1860, Blumenthal fails to accomplish much 
more. A good many of Perkins's findings have been 
challenged, clearing the path for a serious, detailed 
reassessment. Blumenthal fails to fulfill this need.
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